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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
In considering 'The Decline of the British Film Industry, ' 
it is useful to identify six basic issues: 
1. the role of the British majors. 
2. the presence of the Hollywood majors in Britain. 
3. the film policy of British governments. 
4. the availability of finance for independent production. 
5. the nature of costs of production. 
6. the characteristics of British films as products. 
For the student of the industry, these are the perennial 
issues of concern. 
The nature of these factors is established in Chapter Two 
which is an introductory 'Overview' of the British film 
industry taking the form of a historical narrative 
concentrating on the twenty five years following the war. 
The essential decline of the industry can be observed 
within this period. In the 1940s, both the exhibition and the 
production of films in Britain were at their respective peaks. 
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These levels were rapidly eroded over the following two 
decades. 
Section 2.1 of the Overview considers demand in the cinema 
exhibition sector and the other sections of the chapter look at 
the output of the industry, the emergence of the British major 
studios - vertically integrated across exhibition, distribution 
and production sectors - and their subsequent decline, and the 
nature of British government film industry policy. 
Section 2.2 refers to the crucial role in the economics of 
the film industry in general of the distribution sector. Lack 
of access to distribution has been one of the 'Problems of the 
Industry, ' which are the subject of Chapter Three. Section 3.1 
includes a case study of Goldcrest which further emphasises the 
importance of distribution. 
The case study approach is employed frequently in Chapter 
Three. Section 3.2, for example, consists of a case study of 
the 'New Wave' of British film making of the late 1950s, and in 
Section 3.4 'Contemporary Case Studies' are adduced. 
Although the most basic observations about the industry are 
that it is permanently in a state of crisis and that each 
crisis is worse than the previous one, the case of the New Wave 
makes it clear that the concept 'British Film Industry' is not 
somehow a contradiction in terms. 
The Contemporary Case Studies identify the characteristics 
of costs of production and of film finance. The problems 
imposed on British film makers by cost and finance constraints 
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are explored through the medium of four recent British film 
projects. 
Information has been obtained through interviews with 
leading participants. And, more generally in the thesis, 
interviews have been a major part of the research method. A 
list of interviewees is on page 15. 
It must be noted that the interview method in research is 
an imperfect one. This is particularly so for film industry 
research where the quality of response is inhibited in some 
cases by the tendency of some practitioners to circumspection. 
Moreover, there are real limitations in terms of the 
availability of respondents for a historical area such as the 
rise and fall of the British majors. 
The British film industry is an area which is well known 
for its lack of statistical information. Sometimes it has been 
possible in writing this thesis to use data by adapting 
various existing sources, particularly Gifford's invaluable 
'British Film Catalogue, 1895 to 1985' (1986). 
Moreover, numerous compendious 'Film Guides' have been 
published following the original model of Halliwell (1977). 
Much data has been shaped from these guides generally, but 
Halliwell in its 8th. Edition (1991) carries the fullest 
production information. 
In some places, the data is entirely primary. For example, 
in section 3.1, which looks at the contemporary economic 
environment of the industry, table 2 examines the composition 
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of British output in 1987. This includes the costs of 
production of films. 
Although it has never been customary to publish data on 
costs of production, there used, more generally, to be a 
certain amount of statistical information concerning the film 
business published by the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Until February 1985, the DTI magazine 'British Business' 
('Trade and Industry' until 1979) published weekly 
registrations of British, European Community and foreign films; 
British Film Fund (or 'Eady Levy') distributions; and annual 
enquiries concerning Overseas Transactions in Films, as well as 
cinema admission statistics. Much of this DTI information is 
referred to in section 2.1 which deals with the question of the 
decline of the exhibition sector. 
In considering both section 2.3 - 'The Structure of the 
Industry' - in particular and, more generally, those issues 
noted above to be the subject matter of Chapters Two and Three, 
a picture of the market structure of the industry emerges. 
This picture is enlarged in section 3.3 which analyses 'The 
Performance of the Duopolists' and the reasons why Rank (the 
key British major studio) changed its position as a facilitator 
of a critical mass of British production in the 1940s to one 
where it would subsequently only foster a few one-off 
production companies. 
A wide range of other British studios is also considered 
and some interesting data concerning entry/exit and levels of 
activity have been evolved. 
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Section 3.5 uses the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
to draw conclusions in the area of the market structure of the 
industry and in terms of the first three of the six basic 
factors noted on page 6. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 each relate to an aspect of micro 
economic theory - market structure, the firm and product 
competition respectively. In each of these chapters, there is a 
review of relevant economic literature. For Chapter 3, this is 
included in section 3.5 where recent issues in the area of 
Structure-Conduct-Performance are considered. 
Literature concerning the firm and its growth is reviewed 
in section 4.5 of Chapter 4, while in section 5.5 there is a 
survey of the theory of product competition. 
Chapter 4 concerns various models of the firm and their 
application to the range of productive units which have 
comprised the British film industry. Aspects of finance and 
costs of production, points 4 and 5 of the basic factors noted 
on page 6, are considered. 
Section 4.1 deals with both corporate and project finance, 
and a number of interviews has been conducted with merchant 
bankers whose interests are in film finance, and with venture 
capitalists. The finance constraint is further revealed in 
section 4.2 dealing with finance and risk and showing the 
untenability of investment strategy in the absence of a British 
major studio. 
Chapter 4 also deals with the production process and with 
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the behaviour of costs of production. In the light of the low 
budget environment of British activity, the extent to which 
cost constraints make an impact on British producers is a 
further factor of relevance in the seemingly inevitable cycles 
of boom and bust of the British film firm. 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 consider these matters by looking at 
cost control. Analysis is facilitated by reference to a variety 
of British films of the second half of the nineteen eighties 
for which final cost statements have been forthcoming. These 
are considered in the light of cost surveys of the earlier 
post-war period. 4.5 deals with the economic theory of the 
firm, its growth, and the nature of the British film firm. 
The final point among the six key factors noted on page 6 
is examined in Chapter 5 which deals with the economics of 
product competition. It is observed that films compete chiefly 
through characteristics rather than price. Among questions 
which arise is whether the British film industry has been 
unable to compete effectively because of an inability to 
specialise in a product with purely cinematic attributes. 
5.1 looks at these issues, and in 5.2,5.3 and 5.4 analysis 
is facilitated by the clustering model of characteristics 
applied to British and Hollywood product. Primary data has been 
evolved with respect to a wide range of attributes of film 
products and this has enabled a useful analysis of the location 
in characteristics space of the often commercially unsuccessful 
output of the British industry relative to those products, 
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frequently American, which have dominated the box office. 
Conclusions in 5.5 follow a review of the economic literature 
of product competition. 
In the thesis generally, the well known lack of statistics 
on the industry has been further partially relieved by using 
and adaptating information carried in the following: 
(a) 'Screen International. ' 
Weekly production unit lists of theatrical (and television) 
films are published in this London trade paper giving: 
title, production company, senior personnel, crew, 
cast and dates, durations and places of studio and/or 
location shooting. 
It also publishes at the start of the year, summary tables 
of production on a quarterly basis for the previous year. This 
covers numbers of films, and breakdown by studio and location. 
This summary offers some budget information but carries a firm 
health warning as to its accuracy. 
(b) 'The Monthly Film Bulletin. ' 
The MFB of the British Film Institute has, for many years, 
given for every film at the time of its exhibition in the UK: 
nationality, censor certificate, production company, 
distributor, all personnel and original source of script. 
Moreover, a lengthy plot summary is a further valuable 
source of product characteristic information. 
Unfortunately, the BFI decided to discontinue the MFB as a 
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separate publication, and that this major reference work would 
be consigned to the back pages of its 'house journal' 'Sight 
and Sound'. The April 1991 edition was the last MFB; from May 
1991, 'Sight and Sound' has appeared monthly. 
(c) 'The BFI Film and Television Yearbook. ' 
This first appeared in 1983. It has published some rather 
erratic lists of feature film 'starts' for the previous year, 
sometimes indicating which starts are British made and financed 
and which are American productions in Britain. Another useful 
but irregular tabulation in the Yearbook is 'Finance For 
British Features' made during the previous year. ('The Screen 
International Yearbook' carries information on production 
starts similar to that in the BFI publication). 
(d) 'The Variety Annual. ' 
This is published in the weekly edition of 'Variety' in the 
first week of January and offers a 'Big Buck Scorecard, ' giving 
the estimated cost of production of the master negative and the 
North American rentals to date of 'megabuck' pictures, ie. any 
film costing at least $14m. 
These somewhat approximate figures are useful given the 
absence of other sources of cost data and relevant, not merely 
for comparative purposes, but because numerous 'megabuck' 
pictures were made in British studios. Finler's book, 'The 
Hollywood Story' (1988) has also been a useful source of 
American data. 
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(e) Others. 
In addition to the main sources, it has sometimes been 
profitable to consult among various other publications: 'Screen 
Digest' which has a 'Data Box' page offering a miscellany of 
statistics occasionally touching on British production, 'Screen 
Finance' and the 'Annual Report of the British Film and 
Television Producers' Association. 
Chapter 2 follows giving an introductory overview of the 
British film industry. 
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Interviews were conducted with the following: 
Steve Abbot of Prominent Studios. Executive Producer of 'A Fish 
Called Wanda. ' 
Tim Bevan and Graham Bradstreet of Working Title. Executive 
Producers of 'A World Apart. ' 
Andy Birchall of the late British Satellite Broadcasting. 
Tina Boyden of Barclays Bank, Soho Square. 
Richard Brook, Executive Producer, Screen One, BBC Television. 
John Chambers of World Film Services. 
Terence Davies, author of 'Distant Voices, Still Lives. ' 
Jake Eberts, founder of Goldcrest. 
Eban Foggitt of Screen Two, BBC Television. 
Jorges Gallegos of the British and Commonwealth Merchant Bank. 
Victor Glynn of Portman Productions, producer of 'High Hopes. ' 
John Heyman of World Film Services. 
Norma Heyman, Producer of 'Buster. ' 
Premilla Hoon of Guinness Mahon Merchant Bank. 
Cyril Howard, Managing Director of Pinewood Studios. 
Jennifer Howarth, Producer of 'Distant Voices, Still Lives. ' 
Caroline Jackson of the Film and Television Producers' 
Association. 
William Jackson of County Natwest Ventures. 
Maurice Landsberger, Secretary of the Guild of Film Production 
Accountants and Financial Administrators. 
Rodney Payne of Hill Samuel Merchant Bank. 
Nik Powell of Palace Pictures. 
David Puttnam, formerly Head of Columbia Pictures 
David Rose of Channel Four Television. 
Mark Shivas, Head of Drama, BBC Television. 
Faizal Syed, Associate of Merrill Lynch International, London. 
Charles Target of Alan Patricoff Venture Capitalists. 
Angela Topping, Deputy Head of Production, British Film 
Institute. 
Jean Young of the late Parkfield Entertainment. 
Colin Young, Director of the National Film and Television 
School, Beaconsfield. 
Robert Watts, Producer of the 'Indiana Jones' and 'Star Wars' 
cycles, and of 'Who Framed Roger Rabbit? ' 
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2.1 Demand Profile 
The 1984 White Paper 'Film Policy' estimated that the size 
of the British Film Industry was indicated by an annual 
turnover of something between £300 million and £400 million, 
and by industry employment in the region of 35,000. 
Of this total, employment in the production sector, 
including support facilities such as film processing, editing 
and dubbing, was about 25,000 in 1982. In exhibition, there 
were about 5,500 full-time jobs, plus a certain amount of part- 
time work. 
The three sectors were of fairly equal sizes if measured by 
turnover: in 1983, the gross box office receipts in exhibition 
were £125 million, while film production turnover was £140 
million, with distribution accounting for the remainder. 
Production turnover partly consisted of feature films (£70 
million), but it also included industrial and training films 
(£50 million) and advertising films (£20 million). 
These figures are located at the bottom of steep long-term 
downward trends. The rapid decline is illustrated by the fall 
in the number of long films (ie. those of over seventy two 
minutes duration) registered for exhibition in Britain from 350 
in 1955, of which about 80 were British productions, to 225 in 
1981, of which 32 were British. 
Within this declining total, British films fell by 60% in 
their absolute numbers in this period, but also lost relative 
share. However, as is shown by Table 7 on page 39, American 
-17- 
films in British exhibition fell by only about 32% in actual 
numbers and raised their relative share. 
The British cinema box office in this period underwent a 
fall of about 80% in gross receipts in real terms. It is 
proposed to look in some detail at the exhibition end of the 
industry for it is this sector which throws light directly onto 
the basic question of the demand for the industry's output. 
The White Paper mentioned above observed that 'Nowhere has 
the decline in cinema attendance been so steep and irreversible 
as in the UK'. As shown in Table 1 below, this decline was 
continuous over a forty year period from 1946 which was the 
overall peak year in British exhibition in terms of both the 
number of cinemas open (4,709) and the number of admissions 
(1,635 million). By 1987, the number of cinemas was down to 
1,200 and admissions had fallen to around 50 million, 3% of 
their 1946 level. 
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Table 1. 
CINEMAS, CINEMA GOING, and BOX OFFICE TAKINGS, 1945 to 1984. 
CINEMAS OPEN ADMISSIONS IN YEAR GROSS BOX OFFICE 
AT YEAR END. (millions). (£ millions). 
1945 4,703 1,585 114 
1946 4,709 1,635 118 
1947 4,709 1,462 105 
1948 4,694 1,514 109 
1949 4,671 1,430 103 
1950 4,660 1,396 105 
1951 4,624 1,365 108 
1952 4,609 1,312 110 
1953 4,542 1,285 109 
1954 4,509 1,276 110 
1955 4,483 1,182 106 
1956 4,349 1,101 104 
1957 4,102 915 93 
1958 3,864 755 83 
1959 3,414 581 67 
1960 3,034 501 64 
1961 2,711 449 60 
1962 2,421 395 57 
1963 2,181 357 55 
1964 2,057 343 57 
1965 1,971 328 62 
1966 1,847 289 59 
1967 1,736 265 58 
1968 1,631 237 58 
1969 1,581 215 58 
1970 1,529 193 59 
1971 1,482 176 60 
1972 1,450 157 59 
1973 1,530 134 58 
1974 1,535 138 69 
1975 1,576 124 76 
1976 1,562 107 79 
1977 1,547 108 90 
1978 1,563 127 119 
1979 1,582 112 127 
1980 1,574 102 143 
1981 1,528 88 142 
1982 1,439 65 116 
1983 1,303 64 122 
1984 1,233 53 103 
(Sources: 'Trade and Industry, ' 
'British Business' and 
'Annual Abstract of 
Statistics'. ) 
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The sharpness with which cinema admissions declined is a 
particularly British phenomenon. Table 2 shows that by 1981, 
the British exhibition sector had retained only about 7% of its 
1955 audience, whereas Western Europe as a whole still had 27% 
and the US 39%. 
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Table 2. 
CINEMA ADMISSIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN, USA and WESTERN EUROPE, 
1955 to 1981 (millions). 
Great Britain USA Western Europe 
1955 1,182 2,663 2,224 
1960 501 1,378 1,840 
1965 327 918 1,297 
1970 193 749 923 
1975 116 1,033 877 
1980 96 1,022 611 
1981 84 1,027 591 
(Source: MMC) 
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In Britain, real cinema admission prices have risen very 
substantially during the post war period. Table 3 shows average 
British admission prices rising to an index of 1,815 in 1981 
(1955 = 100), where the RPI rises to only 684. Such a sharp 
rise in the relative price of cinema going is emphasised if one 
notes that the lower levels of cinema admissions decline in the 
USA and Western Europe have been accompanied by admission price 
rises on a far smaller scale. For example, the 1984 White Paper 
noted that in the ten preceeding years, British cinema 
admission prices had risen by 312%, while in the USA in the 
same period, prices rose by only 70%. 
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Table 3. 
INDEX NUMBERS - GROSS BOX OFFICE TAKINGS, & THE PR ICE OF 
ADMISSIONS, 1955 to 1981. (* 1955 = 100) 
INDEX OF AVERAGE AD- INDEX OF RPI 
GROSS BOX MISSION AV. AD. 
OFFICE PRICE PRICE 
* (pence) 
1955 100 9.0 100 100 
1960 60 12.7 142 114 
1965 58 18.9 211 136 
1970 56 30.6 342 169 
1975 67 61.2 684 313 
1980 128 141.2 1,578 611 
1981 128 162.4 1,815 684 
(Source: MMC) 
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Television had an 
admissions. Over half 
lost between 1955 and 
(1962) looked at this 
admissions during the 
which was represented 
Table 4 shows som 
important role in the decline of 
the weekly average cinema attendance was 
1960 as can be seen in Table 1. Spraos 
then recent period, comparing the fall in 
1950s with the growth of television - 
by sales of television licences. 
e of the findings: during the 1950s 
literally hundreds of thousands of households each year were 
becoming television households for the first time. For example, 
while only 382,300 television licences had been sold throughout 
Britain up to 1950, by 1952 the figure was already over lZ 
million. It was more than 42 million by 1955, and over 102 
million by the end of the decade. 
Spraos found that it was in the second half of the decade 
in which the greatest damage was done to cinema admissions. As 
the last column of Table 4 shows, the estimated annual fall in 
admissions accounted for by each extra television licence sold 
was far higher in the second half of the decade, peaking at 
124.6 admissions lost per new television household in 1958. 
Cinema goers were most typically working class and 
relatively young and, while the early 1950s saw television 
acquisitions dominated by higher income groups, it was the 
latter part of the fifties which saw the typical working class 
family with children obtain its first television set. 
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Table 4. 
CINEMA ADMISSIONS & TELEVISION LICENCES IN BRITAIN. 1950s. 
FALL OF AD- TV LICENCES 
MISSIONS (thousands). 
SINCE PREY. 
YEAR 
(millions). 
1950 - 382.3 
1951 16.7 857.4 
1952 43.3 1,517.5 
1953 19.1 2,411.5 
1954 19.0 3,398.4 
1955 45.6 4,651.0 
1956 84.8 5,876.5 
1957 128.4 7,162.0 
1958 124.9 8,164.6 
1959 102.9 9,379.6 
1960 77.2 10,554.2 
GROWTH OF TV ANNUAL FALL 
LICENCES OF ADMISSION 
SINCE PREV. PER TV LICENCE 
YEAR (number). 
(thousands). 
475.1 35.2 
660.1 65.6 
894.0 21.4 
986.9 19.3 
1,252.6 36.4 
1,225.5 69.2 
1,285.5 99.9 
1,002.6 124.6 
1,215.0 84.7 
1,174.5 65.7 
(Source: Spraos, 1962) 
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Although the most obvious context for the rise of 
television is the loss of cinema admission, there is another - 
possibly compensating point - in the form of television as a 
source of demand for film industry product, ie. for films to be 
shown on television. 
The trend towards the showing of feature films on 
television began in the early 1960s, and, by 1983, the showing 
of films on the four British television stations had grown to 
at least 1,492 films for the year. (The exact number depends on 
which ITV region is taken. ) 
That traditional broadcast television - as opposed to video 
- is important as a source of demand is illustrated by the 
estimate of the White Paper in 1984 that it then represented 
four billion individual film viewings per year, roughly 70 per 
person per annum. Of course, much of this is accounted for by 
old, recycled films which has no effect on current industry 
activity, apart from the strictly negative one of keeping 
people out of cinemas while they watch television. 
In theory, there has been some measure of protection for 
the film industry in that a feature film could not be shown on 
television until five years had elapsed from the time of the 
film's initial cinema release. The trend for reduction in the 
time barrier began with Lew Grade in the late nineteen 
seventies. For some years at that time, Grade had a large scale 
programme for the making of films which would find their way 
onto television after three years. (Falk, 1987. ) 
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Critics of television's role have argued that, until 
recently, television has had the best of this world, living off 
the film industry rather than contributing strongly to it. When 
television has bought films from the film industry, the latter 
has complained, over many years, of the low returns they have 
been forced to accept from television. This, it is argued, has 
been the result of a restrictive practice carried out by the 
television companies which have colluded on buying. Such 
collusion has had the effect of holding prices down and, 
arguably, of discouraging production sector activity. 
The television buyers' rejoinder is that they HAVE paid 
fair prices because they have normally been forced to buy 
packages of film product which have invariably contained items 
which have been unpopular or generally unsuitable for broadcast 
-a form of a traditional restrictive practice in the film 
industry, block-booking. 
Whatever the truth of the matter, it is unfortunate that 
the television and film sectors in the UK during the entire 
period up to the nineteen eighties lacked any real symbiosis. 
The American position was that the major studios, at an early 
stage, incorporated television programming output into their 
overall strategies. By 1972, Universal's television output, for 
example, represented about a quarter of all networked 
television in the USA. 
In the UK, the BBC's position had been one of self- 
sufficiency, carrying an output of its own radio programmes so 
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that, when television took off, it was seen as little different 
from the wireless in the production context. And when British 
commercial television was born in the mid fifties, the various 
independent television stations needed to have good production 
facilities of their own in order to make plausible applications 
for franchises. 
Given its acquisition of the ABC TV franchise in the mid 
fifties, ABPC, as is discussed in section 3.3, did emerge as a 
potential model of a fully integrated film company in the 
television era. However, any consolidation attained in this way 
was to lack the same stability after ABPC's absorbtion into 
EMI. In this era, ABPC went from vertical integration to 
virtual disintegration. 
Returning to the decline in post-war cinema attendance, 
there was a shift in consumer taste away from an evening out at 
the cinema. A preference for home entertainment grew for some, 
while for other consumers other new forms of leisure activity 
took over. The decline phase of the life cycle of the product, 
ie. traditional exhibition, was probably hastened by the 
increase in the cost of the 'total package' of activities 
involved in a cinema visit: with shifts in patterns of dwelling 
from urban to suburban, a cinema visit can easily have come to 
mean a longish journey to a cinema, parking problems, the 
expense of a meal out and so on. 
The acquisition of a television licence in the 1950s or 
1960s may have squeezed household budgets. However, the period 
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in general was one of substantial economic growth. Table 5 
shows, however, that cinema going became highly income 
inelastic. As a proportion of household expenditure in Great 
Britain, cinema going fell from about 1% to about one tenth of 
1% between 1953-4 and 1980. Meanwhile, the equivalent figure 
for television rose for about twenty years, and the figure for 
alternatives comparable to the cinema - theatre and other 
entertainment - was little affected over the whole period. 
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Table 5. 
HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON ENTERTAINMENTS (%). 
1953-4 1965 1975 
CINEMA ADMISSIONS 0.99 0.32 0.13 
TV LICENCES & RENTALS; 
RADIOS, TV SETS & 
MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS 1.13 
THEATRES, SPORTING 
EVENTS & OTHER 
ENTERTAINMENTS 0.89 
1980 
0.11 
1.9 2.77 2.4 
0.61 0.68 0.84 
(Source: MMC) 
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As is discussed in section 2.3, the distribution sector's 
control over the exhibition sector has been an important 
factor. The exhibition circuits have been 'aligned' to the 
distribution sector: for many years, a distributor has been in 
the habit of offering its films exclusively to one or other 
major circuit. 
In its 1966 Report, the Monopolies Commission found that 
the Rank circuit was aligned to Columbia, Disney, United 
Artists and Twentieth Century Fox, while ABPC's ties were with 
Warner, MGM and Paramount. And, by 1983, when the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission carried out the second such inquiry, the 
essential situation was unchanged. 
This regime of alignments and barring was observed by the 
Monopolies Commission in 1966 to be unique in Europe. It has 
exerted, as has been illustrated in the case of the New Wave in 
section 3.2 for example, a severe constraint on domestic 
production over many years: if you have not had production 
sponsored by Rank, ABPC or a Hollywood major, the prospect of 
your proposed film probably not being fed through the 
distribution-exhibition machinery will have made the raising of 
finance to make the film a very difficult assignment. 
No British film maker has more experience than Sir Richard 
Attenborough. In answer to the question, 'How far do you 
identify the problems of the British film industry with 
exhibition duopoly? ' Attenborough said : 
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'It is the greatest problem that the 
industry has had to face for as long as I 
can remember - for almost fifty years.... 
The problem was that two men, the chief 
film bookers for Thorn-EMI and Rank, had 
become almost the sole arbitrators of what 
was shown at the cinema; their tastes 
prevailed; they decided on the advertising 
that went with a film; on how long the film 
would run. Any movies outside the beaten track 
were often suffocated, and to a large measure, 
this still exists with Cannon and Rank.... The 
government should have intervened. It is to 
the shame of both major parties that they did 
not. It's stultifying. ' 
(Hacker and Price, 1991. Page 89. ) 
Adverse effects of the structure of exhibition-distribution 
have also been felt in the independent exhibition sector. The 
purpose of the time and distance bars has been to eliminate 
local competition. Such has been the extent of the long-term 
trend of cinema closures, however, that the 1983 Report made 
the point that some 38% of cinemas were, by then, sufficiently 
isolated from local competition that barring had become 
irrelevant to these 'solo' cinemas. 
The largest eight distributors had, at the time of the 1983 
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Report, a share of about 90% of all rentals. The barring 
practice that has been deployed by them and the two main 
exhibitors has also had the effect of eliminating potential 
competition on box office admission prices, and acted as a 
disincentive for investment in new cinemas. 
The size of the independent exhibition sector is shown in 
Table 6. The squeezing of the independents has contributed to 
the UK being at the bottom of the screens-per-capita league 
table of Western Europe. And this in turn has contributed to 
declining cinema attendance totals: when any given cinema is 
closed, a large proportion of its 'congregation' is lost to 
cinema attendance in general for good. 
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Table 6. 
THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR OF BRITISH FILM EXHIBITION, 1983. 
NUMBER OF 
SCREENS 
1 
2 to 4 
5 to 49 
NUMBER OF 
EXHIBITORS 
296 
67 
29 
(Source: MMC) 
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2.2 The Industry's Output. 
Turning to the question of the production of films to be 
exhibited in the duopolists' - and others' - cinemas in 
Britain, there has always been an important American influence. 
The American film industry transferred its massive 
comparative advantage to Britain from a very early stage. 
Immediately before the 1927 Act, up to 90% of films being 
exhibited in Britain were American. By this time, the five 
American majors had developed vertically. This enabled them to 
add to other advantages of vertical integration the ability to 
attract large scale external finance. The integrated structure 
would suggest to the financier a reduced level of risk involved 
in investment in the direction of the film business. 
The sheer size of the American industry at this stage 
conferred on it an overwhelming economic superiority. In 1926, 
investment in the US industry was ten times as large as that in 
its British counterpart. Moreover, the bias in British 
investment was heavily towards exhibition - only about 12% of 
total British industry investment was in production. For the 
Americans, access to large scale finance facilitated the making 
of big budget films and thus the ability to increase further 
their competitive edge. 
By this time - the nineteen twenties - US exports were 
already very important to the US industry. There was a 
particular US hold over British distribution: distribution 
facilities were set up in Britain by Vitagraph in 1912; Fox in 
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1916; and Famous-Lasky in 1919. 
US renters in Britain were in the habit of distributing 
only American products. These renters would engage in blind, 
block and advance booking: blocks of films were made available, 
including the one popular film desired. Many of the films in 
the blocks were unseen by exhibitors, and deals were done in 
advance of production. 
Another restrictive practice in this era was that of 
'underselling' whereby American distribution would supply some 
films for exhibition at less than British films' cost prices. 
After the 1927 Act prohibited blind booking and limited advance 
booking, "gentlemen's agreements" were substituted as a means 
of evasion. 
Naturally, activity of this kind had adverse consequences 
for British production: exhibitors had to accept the 
distribution terms as they were dependent on US products, but, 
in turn, British producers were forced to wait for exhibition 
opportunities, and therefore found it difficult to raise funds 
for other investment in production. 
As Guback (1976) has pointed out, films are 'infinitely 
exportable'. The marginal costs of production in terms of 
prints for export markets are very low in comparison to the 
cost of producing the master negative. Prints exported do not 
deprive the home market of consumption, and do not reduce the 
domestic revenue of producers. 
That exports were crucial to the American industry, and 
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that the Americans would strive to defend their dominant 
position was illustrated by a rule of thumb in Hollywood in the 
nineteen twenties which held that for each dollar of revenue, 
seventy five cents came from the American market and only 
twenty five cents from exports - but that the profits of the 
film lay in that last twenty five cents. 
This has also meant that Hollywood has always been able, 
where necessary, to supply films in export markets very cheaply 
with the large domestic market serving to recover the 
production costs. 
The nineteen forties is a most interesting period in which 
to review the situation. It is a period in which there were a 
series of crises relating to American dominance of exhibition 
and to British production, and in which a variety of emergency 
government measures was introduced. And by the end of this 
period, formerly high hopes of a major British production 
sector had been crushed and, by 1948, the industry had embarked 
on what was to be its rapid and unchecked post-war decline. 
Table 7 below shows the continued long-term inability of 
the British industry to expand in its own market in the years 
following the advent of the industry structure and the 
circumstances outlined below and discussed more generally in 
this chapter. 
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Table 7. 
LONG FILMS REGISTERED FOR CINEMA EXHIBITION IN GREAT BRITAIN, 
1955 to 1981. 
TOTAL NUMBER BRITISH FILMS AMERICAN 
OF FILMS % FILMS 
1955 350 23 57 
1960 333 24 43 
1965 302 23 36 
1970 360 24 34 
1975 282 25 46 
1980 219 19 56 
1981 225 14 60 
(Source: MMC. ) 
OTHER FILMS 
19 
34 
41 
42 
29 
26 
26 
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The table shows the number of long films, ie. those of over 
72 minutes duration, registered for exhibition in Britain. This 
number fell from from 350 in 1955, of which about 80 were 
British productions, to 225 in 1981, of which 32 were British. 
There is a fall of 35% overall, with British films suffering a 
fall in their relative share, and undergoing a decline of 60% 
in the absolute numbers of films. The American share rose, with 
" actual numbers falling by only about 32%. 
So what was the scenario in the 1940s? By the middle of 
that decade, the situation was that the Combines - ABPC and 
Rank - had intensified their control. GBPC had passed into the 
hands of J. Arthur Rank in 1941. Rank, the co-founder in 1936 
of the General Cinema Finance Corporation and of Pinewood 
Studios, rapidly consolidated his film empire to cover 
exhibition (Odeon, and Gaumont British - two of the three 
largest chains), distribution (General Film Distributors, 
United World Pictures and Eagle Lion), studios ('D and P' - or 
Denham and Pinewood, Islington, Highbury, and Shepherds Bush 
Studios), and production companies (Two Cities, Individual 
Pictures, Independent Producers, Gainsborough Pictures, and 
Cineguild). (Figure 2: 'The Rank Empire, ' Page 128. ) 
Rank's two exhibition circuits had around 650 cinemas and 
more than 20% of all seats, while ABPC had another 450 cinemas. 
Together, the two Combines' three circuits controlled more than 
half of the first run cinemas in the country and two thirds of 
those in London. 
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As Rank alone controlled over 70% of all British studio 
capacity anyway, the power of the Combines over British 
production was very substantial indeed. But, bearing in mind 
the need for any film to be shown by one of the big circuits 
for it to be profitable, this control was almost complete. 
The entire picture is finally drawn when one notes the 
'affiliations' that had developed between the Combines and the 
US majors - Rank with Universal and Fox, and ABPC with Warners. 
After the first quota legislation, the threat of the Americans 
needing to penetrate exhibition on a large scale had become an 
important issue. In the event, however, affiliations did the 
job. 
For the Americans, any revenue from the British market 
typically constituted profit because films had usually at least 
recouped their costs in the US itself. Underselling could take 
place, with American films supplied artificially cheaply. For 
Rank's cinema circuits the most profitable strategy meant the 
exclusion of much potential British production: an American 
film -a dumped, low budget and poor quality production though 
it may well have been (Hollywood 'B' features were particularly 
cheaply supplied) - would edge out domestic product. 
Meanwhile, Rank's production strategy in the early and mid 
1940s (discussed in section 3.3) was generous in the 
case of a favoured circle of film makers. To a considerable 
extent, it was geared to perhaps eight or ten big budget 
productions designed for the US market. This has been a 
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perennial, but rarely successful, strategy for British 
producers ever since the misleading international success of 
Alexander Korda's 'The Private Life of Henry VIII'. That film 
cost £93,710 in 1933 and made over £500,000 internationally. It 
would forever stand as the basic model encouraging British 
producers to shape elaborate projects for the American market. 
Against the background of crisis in British production, 
Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in 
August 1947 the levy of a 75% import tariff on foreign films. 
The main motive was to make savings in foreign exchange. The 
tariff was to be paid in advance and based on estimated 
earnings. 
The American industry was furious - Britain was the vital 
export market: some 80% of all screen time in Britain was taken 
up by American films, and earnings from this constituted 
approximately 25% of Hollywood net profit. (Dickinson and 
Street, 1985. ) In 1946 the US majors had set up the Motion 
Picture Export Association of America (or 'Little State 
Department' as it became known) to operate in their export 
markets. The MPEAA responded to the import levy with an 
immediate boycott of the British market announced the day after 
the imposition of the duty. 
What is further of interest is that Rank also reacted with 
anger at the import levy. He was caught between two stools: his 
circuits, which were entirely segregated from the production 
business, made large profits based on the exhibition of 
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Hollywood films. With no British product to take the place of 
the missing new American films in his two circuits, Rank was 
forced to show the same existing material repeatedly, and to 
suffer a fall in revenue in the autumn of 1947. 
On the other hand, as the producer of over half of all 
British films, including almost all of those of any significant 
scale, the exclusion of American films suggested that Rank 
might conquer the domestic exhibition sector with his own 
product. 
The levy was also a setback to Rank in respect of his 
plans in the US. When it was introduced, Rank's hard fought for 
American distribution arrangements were cancelled by the majors 
for whom Rank, with his evident inability to prevail upon the 
British government to refrain from enacting the import control, 
had lost all credibility. After much prevarication, Rank, at 
the end of 1947, embarked on what would turn out to be a 
disastrous slate of new production with fundamental 
consequences for the future of the British production industry. 
Rank himself had assumed that the tax would not be imposed 
and that the British government would accept a compromise that 
had been proposed by the MPEAA whereby they would not 
repatriate a proportion of their British earnings and would put 
them into British production instead. (Murphy, 1983. ) 
American films had been taking £70 million, and the 
Treasury had hoped to save £57 million of this. But the tariff 
had not succeeded in halting the outflow of Hollywood dollars 
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because it could not be applied to material already imported. 
There was a stockpile of American films yet to be shown in 
addition to numerous films which could be re-released. As 
Harold Wilson, who became President of the Board of Trade 
during this episode, said in 1948, 'We were actually paying 
...... 50 million dollars for the privilege of seeing 
'Hellzapoppin' for the third time and 'Ben Hur' for the twenty 
third'. (Foot, 1968. Page 74. ) 
The issue between the British government and the American 
film industry was resolved in 1948. But for Rank, the adverse 
effects of this crisis would lead to the end of major domestic 
production from the late 1940s, and to the eventual total 
withdrawal from production. 
The resolution of the tariff question followed negotiation 
between the MPEAA and Wilson. It resulted in the repeal of the 
tariff in May 1948 and its substitution by a new scheme under 
which the Americans could repatriate $17 million per annum. And 
this amount could be raised to the extent that British films 
made money in America. 
There quickly followed another attempt by the British 
government to encourage domestic production - this time in the 
form of an increase in the Screen Quota (table 10, section 
2.4). In 1948 it was raised from 30% to 45%, and announcement 
was made of planned further rises. 
Again, there was opposition both from the Americans and 
from the British Combines. Rank was now reducing production. 
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The duopoly was not in favour of the policy, and the Board of 
Trade was rapidly forced to reduce the Quota to 40% in 1949, 
and to 30% - back to where it had started - in 1950. 
By this stage, the need for an effective third force was 
widely perceived. There were strong arguments in favour of the 
nationalisation of one of the three circuits as a method of 
facilitating independent production as a counter to the 
Combines. This argument was made forcefully, but, in the event, 
the solution was the establishment of the NFFC as a public 
corporation which would provide the 30% 'end money' in 
production finance. 
Also at this time, the Board of Trade told the circuits 
that they should show at least six films per annum from 
independent producers, and forbade the circuits the right to 
amalgamate. But in practice, the first of these directives was 
ignored, while, in 1958, following a change of government in 
1951, the Gaumont circuit was dismantled by Rank. So the 30% 
quota of British films was needed only in two circuits, rather 
than in three. 
In section 3.1, the question of American production in 
Britain is raised with respect to the nineteen eighties and to 
the 'Star Wars' and 'Indiana Jones' cycles of films produced at 
Elstree and followed by a seemingly inevitable American 
withdrawal from production in Britain. 
An earlier model of the rise and fall of Hollywood 
participation concerns the establishment of MGM British at 
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Elstree. When Amalgamated Studios was built in 1937, it was 
technically very modern. Rank acquired this facility in 1939, 
not because he needed the capacity, but in order to protect his 
investment in Denham and Pinewood by preventing ABPC from 
purchasing them. This turned out to be a very successful 
competitive move because ABPC's studios were requisitioned in 
their entirety during the war while Denham remained open. 
During the war, Amalgamated was sold to MGM which wanted to 
establish in Britain 'a miniature Culver City' (Warren, 1983). 
And over the next twenty years, the extravagant environment of 
MGM itself was indeed replicated in Hertfordshire. Major stars 
(Gable, Tracy, Mitchum) appeared in about fifty big 
productions, including, for example, 'Mogambo' (1954), 'The 
Yellow Rolls Royce' (1964) and '2001: A Space Odyssey' (1968). 
However, this glamorous ambience of Hollywood major studio 
production in Britain was only as viable as its parent in 
California. By the late nineteen sixties, MGM in the US was not 
doing well. Although it had made profits of $14 million in 
1967, the downturn in 1969 and 1970 was severe and total losses 
came to $40 million in that period (Finler, 1988). MGM was 
taken over in 1969 by Kirk Kerkorian who cut production, 
dramatically sold off the back lots, held an auction of 
costumes and props, and diversified into hotels. 
Inevitably, this scenario meant the closure of MGM British. 
When this took place in 1970, it was part of a general 
withdrawal from British production by the Americans. In fact, 
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it was the nineteen sixties that had been a boom period 
generally for Hollywood investment in Britain. Table 8 below 
indicates that in the post war period, the Hollywood major 
studios had a continual presence. But where this accounted for 
about 4% of the total number of films between 1946 and 1959, it 
increased to about 11% in the nineteen sixties. 
j 
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Table 8. 
US MAJORS: PRODUCTION OF FEATURE FILMS IN BRITAIN, 1946 to 1970 
% of Colum- 20th Para- MGM Walt Uni- 
Total bia Century mount Brit Warner Dis- ver- 
Brit. Brit- Fox Brit- ish. Bros. ney. sal. 
# Output ish. Prodns. ish. 
1946 2 5 2 
1947 0 0 
1948 3 4 1 1 1 
1949 3 4 1 2 
1950 6 9 3 1 1 1 
1951 4 6 2 1 1 
1952 5 6 2 2 1 
1953 7 8 1 2 1 2 
1954 5 6 4 1 
1955 0 0 
1956 3 4 1 2 
1957 3 3 2 1 
1958 3 3 1 1 1 
1959 2 3 1 1 
1960 6 7 3 1 1 1 
1961 9 12 5 1 3 
1962 10 11 1 2 5 2 
1963 8 9 6 2 
1964 7 11 1 1 3 2 
1965 9 13 1 2 4 1 1 
1966 8 12 1 1 2 1 3 
1967 7 9 1 1 5 
1968 9 12 2 2 2 3 
1969 14 17 3 2 1 3 1 4 
1970 8 8 4 2 1 1 
Tot: 141 16 25 7 49 9 18 16 
[Source: adapted from Gifford (1986)] 
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The extent of the American role in relation to production 
in the UK during the sixties was somewhat larger than is 
indicated by the above table because the American industry also 
financed a variety of independent British production companies. 
In 1965, US investment was extended to part- or whole-finance 
64% of films made in Britain. By 1967 and 1968,90% of the 
finance for all films made in Britain came from US sources. 
In 1961, United Artists opened a production office in 
London with the idea of backing four or five British films 
annually. That there is no foresight in the film industry with 
respect to what projects might be successful at the box office 
is illustrated in the case of the James Bond films where it 
would appear that no one involved in setting up the first Bond 
production had the slightest idea that this and every 
subsequent Bond for more than twenty five years would make a 
fortune. 
Having optioned Fleming's books in 1961, the producer Harry 
Saltzman could find no financial backing. Walker (1974) records 
that when United Artists eventually agreed to invest in 'Doctor 
No, ' the first of the Bond films in 1962, they reduced the 
budget (from $1 million to $900,000) on the assumption that the 
finished film probably would not work at the US box office. 
As a result, expenditure on set design was reduced to a 
mere £20,000, and Sean Connery, not then well known, was chosen 
because the reduced budget effectively ruled out the employment 
of a major star. 
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There was perhaps more judgement than luck associated with 
the signing by UA of the Beatles BEFORE the advent of 
'Beatlemania' to make three films. The first of these was "A 
Hard Day's Night" which cost £200,000 to make and, by 1967, 
when UA sold the rights to NBC television for $2 million, had 
taken $11 million at the world box office. (Coleman, 1989. ) 
By the mid nineteen sixties, UA's profits from Bond, the 
Beatles and its other British hit, 'Tom Jones' (discussed in 
section 3.2), had become too large to be ignored any longer by 
the American industry in general. In 1965, Universal and 
Columbia set up British production offices, followed by 
American independents such as Embassy and Filmways. 
Table 9 shows the ensuing rise in production capital into 
Britain from Hollywood. 
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Table 9. 
IMPORTED CAPITAL FOR FILM PRODUCTION by British Subsidiaries of 
the Major American Film Companies. (£ millions. ) 
1965 14.9 1970 12.8 
1966 18.0 1971 18.6 
1967 22.8 1972 14.0 
1968 31.3 1973 4.8 
1969 20.9 1974 2.9 
(Source: Perilli, 1983. ) 
-51- 
As one might expect, some of the films that were backed by 
these investment funds were in imitation of what had brought to 
UA record profits largely based on their British dimension. 
'Modesty Blaise' (1966) is an example - an attempt at a female 
counterpart to James Bond. This film also illustrates the 
general point that, where a British budget might have been 
reduced a few years before (cf. 'Doctor No'), with a confidence 
in all things British running high, Hollywood - in the form of 
20th. Century Fox - inflated the budget considerably. 'Modesty 
Blaise' had started life as a British Lion project budgeted at 
£600,000, but was eventually made for Fox for £1 million. 
Perhaps the most important influence behind the Americans' 
production migration to the UK in the sixties was the 'Swinging 
London' factor. [Walker (1974) notes that this term was coined 
by the Americans - by 'Time' magazine, 15/4/66. ] Inspired by 
the commercial success in America of a purely British film like 
'Darling' (1965), Swinging London came, in the mid sixties, to 
be seen by the major studios as THE ingredient which would 
confer box office success within the US. 
Indeed, there were hits on this basis. Outstanding examples 
were Paramount's 'Alfie' (1967) and Columbia's 'Georgy Girl' 
(1966). By 1969, the latter had achieved gross takings of $13 
million, $7 million of which was in the US. 
That costs of production were lower in the UK than in 
Hollywood was a further pull factor: for Universal, which 
financed sixteen films from its London production office 
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between 1966 and 1970, 'three films could be made at Pinewood, 
Shepperton or Elstree for every two at Universal City'. 
(Walker, 1974. ) 
Moreover, costs were subsidised by the Eady Levy. For 
instance, UA had made the first Bond at Pinewood and on 
location in Jamaica, rather than in US studios and locations, 
because this qualified it for a distribution from the British 
Film Fund. Such grants were significant: over $1 million by the 
time of the third Bond, 'Goldfinger'. 
Low and subsidised costs were, however, not a sufficient 
factor to sustain American investment in British activity 
indefinitely. In 1970, when MGM British withdrew, production 
had been cut to three films in progress, and Columbia was the 
only US major in the UK not to be reducing production. It had 
six films being made, Paramount had two, UA two, Universal one, 
and Fox none. This picture is reinforced by Table 9 (page 51) 
which illustrates the dissipation of the imported production 
capital of the majors. 
If the Swinging London factor had meant, in 1966, that 
almost any British film would, in principle, be a money 
spinner, then events would, sooner or later, inevitably be a 
source of disappointment. 
Moreover, the late nineteen sixties and early nineteen 
seventies was a period when many of the American majors' big 
budget productions failed commercially (and a period when the 
US box office was close to reaching the bottom of a twenty five 
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year decline). For example, the 1970 films 'Hello, Dolly' and 
'Tors! Tora! Tora! ' each resulted in losses of about $13 
million for Fox. 
Finler (1988) records that the major studios made combined 
losses which were the highest for forty years. Dickinson and 
Street (1985) argue that the main reason for American 
withdrawal from the UK was that the American industry in the 
late nineteen sixties had 'overspent and overstocked' with 
films: the world market could support $500 million worth of 
product, but in the year 1968 alone, $1.2 billion had been 
invested in films for release. 
While such reversal of fortune in Hollywood meant a 
retrenchment and scaling down of operations, the British were 
also displaced by the so-called 'New American Cinema' of this 
period. The popularity of a new batch of films which dealt with 
American characters and American issues - 'Easy Rider' and 'Bob 
and Carol and Ted and Alice' being early examples in 1969 - 
was, in a sense, at the expense of the British. 
That there is a cyclical element to US production in the UK 
is illustrated by the return of Hollywood in the later nineteen 
seventies. By 1978, Fox was spending £18 million in the UK on 
the second films in the 'Star Wars' and 'Omen' series, and on 
'Julia'. The return of American expenditure in this way was the 
result of a number of factors. Hits in the middle seventies had 
restored studio fortunes and thus replenished funds for 
overseas investment; Sterling was attractive; the Eady Levy was 
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still available; there was rampant inflation in costs in 
Hollywood, making production in the UK a cheaper alternative; 
and the somewhat fortuitous location of a blockbuster in a 
British studio (ie. 'Star Wars' at Elstree) had reawakened 
interest in British production. 
However, such an upturn was not of the same qualitative 
magnitude as that of the nineteen sixties. For the earlier 
period also involved a boom in the US financing of British 
films, and did not consist only of cheap offshore production. 
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2.3 The Structure of the Industry. 
In terms of the evolution of the structure of the British 
film industry (see Figure 1 on page 57), two central features 
have been noted: American dominance, and the British duopoly. 
While the implementation of the Screen Quota measures in 1927 
(discussed in section 2.4) was in response to the former, the 
development of the latter was facilitated to a considerable 
extent by the Quota. 
Given the tripartite nature of activity in the film 
industry - production, distribution, and exhibition - vertical 
integration has been the basic model of the firm from a very 
early stage. One makes films and distributes them into one's 
own cinema chain. This enables the maximisation of control over 
what would otherwise be an uncertain, market determined 
activity. Transaction costs are minimised. 
In the US, Paramount, MGM, Warner Brothers, RKO and Fox 
were already established along these lines by the early 
nineteen twenties. At this time, British imitation of the 
Hollywood model would have been futile given the absence of a 
viable production end to any emerging British counterpart. 
The advent of the quota changed this, and, from the late 
1920s, there was the start of the development of the duopoly of 
the vertically integrated British 'majors' or 'combines': GBPC, 
later Rank; and ABPC, later EMI, and, later still, part of the 
Cannon group. Figure 1 illustrates, for the pre-war period, the 
details of the major acquisitions (continued on page 58) 
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[Sources of Figure 1: adapted from Dickinson 
and Street (1985), Klingender and Legg 
(1937), Low (1985) and Perry (1974). ] 
(continued from page 56) and relationships under which 
the incipient market structure and the British duopoly emerged. 
Thus not only did the Act protect British production from 
probable elimination, but it was also a major influence on 
structure. The Act promoted the British combines by encouraging 
City finance for a series of mergers which ensued, and by 
making plausible the notion of a British vertical integration 
which could encompass film production. Before the Act, British 
production could not have sustained the requirements of an 
exhibition and distribution machine. Thus the production side 
of a combine would have had to be American. 
It is true, however, that, while the long term effect of 
the Act was concentration, there was a short term plurality 
with a brief epidemic of new production firms entering the 
industry and creating a bubble of new 'quota companies'. As 
Dickinson and Street (1985) have shown, the 1927 Act created a 
favourable climate for investment in British production, 
suggesting that, whatever the quality of the films produced, 
investment would automatically be profitable. 
But a more competitive model was not sustained: quota 
companies quickly collapsed, with fifty such firms going out of 
business in 1930 alone. To some extent, the lack of suitable 
managerial resources, together with the power of the majors, 
was to blame. -58- 
In 1930, Alfred Hitchcock's film 'Blackmail' was the first 
British sound film, and it was the coming of sound in this 
period which presented a further difficulty for new entrants: 
it became very expensive to produce films. 
Where the average cost of producing a silent film was 
between £5,000 and £12,000, that of a 'talkie' ranged from 
£12,000 to £20,000 (Dickinson and Street, 1985). 
The quota measures succeeded in increasing the number of 
British films produced and in raising the British share of the 
British market. This rose from 4.4% in 1927 to 24% in 1932 and 
to 29% in 1936. These figures, however, include that most 
unfortunate by-product, the notorious 'Quota Quicky'. 
Although it has been stressed that the 1927 Act established 
the basis for the British duopoly, and it is this which would 
in the longer term be an important constraint on the revival of 
the British industry, it must also be noted that the British 
would only play a role of continuous importance in the 
exhibition sector. The early dominance gained by Hollywood in 
production and distribution was not to be conceded. 
So in due course, the British combines would exhibit films 
in Britain sometimes made by themselves, but more usually made, 
or picked up for distribution purposes, by American majors 
integrated, as far as the British market was concerned, across 
production and distribution. 
Clearly, the 1927 Act also encouraged the exhibition ends 
of the combines in that they would be able to keep their 
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cinemas supplied with British films while some of the smaller 
exhibitors would be squeezed out due to lack of product. In 
turn, there was, in the post-quota period, a boom in cinema 
building with - by the end of the nineteen twenties - 
'super' cinemas being built by the combines to accommodate up 
to 2,500 people. 
By 1935, GBPC and ABPC owned 599 cinemas, which constituted 
about 13% of the total number of cinemas and 17% of the seats. 
The largest nine circuits owned a quarter of the auditoria, 
including half of the first-run cinemas, and a third of the 
seats. Moreover, a distribution-exhibition link in a combine 
enabled the circumvention of the outlawing of the practice of 
'blind booking' which had been one of the measures of the 1927 
Act. 
Further aided by the alignments in the distribution ties 
with the exhibitor duopoly, an important long term structural 
trend in the exhibition sector has been the severe squeeze on 
the independent exhibitors. However, it is interesting to 
observe that at the relatively early stage of the 1930s, a 
great many small exhibitors survived, but in a somewhat 
precarious way - barring, for example, was already a factor. 
Nevertheless, over half of the 4,448 cinemas in the country by 
1935 were independents. 
For the major studio, however, the crucial point is the 
control of distribution: 
'The economics have hardly changed during the 
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century, though the numbers are now larger and 
what the (US) government will allow has radically 
modified actual operations. A distributor charges 
a fee, normally around 30% of the box office 
gross, for the services he renders in getting 
the film from theater to theater, providing 
advertising campaigns and promotion, and so 
on. The 30% is before profits (if any) in 
which the distribution company's production 
or financing arm may share typically another 
50% or more. The great majority of films today 
never achieve profit - that is, a level of 
financial return at which the film maker will 
share in revenues. But the distributor's 30% 
is inviolate and in what is called first 
position. The distributor is simply closer 
to the well, and once the machinery for 
film distribution was in place, the great 
controlling fact of the movie business 
as business became and remains: the machine 
must be fed. ' 
(Bach, 1985. Page 32. ) 
Bach is one of the many observers of the film industry to 
stress that control of the distribution sector is the key to 
profitability. The 1988 film 'Batman' is untypical of the film 
industry in almost every way. But it does stand as an extreme 
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example of the profitability of distribution. 'Batman' became 
the fifth biggest film of all time at the North American box 
office. Although it was one of the most expensive films ever 
made - its cost was more than $50 million - it had taken, by 
March 1991, over $250 million from cinema and video. However, 
it was still $150 million short of returning a profit in the 
production sector! Both the film's star (Jack Nicholson) and 
the exhibition sector each accounted for at least 20% of the 
gross, and distributors' marketing expenses formed a further 
$60 million, leaving more than $80 million as fees to Warners 
as distributors. 
The cost profile in the industry is one in which the high 
fixed cost of producing the master negative, ie. of making the 
film itself, can be contrasted with the relatively very low 
subsequent variable costs of manufacturing a print and 
conducting the necessary advertising to show the film to 
audiences. ('Batman' was untypical in this latter area as in 
many others. ) 
It follows that the ability to secure widespread 
distribution in as many territories as possible is vital. An 
early observer, Strauss (1930) noted that if one doubled the 
number of cinemas in which a film was shown, one might increase 
one's net revenues by perhaps a dozen times. There would be a 
reduction of fifty per cent in the production cost that had to 
be charged against the revenue from each cinema. 
In this way, the widest possible distribution of films is 
-62- 
of the essence. 
In practice, in both the UK and the US, production- 
distribution, on the one hand, and exhibition, on the other, 
have not always been under one corporate roof. In the UK, the 
American majors have dominated the production and distribution 
sectors, but have not been an important presence in exhibition: 
British cinema circuits have, throughout most of the history of 
the industry, been monopolised by British firms, principally 
ABPC (subsequently EMI and then Cannon) and Rank. 
Joint profit maximisation has taken place across the 
distribution-exhibition border under bilateral monopoly. As is 
generally the case in economic theory, this has required 
collusion and price discrimination. And the alignments and 
barring restrictive practices have facilitated this. 
The British distribution sector has been characterised by 
groupings of firms dominated by American majors. In 1983, at 
the time of the second report of the Monopolies Commission on 
the exhibition sector [MMC (1983)], the two largest 
distributors, Columbia-EMI-Warner (CEW) and United 
International Pictures (UIP) were noted to control fifty per 
cent of the market. 
Alignments have meant that, by long standing agreement, the 
product of the Hollywood major studios is routed into one or 
other of the two British circuits. 
While CEW had the role of routing Warner output into EMI 
cinemas and Columbia films into Rank, UIP was aligned with EMI 
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for Paramount, Universal and MGM productions, and with Rank for 
those of United Artists. 
Turning to barring, the MMC Report defined this as follows: 
'once the type of release for a film 
has been decided, and which cinemas will be 
involved, a long-standing system of bars 
negotiated and agreed between exhibitors, 
and then with the distributors, is applied 
to determine the rights to exclusive exhibition 
which many cinemas will have and, in effect, 
the order in which those cinemas will show 
the film..... barring determines which of two 
or more cinemas sufficiently close to each 
other exhibits the film first..... EMI and Rank 
obtain first run of virtually all films and 
their cinemas are in most cases first run 
cinemas in their own localities. The order 
in which the other cinemas in the locality, 
including sometimes other EMI and Rank 
circuit cinemas, will show the film, ie. 
as second, third or still later run cinemas, 
relates to the first run positions of EMI's 
and Rank's main cinemas. ' 
(MMC, 1983. Page 75. ) 
The elimination of an independent film distribution sector 
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removes a potential category of arbitragers. Arbitrage is 
impossible when the film is distributed, under barring, into 
the designated first run cinema. The distributor rations 
rentals to one print per exhibitor. (Although the practice of 
'bicycling' has been known to occur: rushing the single print 
backwards and forwards, one reel at a time, from the designated 
cinema to another auditorium for an unlicensed showing! ) 
Various patterns of release are deployed to facilitate a 
market segmentation strategy. Third degree price discrimination 
is used to maximise profits by extracting something approaching 
the full area of revenue under the total market demand curve. 
In general, tie-in sales can be regarded as a form of 
hidden price discrimination, ensuring monopoly profits on the 
tied-in commodity. Here, 'block booking' is the relevant film 
distribution practice. That is, in order to obtain a 
particular, popular film, an exhibitor must agree to take on 
packages which include both the desired film and other material 
which alone would be of little or no value. This practice 
enables revenue to be raised above that which would accrue were 
the films in the block to be priced separately. 
Within the US itself, the Hollywood majors in the late 
1940s and early 1950s agreed to refrain from block booking, 
among other restrictive distribution practices (including those 
corresponding to the British barring and alignments). This was 
a part of a wider episode which constituted the culmination of 
a lengthy series of anti-trust actions prosecuted by the US 
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Justice Department and which resulted in the majors divesting 
themselves of their participation in cinema exhibition. 
Before this divorcement, the vertically integrated 
Hollywood combines had structured transfer pricing so as to 
show the bulk of profits in the exhibition sector. Garnham 
(1980) illustrates that the method of raising capital for 
investment in production was through the exhibition divisions. 
A combination of profitability and valuable real estate in the 
exhibition sector was the most efficient vehicle for attracting 
funds. 
Before divorcement, more than 90% of investment in the US 
film industry was raised through the majors' exhibition chains. 
[In the long term, the resolution of the problem created in 
this respect by divorcement was the pattern of incorporation of 
the majors into diversified conglomerates such as, for example, 
Gulf and Western (in the case of Paramount) or Transamerica 
Corporation (United Artists). ] 
In this model of internal pricing, as in much else, the 
British combines mirrored the US majors. After divorcement 
in the US, the strength of the majors' production-distribution 
oligopoly was sufficient, against a fragmented independent 
exhibition sector, to redress the balance of profitability back 
towards the distribution sector. 
But in the UK, it was production, rather than exhibition, 
from which the British majors withdrew. From the late 1940s to 
the late 1960s, their combined share of British production fell 
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from more than 40% to less than 10%, and was soon to wither 
away altogether. 
With a continued presence in exhibition, there was no 
impetus to change the deal structures inherited from the days 
of full integration. The effect of this has been, and continues 
to be, the delaying of producers' participation in revenues 
and, in effect, the imposition of a disproportionate share of 
the risk onto the production financiers. 
Exhibitors and distributors may be enjoying substantial 
profits, while financiers still await the recoupment of their 
outlay. 
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2.4 Government Policy. 
In the words of the 1984 White Paper, 'Film Policy, ' 'The 
British commercial film industry is small in terms of the 
normal measures of economic significance, such as employment 
and turnover. But it has an importance and influence out of all 
proportion to its size'. 
Despite what might appear to be an acknowledgement of 
important externalities and the consequent implication, within 
the neo-classical tradition, for an interventionist government 
policy, the White Paper went on to justify the removal of 
government support measures. However, the need for government 
intervention in support of its indigenous film industry in 
principle has been perceived as arising from the existence of a 
wide variety of possible external benefits. 
Not only does a film industry give a national population 
an opportunity for creative development, but the industry also 
supplements the cultural side of national life. A weak domestic 
film industry would lead to foreign, probably American, 
dominance of an important aspect of national culture, and to a 
kind of cultural impoverishment. 
Such cultural benefit is sometimes seen as being more 
plausibly achieved through subsidy of films rather than subsidy 
of, say, opera, ballet or classical music, if it is assumed 
that the cinema is the least elitist medium. 
Furthermore, the export of films made in a particular 
country often gives rise to publicity about that country and 
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about its way of life. In turn, this can lead to a demand for 
further exports of that country, particularly in the form of 
tourism. 
For example, in the American case in the nineteen twenties, 
while defending the level of American exports, the Motion 
Picture Division of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce 
expressed the view that every foot of film exported and shown 
abroad yielded approximately one dollar in foreign purchases of 
US goods. 
A less tangible export is international prestige. And if 
this is felt to be an important commodity, then the film 
industry has a role to play as can be seen in the British case, 
for example, on the occasion of any success at the Oscar 
ceremonies. 
While one can clearly observe that the film medium often 
has a useful function in education, it has also been used as a 
major vehicle for the dissemination of propaganda. For example, 
the important war time role to be played by national film 
industries. This is said to have been inaugurated at a very 
early stage in Hollywood by de Mille's First World War 
production 'Joan the Woman'. 
In the British case, the role of the cinema had become well 
established in war by the time of, say, Noel Coward's 'In Which 
We Serve' in 1942: 'Dated but splendid flagwaver; an archetypal 
British war film of almost limitless propaganda value'. 
(Halliwell, 1977. Page 445. ) While for Churchill, Wyler's 'Mrs. 
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Miniver' (1942) was 'worth many battleships'. 
And with reference to the British Empire, there was a 
perception in some quarters of a Colonial policy based, at 
least in part, of showing to the natives the kind of films 
which would introduce them to civilised - ie. British - 
standards of behaviour. Moreover, the cinema has sometimes been 
regarded as a crucial medium for the spreading of a particular 
ideology. This is illustrated by, for example, the House of 
Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities hearings in 
1947 and 1951 on the alleged Communist infiltration of the film 
industry, and the subsequent blacklisting. 
A rather different example concerns the very entry into the 
British film business of J. Arthur Rank. He was a wealthy flour 
miller in the early nineteen thirties, and he taught at a 
Sunday School in the Methodist church. It is said that he 
decided to show, and subsequently to make, religious films 
because he was dissatisfied with traditional methods of 
teaching. 
Rank's first film (a twenty minute short called 
'Mastership, ' which cost him £2,700, and concerned the need to 
conquer one's vices and to give one's life to Christ) was taken 
around the country to show to religious meetings. The failure 
of this and other of Rank's early religious films to gain entry 
to the cinema exhibition circuits was the factor which inspired 
Rank's entry into the industry - he wanted to get his religious 
message over through the cinema medium. (Limbacher, 1972. ) 
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i 
The areas of possible external benefit of domestic film 
production (creativity, culture, prestige, trade, education, 
propaganda) are somewhat problematic in that, while they can be 
hard to justify, they are certainly difficult to quantify. 
Furthermore, it cannot easily be said whether the film 
industry is the most efficient way of achieving the benefits in 
question. A value judgement is made politically with regard to 
the extent and nature of government support - if any - to be 
given to national film production. And, when support is given, 
the question arises as to whether it is to be in the form of a 
market improving policy, or whether the government itself 
should enter production and displace the capitalist model. 
As far as the British film industry is concerned, a 
government policy of market improvement was introduced in the 
form of Screen Quotas as early as 1927. This measure was 
designed to rescue the production sector of the national 
industry which, in the face of American dominance, was all but 
extinct. Indeed, 1927 is an important year in the history of 
the film industry for the introduction in Britain of this 
policy of production support coincided with the advent in the 
US of the 'talkie'. 
The background against which the Cinematograph Films Act of 
1927 was passed was - taking 1926 as an example - one in which 
an annual total of 625 features were released in Britain. But 
of these, 577 were American, 25 were continental European, 
while only 23 (under 4%) were British. 
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A minimum requirement was placed on exhibitors for the 
showing of British films. Under the Act, renters had to acquire 
and distribute a minimum British content of 7.5% of all footage 
rented, while exhibitors had to devote at least 5% of screen 
time to British films. Both quotas were raised to 20% in 1935, 
and the quota was to remain an instrument of policy for over 
fifty years. 
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Table 10. 
The British Screen Quota. 
Minimum British Screen Time Set At: 
1928 7k% for renters 
5% for exhibitors, rising steadily to 
1935 20% for renters and exhibitors; unchanged until 
1938 15% (long films) for renters 
122% (long films) for exhibitors 
1942 planned rising quota levels abandoned because 
of war until 
1947 30% (long films) for renters 
25% (long and short films) for exhibitors 
1948 45% (long films) and 
25% (supp orting programme) for exhibitors; 
renters' quota abolished 
1949 40% (long films) 
1950 30% (long films) 
1982 15% (long films and supporting programme) 
1983 exhibitors' quota suspended 
(Source: 'Screen Digest. ') 
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The Screen Quota was to become one of three central 
instruments of government policy in support of British 
production. The National Film Finance Corporation and the 
British Film Fund Agency (or Eady Levy) were the supplementary 
measures which followed after the war. This support mechanism 
survived until the nineteen eighties and its dismantlement 
following the aforementioned White Paper. 
Table 10 above shows how the level of quota imposed varied 
over the period. The rise and fall of the quota level is 
interesting to note: a system of high post-war quotas proved to 
be untenable given the inability of British producers to meet 
its requirements with adequate output. And the successive 
lowering of quota levels thus followed. 
In 1948, the announcement was made of the establishment of 
the NFFC as a public corporation. It would provide a source of 
finance for film production and attempt to assist British 
production in meeting the quota requirements. Table 11 below 
gives an indication of the scope of the NFFC contribution. This 
was at its greatest during the nineteen fifties with investment 
in around half the British films of that decade. 
(Further discussion of the role and limitations of the NFFC 
is in Chapter 3. ) 
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Table 11(a). 
The NFFC and British Long Film Production. 
Films in Receipt As a% of Films in Receipt As a% 
of NFFC Loans all films of NFFC Loans all 
1950 62 84 1967 12 17 
1951 35 52 1968 6 8 
1952 63 80 1969 5 7 
1953 51 59 1970 8 9 
1954 46 50 1971 11 12 
1955 41 50 1972 2 2 
1956 33 41 1973 3 4 
1957 47 49 1974 1 1 
1958 60 67 1975 8 11 
1959 45 56 1976 1 2 
1960 46 58 1977 5 12 
1961 27 35 1978 5 10 
1962 48 67 1979 4 10 
1963 36 50 1980 2 5 
1964 18 26 1981 2 6 
1965 12 18 
1966 17 24 TOTAL 762 33.02 
(Source: 'Screen Digest'. ) 
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Table 11(b). 
The NFFC and British Long Film Production: 
Quinquennial Analysis and Standard Deviations. 
No. of Films in Receipt As a Percentage of 
of NFFC Loans All Films 
mean standard mean standard 
deviation deviation, 
1950-54 51.4 10.4 65.0 14.3 
1955-59 45.2 8.8 52.6 8.6 
1960-64 35.0 11.4 47.2 14.9 
1965-69 10.4 4.4 14.8 6.4 
1970-74 5.0 14.8 5.6 4.2 
1975-79 4.6 2.2 9.0 3.6 
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The Eady Levy, the operation of which is shown in Tables 12 
(a) and (b) below was established on a voluntary basis in 1950, 
and became compulsory in 1957. It was a means of channelling 
box office receipts into British production. A levy was placed 
on the price of cinema admissions, and its proceeds went into 
the British Film Fund Agency which, until 1981, distributed the 
Fund to producers of British films on the basis of their box 
office success. Grants from the Fund were also made to the Film 
Fund Agency's client bodies: the NFFC, the Children's Film 
Foundation, the National Film School, and the British Film 
Institute. 
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Table 12(a). 
The Eady Levy Rate Per Cinema Seat. 
1950 all seats: /d 
1951 3d - Is: /d 
over is: 4d 
1957 under 10d: exempt 
10d - is ld: /d 
Is 1 Zd - Is 2½d: Zd 
is 3d - is 4d: 4d 
is 4 Zd - Is 5? d: Id 
is 6d - is 72d: 1/d 
is 8d - is 9 Zd: 1 2d 
over is 92d: 14d 
1960 one ninth of amount exceeding 
1968 one ninth of amount exceeding 
1977 one ninth of amount exceeding 
1978 one ninth of amount exceeding 
1979 one twelfth of ticket price 
lld 
is 6d (7zp) 
12 2p 
17-2p 
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The Levy was set in order to raise a total 
fall within rather remarkably wide limits. For 
target minimum per annum was always £2 million 
a target maximum of £5 million from 1957 until 
was raised to £7 million in 1975, and to £12 m 
Although the Levy was a measure introduced 
Fund which would 
example, the 
after 1957, with 
1975. The latter 
illion in 1979. 
by the 
government to divert a proportion of the exhibition receipts to 
production, there was, however, a further measure of government 
fiscal policy which had the simultaneous effect of taking away 
from the grosses some of what would otherwise have found its 
way back to producers. 
The Entertainments Tax had been introduced as a temporary 
measure during the First World War. The cinema was the last 
sector of the entertainments industry to remain subject to this 
tax, and it was not to be abolished until the Cinematograph 
Films Act of 1957 created the circumstances for its reduction 
and eventual abolition in 1960. In 1957, the Entertainments Tax 
accounted for 25% of box office receipts. 
The Eady Levy itself was heavily criticised. Exhibitors 
expressed the view that, while the purpose of the Levy was to 
sustain the industry through the subsidy of British producers' 
costs, it had, as a kind of Poll Tax on cinema attendance, a 
dampening effect on admissions. 
Cinemas with low levels of box office takings were in fact 
exempted from the Levy. The exemption was granted from 1952, 
for example, if the weekly gross fell below £150. This minimum 
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was raised to £250 in 1960, and successively to £1,400 by 1979. 
Relief was also given where takings only just exceeded the 
minimum, or where cinemas had an erratic level of weekly 
receipts. 
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Table 12(b). 
The Distribution of the Eady Levy. (£ millions. ) 
Period Total Levy Grants Payments To Film 
Collected Awarded Makers 
1950/51 1.198 0.060 1.123 
1951/52 2.972 0.1 2.854 
1952/53 2.733 0.12 2.589 
1953/54 2.752 0.125 2.614 
1954/55 2.573 0.125 2.441 
1955/56 2.568 0.125 2.431 
1956/57 3.096 0.13 2.937 
1957/58 3.667 0.125 2.507 
1958/59 3.849 0.125 2.695 
1959/60 3.901 0.125 3.743 
1960/61 4.027 0.125 3.865 
1961/62 3.91 0.138 3.748 
1962/63 3.771 0.138 3.594 
1963/64 4.169 0.138 4 
1964/65 4.677 0.138 4.514 
1965/66 4.623 0.193 4.413 
1966/67 4.507 0.193 4.309 
1967/68 4.359 0.24 4.131 
1968/69 4.037 0.205 3.849 
1969/70 4.223 0.211 4.028 
1970/71 4.588 0.345 4.238 
1971/72 4.344 0.34 3.984 
1972/73 3.975 0.43 3.567 
1973/74 4.304 0.477 3.91 
1974/75 4.977 0.477 4.581 
1975/76 4.721 0.604 3.978 
1976/77 5.51 0.865 4.695 
1977/78 6.617 0.883 5.768 
1978/79 7.454 0.991 6.599 
1979/80 6.038 0.905 5.334 
1980/81 6.584 2.18 4.565 
(Source: 'Screen Digest'. ) 
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The Levy, between 1950 and 1980, diverted a total of £130 
million from box office takings. About £120 million of this (£4 
million per year) was paid to producers of British films. 
Payments in respect of a particular film were in direct 
proportion to that film's success at the box office. 
This gives rise to the two central flaws in the Eady Levy 
as a mechanism designed to support British production. Firstly, 
the Levy rewarded those who were already successfully engaged 
in production, rather than facilitating producers who were 
unable to get projects off the ground. And secondly, much of 
the subsidy went to American, rather than British, producers. 
For example, the subsidiaries in the UK of the Hollywood 
major studios were incorporated under British law and fully 
entitled to participation in the Fund. In this way, in the 
nineteen sixties, when American participation in British 
production was at its height (see section 2.2), the majority of 
the Fund was rewarding American, rather than British, 
production companies. 
The James Bond films provide an example of the apparent 
misdirection of the subsidy. Bond would seem to be the last 
conceivable case of need, and yet its Eady money was always 
abundant. In the instance of 'Thunderball' (1965), for example, 
the reward was about $2 million or 15% of the entire Fund 
(Dickinson and Street, 1985). The Bond production company, Eon, 
belonged to the American producers, Harry Saltzman and Albert 
Broccoli, and its financial backers were United Artists. 
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However, such an objection might mean little to that sector 
of British production capacity - the film studios - where 
activity depends to a considerable extent upon playing host to 
American production. The last Bond film to be produced at 
Pinewood ('The Living Daylights, ' 1986) was the first without 
Eady money. 
The Managing Director of Pinewood Studios (interview, 1990) 
said that for the Bond producer, the missing subsidy (at least 
£1 million) was an important factor. That major film investment 
is 'footloose' is illustrated by the unprecedented decision in 
1990 to produce a Bond film, the eighteenth, entirely overseas. 
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3.1 An Environment of Decline. 
In recent years, the British production sector has faced 
enormous obstacles in the raising of production finance. For 
many years, there has been no British major involved in 
production, while only a few British producers have had access 
to Hollywood money. 
As is illiustrated in section 3.4, a film's makers 
normally have to attempt to compile finance in relatively small 
amounts from a disparate range ofsources - television, British 
Screen Finance (essentially a privatised NFFC), independent US 
distributors, individual territorial pre-sales, private 
investors, and guarantees from sales agents against overseas 
revenues. 
If they succeed, it is probable that the budget will have 
been pared down to well below £3 million. Consigned to small 
budgets (if they can be raised), the film maker faces a 
quotidian struggle for cost control; a tyranny of set-ups-per- 
day productivity. It is observed in section 3.2 how such 
constraints limit the scope of what can be put on the screen 
and place the film at a competitive disadvantage in markets. 
There is an almost total absence of government support for 
production. The view of the 1979 Conservative goverment was 
embodied in the 1984 White Paper, 'Film Policy': 'We believe 
Britain already has a film industry of which it can be justly 
proud, and that there is potential for more growth, and for yet 
greater achievements. But these achievements cannot be attained 
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with all the paraphernalia of government intervention'. 
Accordingly, the subsequent Act removed the Screen Quota, 
Eady Levy and NFFC. Moreover, the Budget of 1982 ended a 
further mechanism of support: for a short period from 1979, 
there had been a fiscal incentive in the form of 100% first 
year capital allowances in respect of the master film negative 
which could be treated as plant rather than as a revenue 
expense. 
By the time that the case study films were made, the 
national support system for production consisted of an annual 
grant of £1.5 million to British Screen; £350,000 to the 
National Film Development Fund; £150,000 for short films 
(administered through British Screen); and the £Z million of 
the BFI's grant which was allocated to its Production Board. 
In the 1991 Budget speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Mr. Norman Lamont rejected proposals for a revival of 
government support for the finance of British production put 
forward by leading members of the British film industry. His 
words were a source of bitter disappointment for the industry's 
campaigners: 
'I remain sympathetic, and if they have any alternative 
proposals they wish to put to me over the coming year, 
I will happily consider them. ' 
This rejection seemed to constitute a still-birth, as it 
were, of the offspring of Mrs. Margaret Thatcher and Sir 
Richard Attenborough conceived exactly nine months before, on 
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June 15th. 1990, at an industry 'seminar' at 10 Downing Street. 
Sir Richard, assisted in his endeavours by twenty senior 
figures from the British film production industry, had taken 
the crisis in production to the then Prime Minister. Although 
only very small support was initially forthcoming (a £5 million 
government grant over the next three years to assist British 
producers wishing to participate in European co-productions), 
the chief outcome of the meeting was the perception of a 
promise that tax breaks for production would be introduced. 
These incentives would, in all probability, follow from 
recommendations to be made by two working parties established 
immediately after the Downing Street meeting: a Department of 
Trade and Industry investigation would look at how to attract 
private investment into production; while an industry 
committee, organised by the British Film Institute, would 
consider necessary changes to the taxation regime in the 
production sector and report its findings to the Treasury. 
There was a general air of optimism after the Downing 
Street meeting. In the words of the press release circulated on 
behalf of the delegation by the British Screen Advisory 
Council, 'The delegates expressed pleasure at the positive tone 
of the discussions and the agreement that film production will 
in future occupy a higher place on the government's agenda'. 
And the Notice put out by the press office of Ten Downing 
Street was headed, 'Prime Minister Agrees Plans to Help British 
Film Industry'! 
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But it was the proposals of the Tax Incentives Working 
Party duly made to the Treasury to which the Chancellor 
referred in March 1991. (A year later, Mr. Lamont's Budget 
announced a small acceleration in the write-off timetable for 
production costs, but against the background of the almost 
complete collapse of production in Britain - only twelve films 
in 1991 - the measure was widely regarded in the industry as 
too little and too late. ) 
What is most remarkable, however, is the very occurrence of 
such a meeting as that at Downing Street in 1990 in the first 
place. In industrial policy in Britain in the nineteen 
eighties, the very idea of 'market failure' was something of a 
non-sequitur. But so grievous had the condition of British 
film production become during this period that what was on 
offer was that most unThatcheristic of commodities - government 
intervention. 
This situation is already sufficiently stark if one only 
considers that a mere twenty seven feature films were made in 
the UK in 1990, the lowest total since 1981. As recently as 
1984, twice as many were made, while the decade of the 1970s 
had an annual average well in excess of sixty British films. 
But the factor which reinforces the severity of the 
environment of accelerated decline surrounding British output 
in the nineteen eighties is that it occurred in the face of 
booming demand. Theatrical exhibition in the UK (see Table 1 
in section 2.1] declined continuously from its peak of 1.6 
-88- 
billion admissions in 1946 until 1984 when it had fallen 
to only 53 million. However, cinema going then strongly 
recovered so that by 1990 there were 98 million admissions. 
These figures conceal a much larger further increase in 
demand when one observes the simultaneous growth of the home 
entertainment sector. Not only has the number of television 
channels multiplied in this period, but the video rental and 
video sell-through markets have shown exceptional growth. 
According to Headland (1991), the video sector by 1990 
constituted demand (about £1 billion) worth at least two and a 
half times as much as cinema box office. 
But the problem that culminated in the Downing Street 
summit was, of course, that the films that were sustaining this 
massive British consumption were, for the most part, not 
British. They were such American blockbusters as 'Ghost' (which 
had a 1990 cinema box office gross of £17.3 million), 'Pretty 
Woman' (£12 million), or 'Back to the Future Part 2' (£7.2 
million in 1990) and 'Part 3' (£8 million). ('Screen 
International, ' 1991. ) Even the highest placed film in the 1990 
British box office rankings with an apparently British content, 
'Shirley Valentine, ' turned out to be an American production. 
As noted on page 6, one of the central problems for the 
British film maker has invariably been that of access to 
finance. For example, there was a severely constrained scope 
for British production activity in the late nineteen 
ifties/early nineteen sixties as is illustrated in the 
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discussion of the 'New Wave' in section 3.2 
That there is nothing unique to the contemporary 
environment in the lack of finance is shown by the fact that 
Woodfall's cycle of New Wave films was only able to start 
because Warners happened to have Richard Burton on a play or 
pay contract at that moment. (Walker, 1974. ) 
But, viewed with the hindsight afforded by the early 
nineteen nineties, the environment of the late 1950s, in terms 
of the sheer amount of British production, looks as it were 
something of a golden age. For the period 1956 to 1965, there 
was an annual average output of eighty two feature films, while 
the corresponding figure for the decade of the nineteen 
eighties was forty five. 
The difference is partly accounted for by the disappearance 
of the British 'majors, ' in particular Rank, as facilitators of 
production. As can be seen from Table 15 on page 130, Rank 
averaged fifteen films in the earlier period, with a further 
one or two annually contibuted by ABPC. Rank largely ceased its 
involvement in production in the nineteen seventies as the 
conclusion of a long term trend which began in 1948. 
And Cannon's suggestion, on purchasing in 1986 the assets 
of Screen Entertainment, the descendant of ABPC, that it would 
contribute British production was to carry little real 
practical weight. 
The other absentees, by and large, in the production of 
British films in the eighties were the Hollywood majors: their 
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British output was around six films a year in 1956-1965. 
The remainder of the production demise can be attributed 
not only to the increasingly severe impact on the British 
independent production sector of the kind of financial 
constraints illustrated in section 3.4 and already in play in 
the earlier period examined in relation to the 'New Wave' in 
section 3.2, but also, so the production sector argued on its 
visit to Downing Street, to the removal of almost all measures 
of British government film support policy. 
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Table 13. 
Total Numbers of Fea 
Commencing Principal 
Eighties: 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
ture Films for Thea 
Photography in the 
38 1985 
24 1986 
51 1987 
42 1988 
53 1989 
trical Release 
UK in the Nineteen 
54 
41 
57 
56 
38 
(Source: BFI. ) 
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It is useful to examine the composition of this output. To 
this end, the following data - Table 14 - analyses production 
for 1987 which was the peak year for activity during the 
nineteen eighties: 
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Table 14. 
The Composition of Output in 1987: Feature Films for Theatrical 
Release Commencing Principal Photography in the UK in 1987. 
TITLE TOTAL COST OF PRODUCTION COMPANY 
PRODUCTION (£m) 
The Adventures of 
Baron Munchausen 23.6 
American Roulette 1.174 
Buster 3.3 
Consuming Passions 2.2 
The Courier 1.5 
The Dawning 1.8 
The Deceivers 2.0 
The Dead 2.259 
The Dream Demon 1.94 
The Dressmaker 1.275 
Drowning By Numbers 1.023 
Eat the Rich 0.75 
Empire of the Sun 23.75 
Jane and the Lost City 1.0 
Just Ask For Diamond 1.4 
A Fish Called Wanda 4.5 
For Queen and Country 1.75 
The Fruit Machine 1.65 
A Handful of Dust 2.43 
Hawks 2.62 
High Spirits 6.91 
The Last of England 0.5 
Leave To Remain 0.9 
The Little Sister 2.0 
Prominent Features/Laura 
Films 
Film Four International/ 
British Screen/Mandemar 
Group 
Buster Films 
Euston Films/Sam Goldwyn 
City Vision/Bord Eireann/ 
Euston Films/Palace 
Lawson Productions 
Merchant Ivory/Michael 
White 
Liffey Films (Valencia) 
/Zenith Productions 
Spectra Films 
Film Four International/ 
British Screen 
Allarts 
Rio Films 
Amblin Entertainment/ 
Warner Brothers 
Marcel Robertson Prodns. 
/Glen Film Prodns. 
Red Rooster Films 
Prominent Features 
Zenith/Atlantic 
Entertainment (LA) 
Granada Film Finance Corp. 
Stage screen Productions 
Chufflink 
Visions/Palace 
Anglo International Films 
/British Screen/Channel 
Four/ZDF. 
Spellbound Productions 
BBC/Nelson Entertainment/ 
West One Film Producers 
The Lonely Passion 
of Judith Hearne 2.78 
Madame Sousatzka 3.49 
Maurice 1.577 
The Naked Cell 1.0 
Nature of the Beast 1.199 
On the Black Hill 0.744 
Pack of Lies 1.5 
Handmade 
Sousatzka Productions 
Maurice Productions 
Cinema and Theatre Seating 
Rosso Productions 
British Film Institute 
Tangent/Robert Halmi/CBS- 
Hallmark Hall of Fame 
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Paperhouse 1.5 Vestron 
Paris by Night 2.015 British Screen 
Pascali's Island 2.261 Avenue Pictures 
Poor Little Rich Girl 5.0 Lester Persky/ITC 
The Raggedy Rawney 2.0 Handmade 
Salome 0.65 Jolly Russell Co. 
Sammy and Rosie 
Get Laid 1.389 Working Title 
The Secret Policeman's 
Third Ball 0.4 Elephant House 
Shag 2.5 Palace/Myrtle 
Beach/Hemdale 
Sherlock and Me 3.76 ITC 
Shostakovich 1.3 Isolde Films 
Sour Sweet 1.9 First Film Co. 
Souvenir 2.75 Fancy Free Poductions 
Stealing Heaven 3.0 Amy International/Jadran 
Distant Voices, 
Still Lives 0.656 British Film Institute 
Stormy Monday 1.65 Moving Picture Co. 
A Summer Story 2.5 ITC 
Taffin 0.85 UBA/Rafford 
Testimony 1.1 Isolde/Mandimar/ORF/ 
NDS/Channel Four 
To Kill A Priest 6.0 Columbia/JP Productions 
(Paris) 
Track 29 5.0 Handmade 
Vroom 1.462 Motion Pictures/Film Four 
International/British 
Screen 
White Mischief 3.95 Umbrella Films 
Who Framed Roger Touchstone/Amblin 
Rabbit? 18.0 Entertainment 
Willow 20.0 Lucas Film/Image 
Entertainment 
A World Apart 2.715 Working Title 
(Source: primary. ) 
-95- 
The composition of output in 1987 apparently reveals a 
healthy production sector with a large and varied collection of 
films. But closer inspection enables one to recognise how 
impoverished and precarious activity had become by the late 
nineteen eighties. The majority of films were small: one third 
were low budget (costing less than Elk million) and a further 
44% were medium budget (£12 to £3 million inclusive). And their 
finance sources were stretched to their maximum and in danger 
of collapse. Indeed by 1990 and 1991, only twenty seven and 
twelve films were made respectively. 
Together, these cheap films (cf. the average cost of a 
Hollywood studio film of about $15 million) constitute the 
essential British industry. Their production depends largely on 
television money (in particular, that of Channel Four), and on 
the participation of British Screen Finance Ltd.. 
Alongside the involvement of commercial television 
companies' offshoots like Euston Films (Thames Television), 
Zenith (Central Television) and Granada, Channel Four's role 
constituted a large brick in the financial foundations: 
nineteen of the forty four medium and low budget films had 
Channel Four finance. British Screen supplemented this, twenty 
one of the forty four having Channel Four and/or British Screen 
input. 
For the period from 1981 (when Channel Four put in its 
first production finance) to 1989, an annual average of 55% of 
low budget output relied on these sources. And for the medium 
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budget sector, since 1983 (the first year of Channel Four's 
participation in the medium category), an average of 30%. 
However, Channel Four/British Screen and other television 
sources are neither large enough bricks in the foundations to 
support fully this small production house, nor are they bricks 
which are firmly cemented into the foundations. All parties are 
financially constrained, the future of British Screen itself is 
uncertain, and the participation of commercial television 
companies waned at the end of the decade in the light of the 
imminent franchise auction. 
Channel Four's funding allocation for feature film 
production between 1981 and 1990 grew from £6 million to £10 
million per annum, but the average cost of the films in which 
Channel Four participated increased from £400,000 to about £1.3 
million in this period. And while British Screen's grant from 
the Department of Trade and Industry is secured at £12 million 
per annum to 1994, its future depends on its shareholders 
(Granada, Rank, Cannon and Channel Four itself) not exercising 
their periodic right to withdraw their funds. 
Although these sources rarely provide 100% finance, it can 
be assumed that most of the films they were involved in in 1987 
would not have been made in their absence. Their support tends 
to have the effect of getting a project off the ground and of 
enabling a more persuasive approach to be made to the remaining 
finance sources. 
This is illustrated in the example of 'A World Apart' in 
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3.4, and, to take further examples from the 1987 films in Table 
14, 'American Roulette' which raised 52% of its budget from 
Channel Four, 25% from British Screen, and then the rest from 
the US independent distributor. 'Stormy Monday' was a slightly 
larger scale British production with a budget large enough to 
accommodate two minor American stars (a strategy frequently 
employed in the hope of giving the film 'marquee' in the US). 
The finance came 24% from Channel Four, 33% from British 
Screen, 25% from the American distributor Atlantic Releasing, 
and the remainder from elsewhere in the UK.. 
Table 14 also shows that in 1987, there were only eight 
larger budget films, (ie. costing more than £3 million) which 
were British productions, rather than American projects being 
made in Britain. Excluding Prominent Features' 'The Adventures 
of Baron Munchausen, ' which, almost uniquely in British 
production in the late nineteen eighties, was allowed to run 
enormously over budget, these films cost between £3 and £7 
million. 
This small sector was financed either, as the case study of 
Prominent's 'A Fish Called Wanda' illustrates in section 3.4, 
by Hollywood, or, more usually, by small British production 
companies, like Handmade or Umbrella, pre-selling to 
independent distributors. 
'Buster, ' which cost £3.3 million, was the most independent 
of independent British films, and its financing illustrates the 
difficulties facing producers. Norma Heyman, the producer of 
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'Buster, ' explained (interview, 1990) that her idea was 
the setting up of the finance along the lines of that of an 
earlier film, 'The Honourary Consul' (1982). This model 
involved pre-selling the film not on a world rights basis but 
territorially. The aim was that if the film failed commercially 
in the US, it would still be possible to make money elsewhere. 
Resultingly, of the target finance of $5.6 million, $3 
million was sought from the US and the remainder from the rest 
of the world. But 'Buster' turned out to be a very difficult 
film to finance. It was turned down for financing in the UK at 
an early stage. Ms. Heyman tried to finance the film at Cannes. 
Many bankers and sales agents were approached -a party was 
thrown. But various deals, including one important video 
interest, fell through. 
Eventually, the American film financiers, Hemdale, bought 
the US rights for $3 million supplying a letter of credit to 
facilitate borrowing. This took place through Pierson Heldring 
and Pierson (cf. 'A World Apart' in section 3.4) who brought in 
the British merchant bank Guinness Mahon as a fifty: fifty 
partner to defray what they perceived as risk. On this project, 
about $400,000 of additional finance was required to cover the 
various costs of bank financing and interest. 
The rest of the world was pre-sold territorially through 
sales agents leading to guarantees from distributors in the UK, 
Australia, Germany, Italy, and so on. As opposed to the Hemdale 
letter of credit, the sales agents, on the basis of these 
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territorial guarantees, put cash in. 
At a late stage, the budget still needed $600,000 to 
achieve full financing. A search in the UK for both City equity 
investment and production company investment was without 
reward. A promised private investment from the US fell through 
at the last minute. There may have been concern about the 
popularity of the subject matter (the Great Train Robbery) with 
US audiences, and that pop fans - of the film's lead, Phil 
Collins, a star of the US music scene - are not cinema goers. 
After all, there is a rule in Hollywood that holds that jazz 
films never succeed at the box office - indeed the commercial 
failure of two recent films, 'Round Midnight' (1986) and 'Bird' 
(1988), would suggest that music fans are not cinema goers. 
The financial crisis of 'Buster' meant that three weeks 
into the shooting, the terms arranged with the banks had to be 
renegotiated, and the fees of the producer and director 
deferred. Although the film turned out to be a success, Ms. 
Heyman, as such an independent producer, stressed that she 
expects to have to devote a day a week for the following seven 
years to matters associated with the 'Buster' project and 
related matters of distribution and collection. 
It is notable that five of the thirteen larger budget films 
made in the UK in 1987 are American productions, and these 
include three with 'mega' budgets: 'Empire of the Sun' - 
costing £23.75 million; 'Who Framed Roger Rabbit' - £18 
million; and 'Willow' - £20 million. 
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These films represented the very end of a fifteen year 
period of British studio activity for the ultimate of 
commercial Hollywood film makers, Stephen Spielberg, whose 
production company, Amblin Entertainment, made 'Empire of the 
Sun' and 'Who Framed Roger Rabbit, ' and George Lucas, whose 
Lucasfilm made 'Willow' in 1987. 
In 1975, motivated by Twentieth Century Fox's wish to have 
his proposed 'space opera' made as cheaply as possible, Lucas, 
with the assistance of the British producer Robert Watts 
(interview, 1990), hired the entire studio at Elstree on the 
then unprecedented 'four wall' basis, that is, he hired the 
studio itself but brought in his own crew. 
The film that Lucas made at Elstree was 'Star Wars, ' which, 
by the end of 1990, had become the second highest all-time box 
office hit in North America. Over the following twelve years at 
Elstree, Lucas and Watts made the other films of the 'Star 
Wars' trilogy, 'The Empire Strikes Back' (which was, by 
December 1990, the fifth most successful at the all- 
time North American box office) and 'Return of the Jedi' 
(third), and Spielberg and Watts made the 'Indiana Jones' 
cycle: 'Raiders of the Lost Ark' (eighth), 'Indiana Jones and 
the Temple of Doom' (tenth), and 'Indiana Jones and the Last 
Crusade' (ninth). (Robertson, 1991. ) 
The British film industry has always craved, above all, 
perhaps, success at the American box office. It is remarkable 
to note that, in this way, it has, in a sense, achieved it. 
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Adding 'Batman, ' which is in fourth position and was made at 
Pinewood in 1988, five of the top ten all-time North American 
box office hits are 'British' films - American films made in 
British studios. 
These films are important for the British industry because 
they keep the film studios viable - immediately after the 
Americans' departure, Cannon sold Elstree Studios and its very 
future was in doubt. Moreover, these films provide employment 
in the domestic sector, and contribute towards the crucial 
matter of keeping intact the industry's skills infrastructure. 
However, British employment created is not to the extent 
implied by the films' total costs: above the line costs, are 
typically very large on such films; post-production of the six 
'Star Wars' and 'Indiana Jones' films took place in Los 
Angeles; human action in 'Who Framed Roger Rabbit' was made in 
Hollywood; 'Empire of the Sun' was partly made on location in 
the Far East. Moreover, no matter how successful the films are, 
there is no spin off for British production generally. The 
'Star Wars' cycle belongs to Fox, and eventual profits on 
'Indiana Jones' and 'Batman' accrue to Paramount and Warners 
respectively. And when footloose American capital leaves, it is 
almost as if it has never been there. The British industry was 
left with the pathetic image of Pinewood not striking the 
'Batman' set in case, by chance, 'Batman 2' came its way. 
So the 'View From Downing Street, ' as Headland and Relph 
(1991) called it, was, in June 1990, a view which required one 
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to crane one's neck and peer back up a long slope of decline. 
Alternatively, one could look from side to side where the view 
through the mist was of an industry, unsupported by 
government policy, Hollywood capital, or national major 
studios, somehow managing to bring together funds for a small 
number of mainly cheap films from diverse - often television - 
sources. One could discern a dim flame: an almost irreducible 
minimum of British production just about keeping it alight. 
As few as thirty eight films were made in 1989. In the 
entire post-war period, there had only been fewer in 1981. But 
as if to gainsay those who argue that the British lack a truly 
cinematic imagination, these films covered a remarkably diverse 
range of subjects offering real cinematic characteristics. 
The continuum ran from Jeremy Thomas's exotic melodrama, 
'The Sheltering Sky, ' through the BFI's political thriller, 
'Fellow Traveller, ' to Parkfield's gangster film, 'The Krays, ' 
and Peter Greenaway's bizarre art house movie, 'The Cook, the 
Thief, His Wife and Her Lover'. 
Discerning through the mist that the British industry 
has the kind of writers, directors, producers, technicians and 
actors required to make such a rich collection of cinematic 
wealth in such a dilapidated environment, one might observe 
that as long as this human infrastructure remains intact, the 
British Film Industry is a success story waiting to happen. 
However, since the demise of Rank and ABPC as facilitators, 
there have only occasionally been British production companies 
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potentially of a sufficient size to support large numbers of 
British films. Can a large British film production company 
survive without being fully integrated into distribution? 
That the answer to this question is a firm 'no' is 
confirmed by a case study facilitated by Goldcrest, whose 
'Rise and Fall' (Eberts and Ilott, 1990) took place in a brief 
period during the first half of the nineteen eighties. It is a 
story which serves to re-emphasise the central importance in 
the film business of distribution. 
In January 1977, the Canadian entrepreneur, Jake Eberts, 
entered the finance of film development, setting up two small 
firms, Goldcrest and Firecrest. Film development, as opposed to 
film production, is the phase in which scripts are worked on, 
budgets drawn up, and principal casting decisions made. 
Development finance can be very profitable: the early 
investment (of £17,700) in the 1980 film 'Chariots of Fire' 
gave Goldcrest profits of £864,000. 
But activity did not remain confined to the development 
sector for long. Inspired by the success of 'Chariots of Fire, ' 
Goldcrest promptly started putting significant sums into 
production. A succession of investments in Sir Richard 
Attenborough's 'Gandhi, ' a somewhat precarious production 
given the propensity of others of its investors suddenly to 
withdraw, eventually came to about £5 million. And as Goldcrest 
rapidly completed its transition to fully fledged production 
company, the other major financing was of David Puttnam's films 
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'Local Hero' (made in 1982), and 'The Killing Fields' (1983), 
in which it invested £2.6 and £8.5 million respectively. Both 
films were to be profitable for Goldcrest. 
But in 1983, at the very moment Goldcrest, with its profits 
and prestige (there were eight Oscars for 'Gandhi'), seemed 
to have 'arrived' as an important British production company, 
there were already signs warning that its mortality was to be 
brief. 
The way in which Goldcrest was expanding was leading in 
management to a damaging upheaval and a destructive 
factionalism. This expansion was based on no business plan - 
'things just happened'. Thirty two subsidiaries, with a 
proliferation of management, appeared in this period. Among the 
subsidiaries was Goldcrest Television, set up as a vehicle for 
Puttnam's 'First Love' series. 
Goldcrest's entry into television production meant the 
creation of parallel lines of command and a resulting power 
vacuum. Moreover, for the remainder of Goldcrest's life, 
television was to be a constant drain on cash, turning out to 
be a larger aggregate source of loss than feature films. 
In spring 1984, after Eberts had left Goldcrest - it had 
travelled miles from his ideal of a small development 
financier; he was also in dispute over salary - there was a 
share issue to raise production funds. At this time, if 
'Gandhi' were removed from the calculation, Goldcrest's 
accumulated deficit was already £1.19 million. Its television 
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side was clearly never going to be profitable; its two most 
senior managers lacked credibility in the film business; and 
the members of its boards were polarised and in open revolt. 
The share issue went ahead and raised £12 million. Bank 
credit of £10 million supplemented this new production fund. 
New films were needed quickly. During the preceeding year of 
managerial turmoil, the lack of production had led, by mid 
1984, to a major cash flow crisis. Overheads had accelerated to 
£2.7 million per annum, while revenues from films going into 
exhibition had dried up. 
While it might have been a useful strategy to buy time by 
making some negative pick-ups to ease the cash flow position, 
it was at this point that Eberts successor, Sandy Leiberson 
drew up his disastrous slate, which, by September 1987, when 
Goldcrest was sold, had resulted in an accumulated Goldcrest 
deficit of £16.808 million. Of the seven projects, three were 
Puttnam's low(ish) budget 'research and development' films 
(which would account for £1.49 million of the deficit), there 
was also 'The Mission' (deficit: £2.88 million), 'Horror Movie' 
(never to be made), 'Absolute Beginners' (deficit: £2.82 
million), and finally 'Revolution' whose unsustainable 
contribution to the deficit would be £9.62 million. 
There were, it must be said, constraints on Leiberson: 
Goldcrest was tied to specific people - hence the Puttnam 
commitment; the films had to be British; and, despite the 
relative abundance of production money after the share issue, 
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Goldcrest still required a partner. That partner was Warners 
which had had a successful relationship with Eberts' Goldcrest, 
but for which, following some rather fraught meetings, the new 
Goldcrest management had no credibility. 
Warners turned down 'Horror Movie' and the risible 
'Absolute Beginners, ' and manoeuvred Goldcrest into a deal 
whereby any expenditure on 'Revolution' above the agreed budget 
would be Goldcrest's responsibility, not Warners'. It is 
extraordinary to note that Goldcrest itself acted as completion 
guarantor on 'Revolution, ' the budget for which was eventually 
£16 million and the total final cost £19 million. For its 
investment of £15.6 million, Goldcrest's share of revenues 
would eventually turn out to be only £6 million. 
Could Goldcrest have survived? Could a comparable British 
production company of the future survive? 
Goldcrest was a medium sized independent production company 
but behaved in the manner of a Hollywood major. The majors 
would have survived the loss making films: as Eberts put it 
(interview, 1990), 'the majors have very deep pockets, twenty 
five films a year, and, above all, control of the distribution 
sector'. 
To some considerable extent, it was the early profitability 
of 'Gandhi' which inspired subsequent attitudes. Indeed, 
throughout its production, 'Gandhi' had no distribution deal 
arranged whatsoever. Eberts position today is that this was 
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extremely unwise, that the risk was far too great. 
In his present company, Allied Film Makers, Eberts has been 
involved in films with a total investment of over $200 million 
- and he has pre-sold everything. For example, he raised the 
finance for the 1990 film 'Dances With Wolves' through the 
London sales agency Majestic Films. Although 'Dances With 
Wolves' could not be accommodated into the Hollywood mainstream 
for production finance purposes, it eventually won seven Oscars 
(including that for Best Film) in 1991 and had reached twenty 
fifth position in the all-time box office charts by the end of 
that year ('Variety, ' 1992). 
For Eberts, if one is in an equity position, 'it is 
impossible to cover the downside risk unless you are a major. 
Otherwise, it is like being in a casino and backing every bet 
that comes up - you will almost certainly run out of money 
sooner or later. The Majors could sustain a 'Revolution' 
because they are in the distribution business, so they take 
thirty per cent of the box office gross. They have twenty five 
films a year. And they have very deep pockets. These are the 
three points to stress. ' 
But, as it is clear that the key to prosperity for a 
production company with such an approach is direct 
participation in distribution, it is interesting to enquire 
whether a British producer could enter this sector. Cost 
barriers to entry are high: on several occasions Goldcrest 
considered expanding into distribution in the manner of the 
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majors. But to make sense of such an operation, it would have 
required an annual output of a rather larger number of 
films, at least $300 million in capital, and a much larger 
organisation - one staffed by perhaps three to four hundred 
people. 
British film makers, as is to be illustrated in the case 
studies in the following section, pre-sell where they can. The 
ideal for a British independent in this respect is to acquire a 
distribution deal with a Hollywood major. They control ninety 
per cent of the North American box office, and they are able to 
deliver very high quality distribution. Such an arrangement 
can be achieved through a negative pick-up (in which the studio 
agrees that it will buy the film for distribution on its 
completion) or (cf. 'A Fish Called Wanda, ' section 3.4) 
through securing direct studio finance of the project in 
exchange for the distribution rights. 
Such deals are difficult, to obtain, and a model, which was 
not a feature of the New Wave era (discussed in 3.2 below), has 
emerged: the pre-selling of rights in the US in the independent 
distribution sector. In the period of the following case 
studies in the mid-nineteen eighties, there was a proliferation 
of such independents. Although some remain strong, (Miramax and 
New Line, for example), many of them (such as Atlantic 
Releasing and Vestron) subsequently collapsed, thus making the 
situation yet more difficult for the independent British 
producer. 
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The demise of Goldcrest has served as a reminder of what 
one might call the First Principle of the Film Business - that 
access to distribution is crucial. 
The contemorary case studies in section 3.4 throw light on 
the methods by which, in recent years, in an environment 
without government support and lacking a Goldcrest, and in 
which, with the withdrawal ofthe British 'majors' from 
production - section 3.3, there is no production/distribution 
link, a relatively few British film makers have managed to 
raise finance for a varied selection of mainly low cost 
subjects. 
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3.2 The Case of the 'New Wave' 
It has often been argued that the decline of the British 
film industry has been the result of some combination of the 
factors noted on page 6: the role of the British 'majors' and, 
inter alia, their monopoly power in the exhibition circuits; 
the American dominance of the distribution sector; the 
shortcomings of government policy in support of indigenous 
activity; the lack of finance for domestic production and the 
corresponding cost constraints under which production in 
practice has taken place; and the weakness of the product 
itself, originating possibly from an alleged lack of a truly 
cinematic sensibility within the British creative imagination. 
It is proposed to establish the nature of the above 
mentioned factors - possible contributors to decline - in the 
light of a brief episode in British film production: the 
achievement, and sudden demise, of the British 'New Wave' of 
1958 to 1962. 
In 1958, the film of John Braine's novel 'Room at the Top' 
represented the beginning of this new cinematic wave. It was 
the first of a succession of British feature films which were 
concerned largely with a realistic portrayal of working class 
life, usually in the north of England, by actors deploying 
authentic regional accents. 
A raw melodrama would be played out against the urban grit 
and grime of a tough industrial landscape with a blunt anti- 
hero figure rebelling against the depressing traditional social 
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norms. In these films, the British preoccupations of sex and 
social class were central. They were discussed in a more 
thorough and frank manner than had ever been the case before in 
the British cinema. 
The life of this 'social realism' cycle was short: by the 
time of Tony Richardson's 'Loneliness of the Long Distance 
Runner' in 1962, it was about to enter its decline phase - the 
New Wave had begun to run into the sand. But, however brief, 
this era of British film production was momentous for the films 
made in this short period in many ways succeeded in satisfying 
almost every possible expectation one might have of the 
performance of a national film industry: 
(a) creativity: they brought to cinematic fruition latent 
talent in all branches of the productive process: directors 
(Clayton, Schlesinger, Richardson), producers (Saltzman, 
Janni), new independent production companies (Woodfall, 
Bryanston), camaramen (Lassally), and new actors (Finney, 
Courtenay, Bates). 
(b) national archive: many of these films endow a permanent 
authentic record of large aspects of national social life at an 
important moment in time, the point when post-war austerity is 
about to give way to nineteen sixties liberalism. 
(c) efficiency: most of these films were made under 
(enforced) conditions of extreme cost constraint: where the 
average cost of a first feature made in Britain in 1958 was 
about £180,000, 'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning' cost 
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£100,000 and 'A Taste of Honey' £120,000. 
(d) profitability: 'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning' made 
profits of £2 million for its British production companies, 
Bryanston and Woodfall, and 'A Kind of Loving' enjoyed a 
British box office gross of £450,000 which was about four times 
the average for a domestic feature. 
(e) success in America: 'Room at the Top, ' which won two 
'Oscars, ' turned in a profit in the U. S.. And at one remove 
from the Social Realism cycle was the Woodfall-Richardson- 
Osborne-Lassally-Finney costume picture 'Tom Jones, ' made in 
1962. This was one of the largest ever British box office hits 
in America. 
These successes demonstrate that the British film industry 
IS capable of thriving; that the very concept of a 'British 
film industry' need not somehow be a contradiction in terms. 
And in attempting to understand the environment of decline 
that has so frequently surrounded the industry, it is most 
useful to investigate - within this episode - both the role of 
the usual barriers to the flourishing of British activity, and 
the reasons for the purely temporary nature of the boom. 
On May 8th. 1956, The English Stage Company presented John 
Osborne's play 'Look Back in Anger' at the Royal Court Theatre 
in London. This production inaugurated the 'Angry Young Man' 
era in both the theatre and in literature. It would seem 
natural that there should have been an important cinematic 
counterpart to this upsurge in creative activity. However, the 
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birth of this New Wave of British films was long delayed and 
difficult. 
Initially in 1956, there was the short lived 'Free Cinema' 
of Lindsay Anderson and others, itself a revival of the British 
Documentary Movement founded in the nineteen thirties by John 
Grierson. Free Cinema specialised in poetic, humanist 
documentaries - Anderson's '0 Dreamland' dealt with life at a 
fairground; Karel Reisz's 'We are the Lambeth Boys' with the 
situation of a group of working class teenagers. 
For films to succeed commercially, it was indispensible 
that either Rank or The Associated British Picture Corporation 
(ABPC), which jointly monopolised the cinema exhibition sector, 
granted them a place on their exhibition circuits. This was not 
provided in the case of Free Cinema. And what might then have 
led to a sustained commercial and artistic revival of the 
British film was therefore stifled when no finance was 
forthcoming to extend it. 
There was a delay of three years before 'Room at the Top, ' 
the first of the New Wave films, was eventually made. The 
extreme conservatism of Rank and ABPC, whose agreement in 
principle to exhibit such films would have been sufficient to 
facilitate their making, can be partially explained by their 
dread of the then fairly new 'X' censorship certificate (which 
was introduced in 1951). Not only was such a rating thought 
likely for any 'angry' film, but was felt - wrongly - to be 
probable box office poison. 
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That the attachment of 'X' certificates could indeed be 
anticipated can be surmised from the single sentence film 
summaries of Gifford (1986). On 'Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning, ' for example: 'Nottingham factory hand impregnates 
workmate's wife, seduces girl and decides to marry her'. Or 
'Room at the Top': 'Yorkshire - ambitious clerk weds pregnant 
heiress, causing death of his married mistress'. 
Such conservatism as that of Rank and ABPC was tied in with 
an extreme general reluctance in the film establishment to 
recognise change. Moreover, there was a snobbishness which 
found the likely combination of sex and the lower social 
classes (despite the atonement of eventual marriage) to be 
offensive. The British exhibition sector was uneasy with any 
rejection of its own ideas of standards of social propriety. 
The film of 'Room at the Top, ' which received a stuffy 
reception from the British critics but an enthusiastic one from 
the audience, was eventually made in 1958 by Remus, an 
independent production company set up by John and James Woolf. 
Their existing company, Romulus, had the distinction 
(shared in the nineteen fifties only by Ealing) of making 
several internationally successful British films including, in 
1951, 'The African Queen'. 
It is Woodfall, however, which is the production company 
most associated with the New Wave. In an attempt to finance a 
film of 'Look Back in Anger, ' Woodfall was set up by that 
film's creative personnel - Richardson, Osborne and Richard 
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Burton. In partnership with the American film entrepreneur 
Harry Saltzman (later, the co-producer of the James Bond 
films), Woodfall was able to get Warner Brothers to back the 
project. But this finance meant a lower budget than that of 
'Room at the Top' (£250,000 rather than £280,000), and was only 
forthcoming on the basis that Warners were owed a film by 
Burton and would have to pay him whether or not he made one. 
Neither 'Look Back in Anger' in 1958 nor Woodfall's next 
film, another Osborne adaptation, 'The Entertainer, ' succeeded 
at the box office. The latter cost approximately £250,000.75% 
of the finance was obtained from Bryanston Films. This was a 
consortium of film makers, led by Sir Michael Balcon, set up in 
1959 in an attempt to circumvent the perennial shortage of 
production funds by raising finance on the joint reputations of 
participants (Michael Relph, Basil Dearden and Ronald Neame). 
Most of the remainder of the finance for 'The Entertainer' 
was obtained from the NFFC which had been set up in 1949 to 
help alleviate the eternal shortage of British production 
funds. Its role was to lend the 'end money, ' ie. the final 
twenty five or thirty per cent of the budget required after the 
main source had been secured. 
At this point, the key film of the period was in prospect: 
'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning'. The original owner of this 
property, Joseph Janni, the Anglo-Italian producer, had been 
turned down in his attempts to get the film made by both Rank 
and British Lion. He had then reluctantly sold the book to 
Woodfall. 
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But without a commercial success on either previous 
production, it was a very difficult film for Woodfall to 
finance - and subsequently to have exhibited. The budget was 
pared down to the extremely low figure of £100,000 with a short 
six week shooting schedule before Bryanston and NFFC money was 
secured. 
On completion, 'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning' was 
disliked by the cinema establishment and was not shown. Its 
eventual exhibition in the West End was a decision made at the 
eleventh hour on the basis of Warners' need to meet their 
screen 'quota' obligations. The quota, the second of the three 
arms of government film policy noted in section 2.4, meant that 
thirty per cent of the 'long' films shown by an exhibitor had 
to be British. 
The exhibitors allocated a very low advertising budget 
which was supplemented personally by Saltzman. But it is 
interesting to note that, on counting the large initial box 
office takings from what was to become a very profitable 
film, the establishment instantly performed a volte-face: 
Hollywood finance was offered to Woodfall for the next New Wave 
film, 'A Taste of Honey, ' and Albert Finney, whose Arthur 
Seaton was the central character in 'Saturday Night and Sunday 
Morning, ' was assigned, by Columbia for their forthcoming epic, 
the role of Lawrence of Arabia! 
Belatedly, the constraints eased and Janni was able to 
obtain 100% financing - rare indeed - for his contribution, 'A 
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Kind of Loving. ' Also in 1961, Woodfall was backed by Bryanston 
- whose finances had been unlocked by the profits they had made 
from 'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning' - to make 'A Taste of 
Honey'. (Hollywood money was turned down due to its condition 
that Audrey Hepburn replace the unknown Rita Tushingham. ) 
Both films were profitable. But Woodfall's next film (with 
Bryanston), 'The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, ' in 
1962, was essentially the last film in this cycle. Consumer 
taste had begun to move on: the central gloom of the British 
New Wave had become over-familiar, and a growing mood of 
confidence and affluence was exerting itself as a 
countervailing force to the grim milieu of the Arthur Seatons 
and Joe Lamptons. 
Remarkably, Woodfall instantly adjusted in the most 
phenomenally successful way. As always, there was no formula to 
show what kind of British film will succeed in America, but 
Woodfall produced a large (British) budget (£350,000) costume 
picture which won three Oscars and made $40 million profits. 
The film was 'Tom Jones' (1963). 
In the financing of this film, Bryanston initially agreed 
to put up 70% of the budget. But when costs escalated, they 
lost their nerve and dropped out (Walker, 1974). United Artists 
took over, backing Woodfall with 100% finance. Had Bryanston 
stayed in, they would, like Woodfall, have made several million 
pounds. In the event, their fortunes dwindled, and, in 1965, 
they were taken over by television - Rediffusion TV merely 
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wanted to acquire their library of thirty films for showing on 
television. 
In the wake of the success of 'Tom Jones, ' domestic 
suppliers of independent finance were further diminished as 
Hollywood entered a period of readily financing British film 
makers. During 1967 and 1968, ninety per cent of the finance of 
all films made in Britain was coming from the Americans. But 
the consequence of this, as Park (1990) has observed, was that 
when the Americans over-extended themselves and then withdrew 
from Britain at the end of the sixties, there was almost 
nothing left in the form of a mechanism to finance British 
films that British producers could fall back on. 
The events outlined above stand as a useful microcosmic 
view of the British film industry at large. They give insight 
in relation to that combination of factors noted on page 6 as 
being the major characteristics of the industry and forces 
inimical to a consistently buoyant national film sector. 
There are six central factors: 
1. The British 'Majors': 
Rank and ABPC - the British 'majors' - and their 
stranglehold on the circuits was an important negative factor 
in the above scenario. Table 1 on page 19 shows declining 
cinema admissions throughout the 1950s. But the figures show 
that the annual decline, which had averaged 7% in 1955 and 
1956, rose to a crisis level of 20% in 1957, followed 
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by 17.5% and 23% in 1958 and 1959. 
The response of Rank and ABPC was retrenchment, cutting 
back on production (there were hundreds of redundancies at 
Pinewood, for example, in 1958), shaping the smaller number of 
films for specified foreign markets, and placing a further 
squeeze on the independent sector. 
But if ever there was a time when the solution was to be 
found in expanding domestic activity and facilitating the 
wealth of British material and talent that was being kept 
waiting in the wings, then this was it. The prejudice and lack 
of judgement which characterised the British majors' 
mismanagement of their monopoly was to be severely exposed by 
the profitability of some of the films which were eventually 
made. 
2. The Hollywood Presence in Distribution and Production. 
The American industry's presence was less than helpful in 
this situation. No interest was expressed in Britain at this 
time apart from that related to relatively cheap off-shore 
Hollywood production, and the ensuring, through their control 
of the distribution sector, of profitable British exhibition of 
the major studios' product. Local production aspirations were 
irrelevant - except in the case of 'Look Back in Anger' where 
it was hoped to cut an already contracted loss. 
But with its customary cynicism, Hollywood suddenly made 
money available to British independent producers after 
'Saturday Night and Sunday Morning' became a hit. That this 
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film was ever made was pure good fortune - Bryanston, after the 
failure of 'The Entertainer, ' was only just able to finance it. 
American finance of British production, when it did arrive in 
an important way from the mid 1960s was extremely volatile and 
its sudden removal had serious consequences for British 
production. 
3. British Government Film Policy. 
In praise of British government policy for the 
assistance of production, David Puttnam has made the point 
(interview, 1990) that the triumph of 'Saturday Night 
and Sunday Morning' was entirely due to the combination of 
government support measures then in operation: the Eady Levy, 
which subsidised Bryanston's production money, the NFFC, which 
put up 30% of the production finance, and the quota, which was 
the incentive for Warners' to present the film for exhibition 
in London. 
That without these instruments of support policy the 
situation would have been even worse is certainly the case. 
However, this market improving mechanism was not sufficient to 
promote the British New Wave at an early stage, and remained of 
little relevance so long as a producer was unable to find a 
source for the initial 70% financial input. And this was the 
central problem in the first place. 
4. Finance for Independent Production: 
The key to the unlocking of finance for production in the 
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New Wave scenario was the distribution sector. But this was 
monopolised by the restrictive practices of the British and 
American majors as the Monopolies Commission (1966) would 
shortly make clear following its investigation into the 
exhibition sector. Frustration with the lack of access to the 
circuits, among other problems, had led British Lion, the main 
distributor of independent British production at this time, to 
scale down activity. 
When finance did eventually come, it was via two of the 
very few remaining possible sources (in the form of Romulus - 
Remus, and then Bryanston). That these independents were viable 
in this way in the environment outlined was pure chance. And it 
is indeed the case that, as an indirect consequence of the 
events discussed, this small sector would be further squeezed. 
5. Production Cost Constraints. 
It is possible that there is some substance to the 
allegation that hopes of a successful British film industry are 
fundamentally flawed because the British creative personality 
lacks a specifically cinematic imagination. Whatever the truth 
of this, the fact that British producers are so often consigned 
to making films at extremely low cost can have the effect of 
making it LOOK as if flair for the medium is missing. 
When average British budgets are forced as low as £180,000 
(and down to £100,000 as was the case with 'Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning' for example), the finished film will not be 
able to exhibit the kind of production values that will make it 
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look like 'cinema'. It will be difficult for the film to 
compete with more adequately funded products - as early as the 
nineteen thirties the one million dollar movie was commonplace 
in the major studios' output in the US. And failure of any one 
film to so compete invariably leads to even further budgetary 
constraint next time around, and thus a reinforcement of the 
producer's competitive disadvantage. 
Moreover, the low budget means that only a short shoot will 
be afforded, such as the six weeks for 'Saturday Night and 
Sunday Morning'. This too will affect the look of the picture 
because such a schedule leads, for instance, to the 
minimisation of the time available for the experimentation with 
and preparation of the lighting of set-ups. 
As luck would have it, these limitations to what a low 
budget film's maker is able to put on the screen were not as 
harmful in the specific case of the grimly realistic films of 
the British New Wave as with British output more generally. It 
is notable that when the New Wave cycle had run its course, 
there was not a renewal of success, except in the form of 'Tom 
Jones'. While a wide variety of factors brought about that 
film's immense success, it may not be without significance that 
it was indeed an expensive film. 
6. The Nature of the Product. 
There are some commentators, Walker (1974), for example, 
who have argued that, although the preceeding observations 
might indeed hold much water, a further factor acting against 
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the establishment of a thriving British film industry has been 
a trait endemic to the British personality. That is, there is a 
lack of a specifically cinematic sensibility within the British 
creative imagination. And, in turn, this has meant that British 
activity in a market where product differentiation is central 
has carried a permanent competitive disadvantage. 
The British New Wave as a case study is a useful vehicle 
for making this point. The Angry Young Man era in the theatre 
and the novel provided an ideal springboard for the creative 
rennaissance of a purely British film. 
But when British film makers eventually had their 
opportunity, they produced a cinema which was purely imitative 
of the dramatic/literary medium. Unlike either the exceptional 
and short lived Free Cinema, which preceeded them, or the 
'auteurs' of the simultaneous French New Wave, they were 
unable, it is argued, to turn the stimulus into a purely 
cinematic phenomenon. They were incapable of producing the 
creative leap forward that would have sustained their work as 
cinema. 
The New Wave in the British cinema did not extend the 
literary sources - it merely reproduced them on the screen. 
This left the cinematic revival entirely dependent on the 
supply of 'angry' literature, and, when this subsided, the 
films had no momentum of their own to keep them going. 
Having begun to identify the nature of the basic factors 
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which have tended to dominate the British film business, it is 
proposed to progress in section 3.3, by following on from the 
specific case of the New Wave to a wider level of review of the 
problems of the industry in which the performance of the 
duopolists is examined. 
Further insight is then afforded by a return to case study 
investigation in section 3.4 which examines how, against the 
background of constraint, contempoary output is fashioned - 
four recent projects are considered. 
The concluding analysis of the chapter (3.5) is based on 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm. 
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3.3 The Performance of the Duopolists. 
During the New Wave, the British majors played only a very 
minor role. In this section, the role of the duopolists is 
analysed for the years 1946 to 1970. 
This crucial period of a quarter of a century encompasses 
the essential decline of the industry, running from something 
of a false dawn immediately after the war through a succession 
of crises in the British, American and governmental sectors of 
the industry. 
In 1946, there was a stark contrast between cinema 
attendance and the level of production of films in Britain. 
While admissions reached 
British output consisted 
immediate post-war level 
until 1981. 
Although there was a 
demand and the output of 
high. There was a mood o 
sector. This is revealed 
For example, in 'The 
their all-time peak level in 1946, 
of only thirty seven long films. This 
was to be lower than any other year 
dramatic imbalance between box office 
British films in 1946, confidence was 
f optimism in the British production 
in the contemporary trade newspapers. 
Cinema' for 2nd. January 1946, where 
the atmosphere conveyed is confident and expansionary from a 
British point of view, British Lion boast that, for their 
studios in Isleworth, 'An ambitious programme is planned of 
large scale productions with top rank stars, and designed for 
the world market. ' Butcher's Film Service (described as 
'Britain's oldest established film [continued on page 129] 
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Figure 2. THE RANK 'EMPIRE, ' 1934 to 1948. 
J. Arthur Rank: 
Co-f British National 
Films, 1934. 
Rank & Woolf co-f Gen- 
Cinema Finance Corpor- 
ation, 1936. 
Pinewood Stuios, 1936. 
GBPC takenover by 
Rank, 1940 inc. 
Gainsborough, Is- 
lington & Lime 
Grove Studios + 
Gaumont circuit. 
Korda's Denham 
Studio acquired 
by Rank, 1938. 
--> 
<--- 
-----------J 
Two Cities f del Guidice 
1937. From '43 financed 
by Rank through GFD. 
1947-acquired by Rank. 
<------- Odeon circuit acqu- 
ired, 1941. Rank's 
cinemas=650 total. 
Independent Producers 
from 1943 for Rank 
to finance & distrib 
various film makers: 
the Archers f Powell 
& Pressburger-parted 
Rank after Red Shoes 
Individual Producers 
f Launder & Gilliat 
Cineguild f R. Neame 
Wessex f I. Dalrymple 
Rank's rivals post-war: 
Korda=British Lion (K. 
control) + London (K. 
owned). 
ABPC=ABC circuit+Els- 
tree Studios+etc. 
------> 
<-- General Film Distributors 
f C. M. Woolf, 1935. 
Tie with Universal. 
V 
<------ 
Ealing Films: distrib 
-exhib. deal with 
Rank, 1944: 75% Rank 
finance. 56 films in 
Rank/Ealing tie inc. 
Ealing 'greats'. 
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Eagle Lion f Rank 
1944-world distrib 
United World Pict- 
ures f Rank + Uni- 
versal, 1947 for 
US distrib. 
[continued from p 127] company of producers and 
distributors') plan five films. And their producers - like 
British National Films - advertise firm, if somewhat more 
moderate, proposals. 
Furthermore in this issue General Film Distributors, the 
distribution arm of Rank's interests, adbertise 'twelve 
forthcoming British pictures' (something of an underestimate in 
fact) which have been made under the aegis of Rank finance: two 
from Gainsborough, three from Two Cities, two from the Archers, 
two from IP, two from Sydney Box and one from John Corfield. 
However, the implication of GFD's announcements in this 
issue is that they are particularly proud of the programme of 
Hollywood films, including nineteen from Universal, which they 
have arranged to distribute in Britain during the year. 
Similarly, British Lion, also producer-distributors, announced 
that they were to be the British distributors for the low 
budget Hollywood mini studio Republic Pictures, seeing 
themselves as good examples of the American-British harmony 
which they feel should reign. 
Figure 2 illustrates the scale of Rank's 'Empire'. This 
dominated the production sector in the immediate post-war 
period, as is shown by Table 15 (on page 130), and 
facilitated a wide range of producers. It accounted for about 
half of British production. Table 15 also shows that in the 
longer term, Rank's role as the mainstay of a British 
production sector steadily receded. 
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Table 15. 
NUMBERS OF 
Production, 
FILMS PRODUCED AND MARKET SHARES of British 
1946 to 1970. 
RANK ABPC US MAJORS INDEPENDENTS 
1946 46 17 8 3 5 2 41 15 
1947 54 26 6 3 0 0 40 19 
1948 49 34 3 2 4 3 44 30 
1949 49 41 6 5 4 3 41 35 
1950 27 19 9 6 9 6 55 39 
1951 21 14 5 3 6 4 68 45 
1952 19 16 1 1 6 5 74 63 
1953 20 17 5 4 8 7 67 57 
1954 24 21 0 0 6 5 70 62 
1955 26 18 1 1 0 0 73 52 
1956 22 17 0 0 4 3 74 59 
1957 20 18 2 2 3 3 69 63 
1958 18 17 3 3 3 3 66 64 
1959 22 17 1 1 3 2 74 58 
1960 20 16 1 1 7 6 72 59 
1961 12 9 4 3 12 9 72 56 
1962 13 12 2 2 11 10 74 67 
1963 15 14 3 3 9 8 73 66 
1964 5 3 0 0 11 7 84 53 
1965 11 8 0 0 13 9 76 55 
1966 15 10 0 0 12 8 73 49 
1967 10 8 1 1 9 7 80 64 
1968 4 3 0 0 12 9 84 62 
1969 8 7 0 0 17 14 75 64 
1970 7 7 9 9 8 8 76 " 78 
[Sou rce: adapted from Gifford (1986), 
Warren ( 1983), and Falk 
(1987). ] 
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The early and mid nineteen forties was a period in which J. 
Arthur Rank applied his dominance as a financier of production 
with some benevolence. Certain film makers were given a free 
hand in creative decision making with little account taken of 
the distributors' view. 
Table 16 on pages 140 and 141 examines the composition of 
the Rank 'Production Empire' between 1946 and 1970 and it shows 
that one of the briefly prolific production companies under the 
aegis of Rank at the beginning of this period was Two Cities. 
It was founded in 1937 by Filippo del Giudice, a refugee from 
Mussolini's Italy. Financed by British Lion rather than Rank, 
it established itself by producing Noel Coward's 'In Which We 
Serve' in 1942 at a final cost of £240,000 which was some way 
over its budget of £180,000. 
This was a remarkable film in a number of ways. It had a 
major propaganda role in the war; it was a critical success [to 
the extent that 'Newsweek, ' quoted by Halliwell (1977, page 
445), regarded it as "One of the screen's proudest achievements 
at any time and in any country"]; it took $2 million at the 
American box office; and it enabled both David Lean and Richard 
Attenborough to make their debuts in directorial and acting 
roles respectively. 
To later regret, C. M. Woolf of Rank's General Film 
Distributors had passed over the opportunity to finance 'In 
Which We Serve'. But with the profits from 'Pygmalion' (see 
below) to invest, Rank agreed to finance Two Cities' subsequent 
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films in exchange for a controlling interest in Two Cities. 
These productions included the Coward adaptations 'This Happy 
Breed' in 1944 and 'Blithe Spirit' in 1945, and Laurence 
Olivier's 'Henry V' in 1944. 
As a producer, del Guidice's philosophy was to spend 
lavishly on production. And it can be noted that in this brief 
phase of Rank production, there were relatively few constraints 
on financially profligate creativity. 'Henry V, ' for example, 
which would indeed turn out to be very profitable, required 
£475,000 of Rank's finance. And another very important Two 
Cities film produced under Rank, Carol Reed's 'Odd Man Out, ' 
also incurred high costs, running one third over budget. 
Although del Giudice paved the way for the freedom of the 
IP system of production at Rank (see below), that Rank's cash 
in this era was not a cornucopia is illustrated in the case of 
Gabriel Pascal, the maker of the notoriously expensive 'Caesar 
and Cleopatra'. 
Before the war, Pascal, a Hungarian immigrant, had 
succeeded where others, including Alexander Korda, had failed 
in persuading George Bernard Shaw to renew permission for his 
plays to be filmed. Indeed, Pascal felt that it was his divine 
mission to make films of Shaw's plays. 
Flattered by Pascal, Shaw consented to the filming of 
'Pygmalion. ' This was made in 1938 with Rank's financial 
backing given to Pascal, but, as he was then little known, only 
on condition of a completion guarantee being in place in case 
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the film went over budget. 
On 'Pygmalion, ' Pascal began to develop his reputation as 
the most financially irresponsible film maker in Britain. 
However, the film only went over budget to the extent covered 
by the guarantees and it turned out to be the most profitable 
film of 1939, the biggest box office success in the US since 
Korda's 'The Private Life of Henry VIII, ' and the source of 
five Oscar nominations (including one for Shaw himself). 
On this basis, Rank's finance was forthcoming for Pascal's 
next Shavian project, 'Major Barbara'. This production at 
Denham in 1940 - Pinewood was requisitioned in the war and 
Korda's studio had fallen into Rank's hands - was over budget 
with the shooting of the film taking more than twice the 
scheduled time. Moreover, it was not a box office success. 
After abortive attempts at 'Arms and the Man' and 'Saint 
Joan, ' Pascal's last film for Rank (his only other film would 
be 'Androcles and the Lion, ' made for RKO in 1952) was the most 
expensive British film ever made (£1,278,000): 'Caesar and 
Cleopatra' was released in 1946 having taken over two years to 
complete. The cost escalated as a result of the lavishness of 
the sets of ancient Alexandria built at Denham, and the 
location work in Egypt to where, film folklore has it, sand was 
imported in order to obtain the 'correct' colour. 
Pascal, who was both director and producer of 'Caesar and 
Cleopatra, ' had insisted on the hiring of prominent actors at 
high fees even for minor roles. The ACT censured him and in 
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effect forbade him from working in British studios, while for 
Rank, the limits of expenditure had been breached and Pascal's 
next project, 'Saint Joan, ' was cancelled. 
There can be little doubt, however, that the vast majority 
of Rank's film makers felt no constraint whatsoever during the 
nineteen forties. David Lean, for example, is quoted in the mid 
forties by Perry (1976, page 60): 
'I doubt if any other group of film makers 
anywhere in the world can claim as much freedom. 
We can make any subject we wish with as much 
money as we think that subject should have 
spent upon it. We can cast whatever actors we 
choose, and we have no interference at all in 
the way the film is made. No one sees the films 
until they are finished, and no cuts are made 
without the consent of the director or producer, 
and what's more, not one of us is bound by any 
form of contract. We are there because we want 
to be there. Such is the enviable position of 
British film makers today. ' 
The group of film makers to which Lean referred was 
Independent Producers Ltd.. IP was a collection of small 
production units including Cineguild which was that of Lean, 
Havelock-Allen and Neame; Dalrymple's Wessex Productions; 
Powell and Pressburger's Archers; and Launder and Gilliat's 
Individual Pictures. The idea of IP, as can be seen from Lean's 
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comment, was that these units would be consolidated within the 
Rank empire in such a way as to facilitate creativity by 
minimising extraneous business intrusions. IP, founded in 1942, 
would handle business and legal matters on their behalf. 
This arrangement led to the production of some of the most 
memorable British films - Lean's 'Great Expectations' made in 
1946 and 'Oliver Twist' in 1947, for example. The latter was 
banned in the US on the basis of the supposed anti-semitism in 
Alec Guinness's Fagin. But it is interesting that, while the 
danger of such a ban was anticipated, there was no interference 
to adjust the characterisation despite the potential reduction 
in profits. 
Powell and Pressburger's contribution was also very worthy. 
It included 'Black Narcissus, ' for example, which won two 
Oscars (art direction and photography) in 1948, and 'The Red 
Shoes' made in 1947. The latter eventually broke the North 
American box office record for a British film (and would become 
the only British film in later years to be included in the 
US all time top 100 box office hits). It would be held in high 
critical regard given its exquisite ballet and art direction. 
But what is significant is that, although it was still 
possible under IP for the initial, inadequate budget of 
£300,000 to be raised to £560,000, Powell and Pressburger came 
to be criticised at Rank for their extravagance. 
Indeed, this was an example of how the golden era of 
unconstrained artistic freedom under Rank was starting to end, 
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and to do so relatively rapidly. Writing many years later, 
Powell, in his autobiography, still seemed to be upset at the 
"chilling reception accorded to 'The Red Shoes' by Arthur and 
John, " that is Arthur Rank and John Davis, the Rank executive 
who would shortly become the austere head of production. 
For Powell, the explanation seemed to be a matter of Rank's 
failure to secure wide distribution in the US -a failure which 
would inevitably mean that most of these expensive films would 
be loss making. 'The Red Shoes' was the kind of high brow film 
that Rank and Davis could not understand, and, without the 
prospect of profit at that time, they greeted it with disdain: 
'It seemed incredible to us now that they 
hated the film because they didn't understand 
it, and they tried to kill it because they hated 
it. There's no other way to explain it. They were 
afraid that their newly acquired shareholders 
would notice that the Archers' new production 
with a budget of half a million pounds or more, 
was a flop, so they rushed it out as soon as it 
was finished, and took it off the market as 
soon as they could. ' 
(Powell, 1986. Page 663. ) 
This is in extreme contrast to the idyllic environment of 
IP film making described four years earlier by Lean. But Powell 
and Pressburger's disillusion with the new circumstances at 
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Rank and the concomitant cost cutting and criticism for 
exceeding budgets was to become a commonly held feeling among 
Rank's film makers and one which contributed to the break up of 
IP before the end of the nineteen fifties. 
According to Falk (1987, page 51), Davis who was 'arrogant, 
ruthless and often plain rude... created an atmosphere of fear 
and loathing as he revived the fortunes of the Organisation'. 
Without a sustained position in US distribution and 
exhibition, the sheer scale of Rank's nineteen forties budgets 
was untenable. On film production in 1946, Rank made a loss of 
£1,667,000. When this loss was announced in the autumn of 1947, 
it coincided with the government's imposition of the 75% import 
duty on foreign films. This is discussed in sections 2.2 and 
3.5 where the adverse impact of the crisis is noted. 
Under the instant retaliatory MPEAA boycott, no American 
films would be allowed into Britain. The government asked Rank 
to make films to fill the gap, and, in November 1947, Rank 
announced an investment programme of £9.25 million for 47 
films, later to become 36 and finally 32. 
The full extent of the crisis for Rank can be observed 
when, in May 1948, the American boycott 
Rank's investment programme started to 
exactly this time and were swept aside 
backlog of Hollywood product. 
Rank's existing financial problems 
the task of raising funds for the 1947 
t was ended. The films in 
come to fruition at 
in the avalanche of the 
had been exacerbated by 
investment programme 
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f 
which required the formerly financially segregated, and 
constantly very profitable Odeons, to become involved in the 
highly volatile area of financing production. There was much 
resistance to this, and Rank was highly criticised in the City 
press. 
By 1949, Rank was heavily in debt, owing £16 million to the 
National Provincial Bank. The crisis threatened to end film 
production altogether. 
Michael Powell had observed (above) the rising influence of 
the Rank executive and City accountant John Davis, and it was 
at this stage that he took over as production head and 
introduced an austerity programme which to a considerable 
extent would account for Rank as a source of serious film 
production. 
Against this background of debt and unprofitability, and 
the first perceptions of television as a further threat, 
Davis's measures included the sale of Lime Grove Studios to the 
BBC, the effective closure of Denham Studios (the largest in 
the country), and the closure of Gainsborough Studios at 
Islington. 
Gainsborough Pictures, co-founded by Balcon in 1924, had 
been acquired by Rank in 1940 on taking over Gaumont British. 
Table 16 on page 140 indicates the considerable relative 
importance of Gainsborough in Rank production in the second 
half of the nineteen forties. Indeed, after 1946, when the 
running of Gainsborough was taken over by Sydney Box, following 
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his successful production under Rank's finances of 'The Seventh 
Veil, ' it was intended that there should be a slate of twenty 
five films per annum. 
Gainsborough had been a highly commercial producer of very 
British costume melodramas, and its leading players, Margaret 
Lockwood and James Mason (a scathing contemporary critic of 
Rank's monopoly), were among the top box office stars of the 
period. The apotheosis of Gainsborough, Lockwood and Mason was 
the costume drama, 'The Wicked Lady' in 1946. 
Del Giudice had lost control of Two Cities to Rank in 1947. 
(He then went to Hollywood, before returning home to retire to 
a Roman monastery. ) Rank's production was restricted to 
Pinewood, under the control, from 1951, of another important 
Rank executive of this period, the American Earl St. John. The 
idea was that, as a former cinema circuit manager, St. John 
would know what kind of productions might find popularity in 
exhibition. 
Davis's plan was for cheap, popular films with little in 
the way of experimentation. Production funds were cut and 
£150,000 was set as the maximum budget per film. There were 
many managerial redundancies and a 10% pay cut for survivors. 
In 1950, Rank's share of British production fell below that 
of the independents. Its output of films fell from 41 in 1949 
to 19 in 1950 and 14 in 1951. It remained at an average of 17 
during the 1950s, and resumed a downward trend in the 1960s 
pointing towards final withdrawal from production in the 1970s. 
Table 16 follows: 
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Table 16. 
THE RANK PRODUCTION 'EMPIRE': Numbers of Films Produced by 
Production Companies Associated With Rank, 1946 to 1970. 
Year: 1946 78 950 12345678 960 12345678 970 
IP 555 
Two Cities 4598410321 
Ealing 25465454653 
Gainsborough 2 51011 3 
Triton 1213 
John Corfield 11 
Sydney Box 1 
Wes. Ruggles 1 
Ralph Smart 1 
Holbein 1 
Prodn Film Serv. 1 
Pinewood 162 
Burnham 2 
Appollo 1 
Merton Park 1 
Aquila 4 
Kenilworth 1 
Pinnacle 1111 
Plantagenet 1 
Javelin 11 
Jay Lewis 1 
Conqueror 11 
Carillon 1 
Indep. Artists 1122124 
HH Films 1 
Mayflower 1 
Tower 1 
Vic 11 
BFM/Group 18589 
Indep. Sovereign 1 
Conquest 1 
Constellation 1 
Chiltern 1 
Sirius 1 
Clarion 1 
ACT 1 
London Indep. 122 
Verona 1 
Eagle-Schlesinger 1 
Rank* 1111311110 546523121 
Arcturus 
Vega 
Foxwell* 11 
IPF 11 
Dial 
Luckwin 
Keyboard 
Tempean 
Briar -140- 1 
Year: 1946 78 950 12345678 960 1 2 3 45 6 7 8 970 
Beaconsfiefd 1 1 
Artna 2 
Luckwell 1 
Everest 1 
Four Star 1 
Ethiro 3 
AFM. * 2 1 1 1 
Martin 1 
Alexandra 1 
Pennington-Eady 1 
Five Star 1 
Parkway 1 
United Coprodns. 1 
Argo 1 
Security * 1 1 
Trionyx 
Eon 
Three Kings* 1 
Sevenay 1 
Parroch-McCallum 
Lowndes * 1 1 
Benton 
John Mills 
Partisan 
Titan * 2 
Adder * 1 2 12 3 
Cyclone 1 
Williamson-Powell 1 
Parallel 1 
Poetic 1 
Santor 1 
de Grunwald 1 
Rialto-Preben 1 
Francos-Quadrangle 1 
Dominion 1 
Intertel-VTR 1 
Ashdown 
Brightwater-Palomar 
World Film Services 
Incorporated TV 
ITC 
Hammer 1 
[Source: adapted from Gifford (1986) and Falk (1987). ] 
* Includes co-productions as follows. Rank: Selmur-Rank 1968. 
Foxwell: Foxwell-Carthay, 1966. AFM (Allied Film Makersl -4 
co-productions: AFM-Excalibur, 1960; AFM-Beaver, 1961 & 1964; 
AFM-Anglo Allied, 1962. Security: Royal-Brenmar-Security, 1969. 
Three Kings: Three Kings-Harold Shapman Filmusic, 1965. 
Lowndes: Lowndes-Steven, 1965. Titan: Titan-Ivy, 1966. Adder - 3 co-productions: Adder-Ethiro, 1969 and 1970; Adder-GT, 1970. 
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Table 16 shows that, after the IP era, there were many 
producers backed for one or a few productions, but that the 
largest production companies were successively British Film 
Makers (BFM) and Group Film Producers which accounted for over 
one third of Rank output between 1951 and 1955, and Rank 
Organisation Film Productions - over half of output during the 
next ten years. 
This evolved following the establishment of the NFFC. In 
1949, Rank initially refused to participate in the system of 
financing production through lending to a distributor - debts 
were high enough already. Korda's British Lion became the 
vehicle for this finance. 
But in 1951, there was briefly aU turn, and BFM was set up 
under Rank to make films based on borrowing from the NFFC. In 
1953, BFM was taken over by Group which ended NFFC 
participation, and which, in 1955, changed its name to Rank. 
Not only did the amount of production fall after the 
nineteen forties, but the type of films produced also changed. 
On the whole, material was more bland and parochial. A 
particular emphasis was placed on comedies such as the 'Doctor 
in the House' series and the Norman Wisdom films. [As 
production head, St. John is said to have regarded Wisdom as 
his 'proudest discovery'! (Perry, 1976). Page 110. ] 
From 1953, Wisdom's comedies, at the rate of one per year 
for the rest of the decade, were a goldmine for Rank. That they 
were made at an average cost of only £130,000 was partly due to 
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their being photographed in black and white - much to the 
distaste of Wisdom himself. So great was their commercial 
success that there was a brief but abortive plan by one of the 
majors to invest £500,000 in a film to launch Wisdom in the US. 
Similarly, the 'Carry On' series became a mainstay of Rank 
output. This was only from 'Carry On' number twelve in 1958, 
for the earlier films had been backed, with NFFC assistance, by 
Anglo Amalgamated, the production company of the independent 
financier, Nat Cohen, later in charge of production for EMI. A 
'Carry On' at Pinewood would be produced very cheaply on a five 
or six week shoot (with such low fees that the production would 
always be scheduled for spring or autumn in order to allow the 
main players to make their living in pantomime and summer 
seaside shows). 
During the first half of the nineteen fifties, the Davis 
regime reduced Rank's debts from £16 million in 1950 to £4 
million. By 1960, Rank was making a profit of £7 million. In 
addition to retrenchment in production, further scaling down in 
the film industry was accomplished by reduced activity in 
exhibition: the Odeon and Gaumont circuits were merged in 1958, 
and the policy on other cinemas was closure (as opposed to 
selling them on to other exhibitors). 
In 1957, a further 300 Pinewood workers were made redundant 
(as a result of the cancellation of four films costing a total 
of £1 million), as the role of Pinewood - and other studios - 
gradually moved in the direction of rental to other, external, 
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producers. The Bond films assumed a particular importance in 
this respect. 
Meanwhile, Rank diversified away from the film business and 
into such areas as photocopying (Rank Xerox), hotels, motorway 
service stations and bowling alleys. And on this basis, the 
profits of the Rank Organisation (the title assumed in 1953) 
attained a record level of £15 million in 1973. 
By the first half of the nineteen seventies, Rank's 
investment in film production had fallen to an average of about 
£14 million a year. This included the 'Carry Ons' and the 
financing of five of Hammer's films. Rank then withdrew from 
production but, to much surprise, re-entered the field in 1977, 
investing heavily in, among others, remakes of two of 
Hitchcock's films. In 1980, further plans were scrapped and 
Rank again withdrew from production. Occasionally, however, 
during the nineteen eighties, Rank Film Distributors would 
invest in production. For example, in 'Educating Rita' in 1983, 
or 'The Fourth Protocol' in 1987 into which it put the 
extraordinary sum of £3 million. 
Submerged within this rise and fall is Sir Michael Balcon's 
Ealing Films whose idiosyncratic output conveys to this day a 
lingering sense of a national British cinematic product. It was 
probably in 1949 that Ealing attained its ideal image when, 
among the six films it released, were 'Whisky Galore, ' 
'Passport to Pimlico, ' and 'Kind Hearts and Coronets, ' classic 
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examples of a unique whimsicality. 
In 1944, although Balcon had been a critic of Rank, Ealing 
came under the Rank umbrella and there were to be 56 films (of 
the grand total of 96 Ealing films) made under the Ealing: Rank 
tie up, including all the major Ealing comedies. Rank's 
relationship with Ealing, which was, overall, a loss making 
one, was based on what Balcon conceded was a generous 
arrangement. 
It was a distribution/exhibition deal in which Rank 
financed 75% of production costs. Ealing had complete artistic 
control, good distribution and a seat on the Rank board in 
exchange for Rank having a 50% holding (later raised to 75%) in 
Ealing Films. 
But Ealing was to become yet another important production 
sector casualty of Rank's rationalisation during the nineteen 
fifties. Ealing Studios is in a residential area, and Davis 
encouraged Balcon to sell out and to move production to 
Pinewood where, as Balcon understood it, Rank would build an 
'Ealing' in the form of two stages for Ealing's exclusive use. 
(Perry, 1981. ) 
When the offer for the studios came (which Balcon was 
obliged to take), it was in fact from television. The BBC 
purchased Ealing Studios in 1955 for £300,000. The Pinewood 
'Ealing' plan failed to materialise, and Balcon severed his 
connections with Rank. He subsequently did a deal with MGM 
British at Elstree and made a further six films in three years 
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there. (Kardish, 1984. ) 
In 1959, ABPC bought Ealing's assets from Balcon, and, 
apart from completing the film then being made, terminated 
Ealing production. 
(Balcon then became Chairman of the new Bryanston Films, 
whose role in the New Wave era is discussed in section 3.2, 
and, in 1964, he purchased British Lion from the government, as 
discussed below. ) 
Considering that sector of independent production not under 
the Rank umbrella, the tables below of 'Major Minors' [see 
Tables 17 (a), (b) and (c) on pages 155,159 and 160] indicate 
the limited extent of competition from other British studios 
able to make a significant and sustained contribution even in 
the period after Rank had begun its retreat from production. 
But what of the other British major, ABPC? 
In the 1930s, John Maxwell's BIP studios at Elstree, the 
production arm of the ABPC holding company, was backing 
independent producers to whom the studios were leased and 
contributing towards the task that never ends in an integrated 
film organisation: feeding the circuit - in 1937, ABPC had 450 
cinemas. This was to remain the model after the war, but with 
an emphatic trend in the direction of participation in 
television. 
The trailblazer in regard to television at Elstree was 
Douglas Fairbanks Junior who, in 1952, set up the first 
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production company in the British film industry to make 
product for television. In October of that year, Fairbanks took 
over the British National Studios, the use of which had not 
survived their owner, Lady Yule of British National Pictures. 
Lady Yule, a jute heiress, had co-founded British National 
Films in 1934 with Rank, thereby facilitating Rank's initial 
entry into commercial film production. British National's 
output of 15 films between 1946 and 1948 is recorded in Table 
17 (a) on page 155. 
Fairbanks' acquisition was made in order to engage in the 
production for the US television network NBC of advertisements 
and numerous short, cheap and quickly produced films. 
As if to say that when you cannot beat the opposition you 
must join them, ABPC responded to the launch of ITV in Britain 
in 1955 by setting up ABC TV which obtained the franchise for 
the Midland region. Although Teddington Studios was to be the 
headquarters of ABC, some television production would take 
place at ABPC at Elstree together with continued feature film 
making. 
ABPC financed few such films itself (Table 15, page 130). 
However, in the late nineteen fifties and early sixties it 
achieved a high ratio of success in the projects it backed. 
Although there were a few memorable projects ('Yield to the 
Night' in 1956, and 'Ice Cold in Alex' in 1958, for example), 
the artistic and budgetary horizons were usually limited. 
But ABPC got results in the British market with many of 
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its staple films - such as those of Cliff Richard, which 
started with 'The Young Ones' in 1961, and those of the 
comedian Charlie Drake, which began in 1960 as a counterpart to 
Rank's Norman Wisdom. 
With these directly financed films, with rented studio 
space to externally financed projects (such as Hammer and Anglo 
Amalgamated) and with its television activity, ABPC enjoyed 
something of a boom in production at the beginning of the 
nineteen sixties and a major programme of expenditure on 
investment in the ABPC studios at Elstree took place. (Warren, 
1983. ) 
ABPC had record profits in 1964, and, by the time of the 
completion of the studio refurbishment in 1967 - new stages and 
cutting rooms, it appeared to be the model of an integrated 
film company in an age where television was booming and cinema 
admissions continuing to plunge. 
Under the ABPC umbrella were the studios themselves, the 
film production company ABP, the television franchise ABC, the 
Pathe film processing laboratories, the AB Pathe film 
distribution company, and the ABC cinema circuit. Furthermore, 
there was a very valuable library which included its own films, 
those of Ealing and many of Warners, and the television 
contribution of ABC TV including 71 episodes of 'The Saint' 
plus 'The Avengers' series. 
The problem for ABPC, however, was that in 1946, Warners 
had consolidated its shareholding in the organisation and 
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indeed at that time Warners London head had become Managing 
Director of ABPC. In 1968, EMI purchased Warners' shares, and 
secured the acquisition in early 1969. At this point, the 
existing board was ousted and ABPC became EMI Film and Theatre 
under Bernard Delfont, Nat Cohen and Leslie Grade. 
In 1969, they appointed the actor-director-producer Bryan 
Forbes as Head of Production and Managing Director of Elstree 
at a salary of £40,000. His assignment was to rationalise the 
production on the basis of a slate of new films without 
reliance on American finance, ie. to evolve a studio operation 
of real financial independence. 
Forbes embarked on large scale production plans, but 
his reign would last only eighteen months until his resignation 
in March 1971. Commentators on the British production industry 
usually regard this as a major lost opportunity and a further, 
perhaps final, nail in the coffin of the sector. 
Although morale was high at the start, Forbes' programme 
began badly with three flops. Subsequently, fortunes did 
improve, and the legacy of the Forbes period is identified 
by two films, 'The Railway Children' and 'The Tales of Beatrix 
Potter, ' both in 1971. 
Forbes was somewhat embittered on leaving. He had produced 
eleven films based on 'a revolving fund of £4 million which did 
not revolve' (Walker, 1985. ) He hinted that his judgement had 
not been fully backed by Delfont, and that EMI's own 
distribution arm did not distribute the films that were made 
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with as much enthusiasm as they might have shown. 
Shortly after Forbes' appointment, there was a dramatic 
psychological reversal in April 1970 when MGM British, which 
had been based for twenty years on the other side of Elstree 
Way and had made there a succession of glamorous Hollywood 
films, closed down. Only the previous year, MGM had announced 
plans for the production of between ten and twelve films 
annually at MGM British Studios. 
The withdrawal meant that the agglomeration of six studios 
at Elstree had dissipated. The one remaining studio was EMI's 
former BIP facility which had nine sound stages. When 
closure of MGM British came, the announcement was for EMI's 
studio to be renamed EMI-MGM Elstree Studios Ltd.. MGM would 
pay £175,000 for this arrangement. And in early 1971, MGM 
announced that it would spend $13 million per annum on the film 
production partnership with EMI. 
There was much production backed directly by EMI and 
sometimes by MGM in the brief period which followed. The films 
included 'The Go Between' in 1970, 'Get Carter' in 1971, and 
'Henry VIII and His Six Wives' in 1972. In the very early 
seventies, the studio was at full capacity with 350 skilled and 
unskilled labourers employed full-time on building sets. 
After Forbes' departure, Nat Cohen himself took over as 
head of EMI production, and a particular emphasis was placed on 
film versions of low brow television comedies - 'On the Buses' 
and 'Steptoe and Son' in 1972. Like Rank's 'Carry On' and 
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Norman Wisdom features, these were both cheap (at £100,000 
each) and profitable. 
But box office takings continued to fall and the studio was 
making a loss by 1973. At this stage, MGM in the US announced 
that it was withdrawing from distribution, cutting back on 
production and terminating the deal in the UK with Elstree. 
These factors constituted a major threat to production. The 
EMI parent decided that there had to be more outsiders' films 
made at Elstree to restore profitability. In 1973, full-time 
studio employment of almost 500 was halved and there was a real 
danger of closure. By 1975, the situation had worsened and EMI 
closed six of the nine stages, made most of the remaining 
labour force redundant, and went four-walled. 
The strategy succeeded when, as discussed in section 3.1, 
Fox and Paramount embarked on their respective 'Star Wars' and 
'Indiana Jones' cycles at Elstree. In fact, this led to 
increased investment in the studios by EMI: at the time of the 
second 'Star Wars' film, a stage was built on the back lot at a 
cost of £600,000. 
From time to time, EMI did put big money into production: 
for example, in 1974, it invested in 'The Orient Express, ' an 
expensive vehicle for a collection of fading stars. But EMI did 
not play the role of the diversified conglomerate parent of a 
studio on the Hollywood model (eg. Transamerica and UA, Gulf 
and Western and Paramount) as fully as would be hoped. 
By the end of 1977, it was becoming clear that EMI had made 
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major losses in the US with its body scanning machine. The 
profits of EMI were more than halved in 1978, and this was due 
to losses of £13.2 million in the scanner episode (Johnson and 
Scholes, 1984) and further losses in the record division, 
rather than to film activities. There was a cash flow crisis 
and in November 1979, EMI was taken over, becoming Thorn-EMI. 
The new organisation put further investment into refurbishment 
of the studios, paving the way for their sale to Cannon 
together with the cinemas and film library. 
From the end of the nineteen forties, it briefly appeared 
that there would be a kind of replacement in British production 
for Rank, namely Alexander Korda. In fact, Korda's London 
Films, having spent heavily on production in the later nineteen 
thirties, had accumulated such debts that Korda had lost 
control of the studios he had built at Denham to Rank via the 
Prudential Assurance. (Kulik, 1990. ) 
However, shortly after the war, Korda re-established his 
presence in both production and distribution. British Lion was 
the third largest distributor and was acquired by Korda in 
1946. In turn, British Lion purchased control of Shepperton 
Studios, which were the second largest after (Denham), and, 
with a half share in Worton Hall Studios at Isleworth, Korda's 
London Films not only had an important distribution arm, but 
also controlled more studio space than anyone other than Rank. 
The early post-war period for London Films was 
characterised by such lavishly staged, expensive flops as 'An 
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Ideal Husband' in 1947 and 'Anna Karenina' in 1948. 
Subsequently, however, Independent Producers at Rank began to 
break up under the effects of the incipient trend to cost 
control and distrust of the artist. 
As a result, by the end of the nineteen forties, most of 
Rank's important creators had moved to London Films. There, an 
output of good British films continued for another brief 
period. It is not surprising, given Rank's hostility to 'The 
Red Shoes, ' that Powell, for example, left Rank at this time. 
He and Pressburger made four films for Korda between 1949 and 
1951. 
Launder and Gilliat had also been criticised for 
overspending at Rank and they too defected to London Films. 
Among their projects was 'The Happiest Days of Your Life' in 
1950. If that film was at least memorable, London Films, in 
this period, did produce one British film of real greatness: 
'The Third Man, ' Carol Reed's second film for Korda was made 
after he had left the Rank empire at an early stage after 
making, in 1946, 'Odd Man Out' (said to be J. Arthur Rank's 
favourite film). 
Korda's reputation of being able to obtain production 
finance from otherwise unpromising sources was enhanced when he 
received a £3 million loan from the government on the occasion 
of the establishment of the NFFC. When Harold Wilson set up 
this body in 1948, he did not implement fully the 
recommendations of the Palache Committee of 1944 which had 
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suggested the inauguration of a government controlled 
distributor in addition to a financial source. Instead, the 
plan envisaged a link to an existing distributor. 
£3 million of the £5 million involved in the launch of the 
NFFC was channelled through the distribution side of the 
industry, rather than lent directly to producers. Rank declined 
to participate and, in November 1948, the loan was made to 
British Lion. 
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Table 17(a). 
Major Minors: Numbers of Films Made By Production Companies Not 
Associated With Rank and Making at Least Three Films in Any One 
Year, 1946 - 1970. (Long films only. ) 
Brit. But- BLPA All- Film Indep- Temp- 
Nat- Cher - ian- Stu- Adv- endent ean. Hammer 
ional Lon- ce dios ance Sover- Byron 
don Manch- eign 
ester 
1946 7 2 
1947 4 2 1 3 
1948 4 2 5 42 
1949 1 4 33 3 
1950 2 9 21 2 1* 
1951 3 5 1* 1 3 4 
1952 4 7 11 3 1 7 
1953 4 5 23 3 6 
1954 3 4 1 7 
1955 6 1 5 5 
1956 1 1 2 
1957 2 1* 4 
1958 2 2* 1* 6 
1959 7 
1960 6 
1961 1 6 
1962 1 6 
1963 1 4 
1964 6 
1965 8 
1966 3 
1967 6 
1968 4 
1969 3 
1970 3 
[Source: adapted from Gifford (1986)] 
* includes at least on e co-production. 
For Butcher, read 'Net tlefold, ' 1948 - 1953. Hammer and Tempean pro duced an additio nal 2 and 1 films 
respectively under Rank finance - see Table 16, pages 140 
to 141. 
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However, in the period of the launch of the NFFC, British 
Lion (BL) had major financial problems. As Walker (1974) 
records, by 1949, BL was owed £1.3 million by London Films and 
was making a loss of £700,000. And when it looked as if BL 
would be unable to repay the NFFC in 1952, the government wrote 
off £1 million of this debt followed by an announcement in 1953 
that the NFFC's total loss on the BL loan would be £2.2 
million. The following June, the government put a receiver into 
BL, ousting Korda and declaring BL bankrupt. 
In January 1955, BL was re-established with a share issue 
to the NFFC which was taken in part settlement of the debt. The 
NFFC then advanced a £Z million loan to BL to get production 
going again. The government now owned BL. In the words of the 
Captain of the 'Titanic' in Rank's lugubrious 1958 film 'A 
Night to Remember, ' 'When the Board of Trade drew up the 
regulations, they did not envisage this situation! ' 
However, after 1958, a five year period ensued during which 
the NFFC brought in the Boulting Brothers and Launder and 
Gilliat as current film makers to help run BL's operations. 
This was a very successful era during which, on the basis of 
such films as the Boultings' "I'm All Right, Jack" and 
Romulus's "The L Shaped Room, " debts were repaid to the 
government and four successive years of profit were recorded. 
The film makers exercised their option of selling their 
holdings in BL back to the NFFC at the end of the five years. 
While the term 'privatisation' would not be coined until 1969 
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(by the American organisational theorist Peter Drucker), and 
its role as an economic panacea not pursued until 1979, an 
early example of its practice was the subsequent sale of BL in 
1963. 
With its enlarged library of films - Korda's, plus the more 
recent output - BL was, like many a future privatisation, 
somewhat underpriced at £1.6 million. BL also owned Shepperton 
Studios, although the government introduced a constraint on the 
buyer concerning any further sale of the rich acres there. 
Nevertheless, Shepperton Studios' sixty acres would shrink to 
twenty over the following twenty years. 
Harold Wilson had made his first contribution to the 
British film industry as President of the Board of Trade in the 
nineteen forties. The Trade minister now addressing the issue, 
and stewarding the privatisation, was Edward Heath. In the 
event, Heath's buyer turned out to be Sir Michael Balcon who 
introduced Into BL's management a variety of film makers: 
Launder and Gilliat and the Boultings returned, together with 
various groups drawn from the New Wave. 
Among the relatively few films the new BL now made were the 
Boultings' 'The Family Way' in 1965 and Karel Reisz's 'Morgan - 
A Suitable Case For Treatment' in 1966. It is interesting that, 
although these were profitable projects and each incumbent 
group had the right, but not the obligation, to invest in any 
film of any other group, there was, according to Reisz (1991), 
no cross investment of this kind by the various film makers. 
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Unfortunately, the level of investment generally was rather 
low. Early in 1965, a plan for investment of £2 million in 
twelve films was announced for the following two years, but 
four were never made. This meant that life continued to be 
difficult for independents unless' they were able to obtain 
finance from the Americans - who were about to become an 
important presence in London. 
The central problem for BL had always been that it was a 
distributor without an exhibition circuit and that its 
relations with the major circuits were poor. The announcement 
of a Monopolies Commission investigation into the exhibition 
sector seemed to offer some hope, and the rather thin output 
supported by the new BL is explained by its waiting for the 
Commission to report. 
Although the Report, when it came in October 1966 (HMSO, 
1966) criticised Rank's and ABPC's monopoly of the circuits as 
having the effect of stiffling domestic production, it 
disappointed in that it envisaged that any overhaul would 
present insurmountable practical problems. 
Reference to Tables 17 (a) 
reveals that the most prolific 
successful) in the British pros 
developed, from 1955, a highly 
Hammer horror movie. It was as 
of the Ealing Studios comedy. 
(above) and (b) and (c) (below) 
studio (and indeed the most 
auction sector was Hammer which 
differentiated product: the 
distinct a brand image as that 
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Table 17(b). 
Major Minors (continued from page ??? ): 
Romulus Group War- Insig- Film Merton Anglo Bea- Dan- Prod 
-Remus Three wick nia Lcns. Park Guild cfld. zig. Asoc 1951 3 
1952 36 
1953 4212 
1954 26211 
1955 131332 
1956 4423 
1957 15234 
1958 223 1* 55 
1959 131431 
1960 3* 11 
1961 12 
1962 3* 2 
1963 
1964 1 1* 
1965 11 
1966 
1967 
1968 1* 1* 
1969 
1970 
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Table 17(c). 
Major Minors (continued): 
Emmett GW Wood- Parr- GHW Caralan Amicus Seven Tekli 
Dalton Films fall och & Dador Arts 
1958 1 3 
1959 3 11 
1960 2* 3 
1961 1* 1 2 3 
1962 2 1 1 3 1 3* 
1963 1 1 2* 2 
1964 2 3* 1 2* 2* 
1965 1 1 2* 3* 
1966 1* 1 3* 1* 
1967 1 5* 1* 
1968 2 2* 
1969 3* 3* 1* 
1970 1 1 
Towers of Mirisch Winkast Tigon Josef 
London British Shaftel 
1964 3 2* 
1965 
1966 2* 1 
1967 2* 
1968 2 1 3* 
1969 1* 3* 1* 4* 
1970 1* 3* 3* 3* 
(* includes at least 1 co-production. ) 
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Hammer was founded in 1947 by Sir James Carreras and 
evolved from Exclusive Films, the distribution/production 
company of his father Enrique Carreras. From 1952, Hammer owned 
Bray Studios where it made as many as six or seven films a year 
during the nineteen fifties and early sixties. 
Hammer's strategy was always entirely commercial. It would 
obtain finance, which it often succeeded in finding in the US, 
and make whatever subject the finance source wanted. If a 
distributor was particularly keen on a specific project, it was 
Carreras's ingenious tactic to block sell, as it were, 
extracting finance for, say, three films where only one 
particular title had been desired - and thereby putting the 
distributor himself on the receiving end of the standard anti- 
competitive distribution practice of block booking. 
Hammer's association with the horror film followed a brief 
hiatus in activity in 1955. The only success among its 1954 
output was 'The Quatermass Experiment, ' a mixture of science 
fiction and horror. Porter (1983) records that Carreras's 
enquiries with cinemas revealed that it was the horror element, 
rather than science fiction, that had made the film popular. 
On this basis, Hammer started production of what would turn 
out to be the first of five Hammer 'Frankenstein' films ('The 
Curse of Frankenstein' in 1956). A distribution deal with 
Warners was obtained for the US where the film was a hit. This 
facilitated Universal finance for the first of Hammer's nine 
'Dracula' projects between 1957 and 1973, and a deal for three 
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films per annum with Columbia. 
Hammer's product strategy in large part was that more 
commonly associated with Roger Corman's New World Pictures: 
take a successful film and remake it cheaply. In Hammer's case, 
there were Mummy, Werewolf, Vampire, and Jekyll and Hyde 
cycles; Hitchcock rip-offs ['Maniac' (1961) inspired by 
'Psycho' (1960), and 'The Reptile' (1965) out of 'The Birds' 
(1963)1; and 'Prehistorics' in the mid sixties like 'She' and 
'One Million Years BC, ' both remakes of nineteen thirties 
Hollywood films. 
By the time of the Prehistoric era, production had begun to 
move from Bray to ABPC Elstree Studios. Where ABPC/EMI finance 
was involved, Hammer production would take place at Elstree, as 
in the case of four of the six films of 1964 and two of the 
eight made in 1965. 
And when Hammer suffered a slump as a result of the 
reduction in American finance at the end of the nineteen 
sixties, it sold Bray Studios (in 1970) and moved to Elstree 
under a deal whereby EMI would finance nine films over the 
following three years. 
It is interesting that this move may have contributed to 
the downturn in Hammer's fortunes which was to come. As Porter 
(1983) sees it, the move to Elstree involved 'a marked effect 
on the quality of the Hammer films which now seemed to lack 
that sense of style and unifying cohesion which had marked 
their earlier products'. 
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Although the output of Hammer at Bray had been high, it was 
what Carreras called 'a single picture studio' in which at any 
one time there was a feeling that everyone working in the 
studio in any capacity was somehow involved with that one film 
that was in production. And for Carreras, the move to a multi- 
picture studio like Elstree meant that an important intangible 
factor of production was lost. 
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3.4 Contemporary British Production - Four Case Studies. 
Given the demise of the British studio system which is 
observed in section 3.3 above, it is interesting to examine the 
conditions under which British films are made in the present 
period. This is done by means of the four contemporary case 
studies which are the subject of this section: 
1. The British Film Institue's production of 'Distant 
Voices, Still Lives' made in 1986 and 1987. 
2. Victor Glynn's and Simon Channing Williams' 'High 
Hopes' (1988). 
3. Working Title's 'A World Apart' (1987). 
4. Prominent Features' 'A Fish Called Wanda' (1987). 
The projects are considered first on the basis of their 
financing, and then in terms of costs of production. 
A. THE FINANCING OF PRODUCTION. 
1. 'Distant Voices, Still Lives. ' 
The two parts were made separately. The total budget for 
the first film, 'Distant Voices, ' was £285,000 and this sum was 
voted to the film's maker, Terence Davies, by the Production 
Board of the British Film Institute. The subsequent finance 
required for 'Still Lives' was about £350,000 and this came 
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only in part from the BFI; the bulk was raised from ZDF, the 
German television station. 
So this British public sector film had to be supported, as 
is frequently the case, by supplementary co-production finance. 
In 1990, for example, the BFI Production Board had only about 
£1 million to put into production. It received just under £Z 
million from the BFI itself, £450,000 from Channel Four, and 
£60,000 from other commercial television sources. Co-finance is 
raised as with 'Still Lives, ' or, to take a further example, 
from the BBC and the American HBO for the 1989 production 
'Fellow Traveller'. 
The BFI is constrained in practice to participation in the 
finance of a maximum of about four features per annum. It 
does, however, have a small advantage in terms of access to a 
specific sector of the film distribution market as its 
Distribution Division runs a regional network of cinemas 
throughout the UK. 
The BFI also manages to finance a number of shorts from its 
own funds, and to commission new directorial and writing 
talent. It is through this door that 'Distant Voices' entered 
the Production Board. Terence Davies (interview, 1990) said 
that his 'Trilogy, ' an earlier project, had been ten years in 
the making, and yet had carried a cost of only £45,000! 
Following his success with 'Trilogy' at the New Directors' 
Festival in New York, the BFI had commissioned him to develop a 
script. 
-165- 
This script turned out to be 'Distant Voices' and the 
finance was then released to make the film. On completion, the 
BFI wanted it to be distributed, but Davies refused. He felt 
that 'Still Lives' should be added. 
In this sector of film making, financial constaints are at 
their most real. However, a showing of 'Distant Voices' to 
influential parties was arranged and the upshot was that Davies 
was voted development money by the Board for 'Still Lives. ' 
This, in turn, led to the ZDF co-finance. 
2. 'High Hopes. ' 
Costing £1.3 million, and thus a rather larger project than 
'Distant Voices, Still Lives, ' Mike Leigh's film 'High Hopes' 
is, as a financial proposition, typical of many small British 
films since the mid-nineteen eighties: it is an example of the 
Channel Four/British Screen model of finance. To start with, 
'High Hopes' looked as if it would be easy to finance. The co- 
producer, Victor Glynn of Portman Productions (interview, 1990) 
said that when the project came his way, he found that Channel 
Four were, despite the absence of a story or script, willing to 
put up finance of £31 million. This comprised £300,000 'licence' 
(to show the film on television) and £450,000 equity 
investment. 
At this time, in 1985, British Screen was about to commence 
operations, taking over, approximately, the role of the late 
NFFC. Despite a degree of initial reluctance concerning this 
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project, British Screen agreed, following some lobbying from 
the producers, to put up £350,000. Portman Productions would 
supply the remaining £200,000. 
Rehearsals then began - in Blackburn - with a cast of well 
known actors, and the project started to get off the ground. 
Unfortunately, at this point Mike Leigh was taken seriously 
ill. When he recovered, the producers tried to put the 
financial package back together. But this was rather difficult 
as all parties were somewhat nervous about any investment they 
might make. Moreover, Leigh's bad fortune had led to an 
insurance settlement whereby the project recovered, in full, 
the £250,000 that had been spent in Blackburn. The insurers 
were reluctant to participate in a revived project. 
The story has a happy ending. As a kind of try-out on his 
comeback, Leigh made a television short which was promptly 
nominated for a BAFTA award. It was at this stage that Channel 
Four and British Screen agreed to return to the fold once the 
insurance situation was cleared up. And so, some five years 
after it had begun, 'High Hopes' found its way onto the screen. 
3. 'A World Apart. ' 
Where the two films considered above, costing less than 
£1.5 million, can be regarded as belonging to the 'low budget' 
category, the planned cost of 'A World Apart, ' £2.6 million, 
puts it into the 'medium budget' bracket, ie. between £1.5 and 
£3 million. This meant that, in addition to relying on the 
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Channel Four/British Screen sources of 'High Hopes, ' it 
required supplementary sources of finance. 
Initial development money was raised in Zimbabwe by the 
London production company, Working Title, for the carrying out 
of pre-production research. Once a budget was drawn up, the 
first stage in raising its £2.6 million was to send the script 
to British Screen and to various television companies. This was 
successful to the extent that British Screen agreed to 
subscribe £2 million. Moreover, Channel Four offered £300,000 
in exchange for a licence (five transmissions over 3 years). 
In the US, there were no takers among the major studios 
approached. The subject matter of 'A World Apart' was apartheid 
in South Africa, and it was felt that existing projects like 
'Cry Freedom' and 'A Dry White Season' had used up whatever 
interest was going for this general subject. 
However, the mid nineteen eighties was a period when the 
American independent distribution sector was buoyant. Working 
Title's distributor for an earlier film, 'Wish You Were Here' 
(1986), was Atlantic Releasing of the Atlantic Entertainment 
Group. This American independent distributor expressed an 
interest in 'A World Apart, ' agreeing to buy all North American 
rights for £1,320,000. This was just over half the budget. Half 
of Atlantic's finance was to be forthcoming at the completion 
of principal photography, and the remainder in instalments 
until delivery. In the meantime, Atlantic's practice was, in 
all probability, to cover their outlay by laying off some of 
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the rights to video distributors. 
Working Title raised the actual cash against Atlantic's 
obligations from the Dutch merchant bank Pierson Heldring and 
Pierson. This cash, plus that of British Screen and Channel 
Four, left about £2 million to be found from a private investor 
in Zimbabwe. 
4. 'A Fish Called Wanda. ' 
With 'A Fish Called Wanda, ' which was budgeted at about 
£4.5 million, the discussion moves into the sphere of the 
'larger budget' film, ie. those with costs in excess of £3 
million. This film's finance was raised entirely in Hollywood: 
it was a major studio - MGM - financed British film. 
The project originated from John Cleese who wrote the 
script, acted the leading role, informally co-directed with 
Charles Crichton, and became co-executive producer with Steve 
Abbot. Cleese's objective was to obtain complete overall 
control of the project. To this end, in the period before the 
film's London production company - Prominent Features - was 
formed, Cleese himself financed the development phase. Although 
the opportunity cost of his input may have been high during 
this two year period, the monetary outgoings (covering the 
drawing up of the budget, flying in the principals for script 
meetings, etc. ) were no more than about £20,000. 
Abbot (interview, 1990) said that the strategy was to have 
all key aspects of the project in place before approaching the 
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Hollywood majors for finance. By that time, the leading players 
were secured, the script had been polished for two years and 
production schedules had been thoroughly planned. 
In the event, when the producers did go to Hollywood, 
submitting the project to both MGM and Universal, Alan Ladd 
Jnr. offered the $7.3 million without even seeing the script! 
The only conditions imposed by MGM were the right to approve 
the film's designer, editor and production manager. 
The deal involved MGM having world rights including all 
television. And rather than a pure gross percentage, which 
requires abnormal bargaining power, Prominent would obtain a 
percentage of gross revenues at certain trigger points based on 
multiples of the negative cost. The negotiation on profit 
participation was conducted in such a way as to attempt a 
balance whereby MGM would be encouraged to invest in 
distribution. 
This case raises the issue of obtaining production finance 
from the Hollywood majors. Clearly a track record - such as 
that of Cleese himself, and the association with the 'Monty 
Python' films - will facilitate an interview in the studios 
with important decision makers in the production sector. There 
is, however, a production/marketing interface and it turns out 
to be important that the marketing managers, who will not have 
seen the producers' presentation, have some key names to react 
to (in this case, the American actors, Jamie Lee Curtis and 
Kevin Kline). 
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As is well known, the rate of turnover of studio executives 
is rapid, and a consequent danger of this form of finance is 
that the gestation of a studio film may be rather longer than 
the average tenure of a studio executive! Furthermore, the 
ownership of studios can change hands as MGM's almost did 
during this period -a change which might have jeopordised the 
filn's release. 
B. THE COSTS OF PRODUCTION. 
1. 'Distant Voices, Still Lives. ' 
Even by British standards, 'Distant Voices, Still Lives' 
was a very low budget film. The production costs of its two 
parts were £279,600 for 'Distant Voices, ' and £376,150 for 
'Still Lives. ' Remarkably, it was not only planned to be made 
on such a shoestring but actually came in slightly under 
budget, 'Distant Voices' having been budgeted at £285,000. 
What were the factors in this cost control? 
With the exception of a single brief sequence, the entire 
film was made on location rather than in the more expensive 
environment of a film studio. Although the film was set in 
Liverpool, the locations were found mostly in London, thereby 
avoiding the out of town hotel and other costs of a production 
unit on a remote location. 
This film was, above all, a personal project of the 
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writer/director Terence Davies - the film concerns his family 
in Liverpool in the war and post-war periods. Davies found, 
after a lengthy search, a house in London which would satisfy 
him as a replica of the family house in Liverpool. 
The producer of 'Distant Voices, Still Lives, ' Jennifer 
Howarth (interview, 1990) stressed the necessity of 
understanding the role of effort on the part of the production 
management if one was to comprehend the achievement of making 
such a film at so low a cost. The production team was prepared 
to undertake a variety of duties in addition to their normal 
ones - for example, accountancy and chauffeuring are not 
normally part of the job of the producer. Moreover, there was 
no production manager until fairly late in the project. During 
the making of the film, Ms. Howarth was 'constantly worried 
about every pound'. 
British Film Institute facilities: the fact that this was a 
BFI production meant that there were certain facilities 
available to the production which were not formally costed in 
the budget. This included stationery, photocopying of scripts, 
office space, storage space, telephones and editing equipment. 
And when a production manager did eventually join the project, 
it was a member of the full-time BFI staff. 
In addition to providing a kind of subsidy to budgeted 
costs, the BFI's presence behind a low budget film has a 
further relevant effect: film industry personnel are sometimes 
attracted to a BFI project, knowing that it will be rewarding 
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to be involved in what will almost certainly be an artistically 
worthwhile film. (At the very least, they may simply be 
encouraged by the idea that they will, in fact, be paid in full 
and on time! ) 
'Distant Voices, Still Lives' was a film in which music was 
central - there is a great deal of singing of music hall songs. 
When it came to obtaining the numerous music clearances, 
Howarth's strategy in this potentially expensive area was to 
adopt a person-to-person approach and to stress the limited 
budget and scale of the project. Indeed, at the time of the 
first negotiations, it was but the fifty minutes of 'Distant 
Voices'. Moreover, successful negotiation with EMI enabled 
Howarth to approach other copy wright owners and ask for 
similarly low rates - the so-called 'favoured nation status'. 
In discussing cost control on 'Distant Voices, Still 
Lives, ' Davies's role must also be stressed. As the writer and 
director, he fine tuned his script in the pre-production stage. 
As with cost conscious film making anywhere, it is vital to 
ensure that the script will work before shooting starts. 
There was a relatively long period of fourteen weeks of 
pre-production, a period which included the search for the 
acceptable London locations. The subsequent shooting times were 
down to five weeks for 'Distant Voices, ' and a mere four weeks 
for 'Still Lives. ' 
Davies's careful planning and clarity of conception also 
meant that he was able to say with certainty exactly when and 
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for how long expensive facilities like, say, crane hire would 
be required. And finally, it was generally thought that his 
sheer enthusiasm generated a widely shared feeling of 
commitment to the project among all concerned in its 
realisation. 
2. 'High Hopes. ' 
The total budgeted cost for 'High Hopes' was £1,300,000. 
And the film came in at £1,288,695, very slightly under. 
'High Hopes' was a film of Mike Leigh whose approach to the 
making of television drama is famously unconventional. A 
project starts with a group of actors who have no script, no 
storyline and possibly even no title to work on. The actors 
then develop and research the piece in an intensive period of 
rehearsals. And as such, it has been unfortunately rare for Mr. 
Leigh to have the opportunity of making a theatrical film for 
his modus operandi runs contrary to received industry practice 
and the expectations of financiers who will usually only invest 
in the commercial potential of a completed script. 
However, Victor Glynn, the co-producer of 'High Hopes, ' was 
an exception. He was delighted to have the opportunity of 
producing a film which would mark Leigh's return to the cinema 
after many years. (His only previous cinema film was 'Bleak 
Moments, ' made in 1971. ) 
How did the producers deal with the budgetary side of the 
situation in such a way as to accommodate Leigh's idiosyncratic 
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approach to the creative process? 
The answer was to take away all known costs from the total 
budget of £1.3 million. Thus they subtracted the fees of the 
major personnel, the cost of the completion guarantee (ie. 
production insurance) and the cost of the customary contingency 
reserve. They further identified the costs that would be 
required actually to make the film: the cost of a crew on the 
basis of a six day week for seven weeks was a known quantity, 
as was, approximately, the cost of twelve weeks for editing. 
These subtractions left the producers with £300,000 to 
award to Leigh to finance the actors in rehearsal. All actors 
were to be paid the same rate, and the £300,000 meant that 
there were 650 'actor weeks' at Leigh's disposal. He was free 
to allocate these resources as he saw fit - he could, if he 
wished, rehearse one actor for 650 weeks, or 650 actors for one 
week, or any combination between these extremes. 
In the event, the rehearsals took fifteen weeks. Many 
actors came and took on the stimulating, if somewhat exacting 
assignment of auditioning while not knowing what play they were 
in, let alone what part they were playing! 
The other major cost control device was to insist that five 
minutes screen time per day should be produced during shooting. 
That 'High Hopes' did come in on budget was, in Glynn's 
opinion, because Leigh is a very disciplined director who 
conducts a long working day. Moreover, if the film DID get 
behind schedule, it was not the case, given the absence of a 
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script as a blueprint for the film, that the completion of the 
scene in question would be seen as crucial to the whole project 
Needless to say for such a low budget film, all shooting 
took place on location. It was centred on a council flat hired 
by the producers in King's Cross. 
3. 'A World Apart. ' 
'A World Apart' was made by the independent production 
company Working Title for a total final cost of £2.715 million. 
This was slightly in excess of its budget of £2.652 million. 
The film was photographed during nine weeks on location 
(there was no use of studios) in Zimbabwe starting in June, 
1987. This followed eight weeks of pre-production, a period 
which included extensive tests and rehearsals designed to 
discover the right actress to play the role of the thirteen 
year old girl at the centre of the film. Post-production took a 
final period of eighteen weeks. 
Film production costs are normally categorised as 'above 
the line' and 'below the line'. While the latter are the costs 
of actually making the film (including such items as the cost 
of the production unit, supporting cast and location expenses), 
above the line costs comprise the fees of the producer, 
director and principal artists plus the costs of story 
acquisition and scriptwriting. 
For the co-producer of 'A World Apart, ' Tim Bevan 
(interview, 1990), above the line costs, at about 8.6% of 
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budget, were remarkably low. He felt that the services of the 
writer, Shawn Slovo, and of the American star, Barbara Hershey, 
were obtained on very favourable terms - although the decision 
to make the late addition of Ms. Hershey to the cast during 
shooting did in fact lead to a brief period of financial 
concern. 
An eminent technical crew was secured at fees which were 
low relative to market rates. Personnel were attracted by an 
affinity with the work of Chris Menges, the celebrated South 
African cinematographer, for whom 'A World Apart' was the 
directorial debut. 
The main area in which the film went over its budget was in 
post-production. The contingency had already been spent and 
there was little room for manoeuvre on music and cutting, etc.. 
Editing costs, for instance, were some £40,000 over budget. 
4. 'A Fish Called Wanda. ' 
'A Fish Called Wanda' was by far the largest scale of the 
projects under discussion with a budget of $7.3 million (about 
£4.5 million). 
The producers felt that if the above the line costs were as 
low as possible, this would maximise the chance of the film's 
financiers keeping to the kind of arm's length relationship 
with the production that they sought. This was their major 
objective. 
Hence, the film's four stars (Cleese, Palin, Curtis and 
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Kline) were signed for well below market rates, but with profit 
participation points. The budget would have been perhaps $9 
million, rather than $7.3 million, had Hollywood salaries been 
paid. In the event, above the line costs were approximately $2 
million. 
A reason for keeping the budget to about $7 million was 
that the average cost of a Hollywood studio film at this time 
was $14 million. The producers felt that they might gain a 
negotiating edge in going to the table offering, as it were, a 
half price film. 
Such a budget is, of course, far from small by the 
standards of British film making and this allowed for a degree 
of relative luxury: an approximate 50: 50 division between 
location and studio (Twickenham) shooting. The film was shot - 
using an entirely British crew - in ten weeks. These were five 
day weeks to allow, among other things, for the advanced age of 
the director, the Ealing veteran Charles Crichton. 
The cost of a completion guarantee did not have to be 
incurred as such, but the producers' and director's fees were 
deferred against the possibility of the film being more than 
10% over budget. A bonus was paid for delivery on time. 
Although certain cost categories were over budget - the 
largest being music, 'Wanda' came in about $300,000 under 
budget. After test marketing in the US, this money was then 
used for some reshooting designed to make the film less bloody 
and generally more user friendly! 
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One can conclude from these cases that in the absence of a 
British major, the finance constraint on British film makers is 
very real. The access of a John Cleese to Hollywood finance is 
rare. 
While Terence Davies, in the case of 'Distant Voices, Still 
Lives, ' provides a model of efficiency through extreme care in 
the preparation of script and schedule, Messrs. Glynn and 
Leigh, for 'High Hopes, ' originally intended a much larger 
scale production. Mr. Glynn approached every conceivable 
finance source - but without luck. The only response he had was 
from Yoram Globus and Menahem Golan of the Cannon Film Group 
(who offered $100,000 for the world distribution rights! ). 
But even the very finance sources which 'High Hopes' fell 
back on, and which have sustained a low budget British sector 
in this recent period, remained uncertain. By 1991, the future 
of British Screen was by no means guaranteed, while the boom in 
television investment in feature films had collapsed. 
The medium budget 'A World Apart' supplemented the finance 
sources of 'High Hopes' by pre-selling half the budget against 
North American rights and discounting the contract through a 
merchant bank. Of this model, it is worth noting that the costs 
of financing are high since perhaps £% million would be 
required to meet bank costs and interest. 
Moreover, the pre-sale to the American distributor leaves 
the fate of the film in the US at the mercy of the amount of 
marketing the distributor decides to undertake. In the case of 
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'A World Apart, ' Atlantic Releasing - in financial difficulties 
- did relatively little marketing, with the resulting under 
performance of the film. 
It would have been ideal, other things being equal, to have 
had the weight of a Hollywood major behind the film, as with 'A 
Fish Called Wanda'. But with 'A World Apart, ' no major would 
get involved in the first place. The independent sector of 
distribution in the US is very volatile as a succession of 
corporate failures in the late 1980s showed. (Atlantic itself 
went out of business in June, 1989. ) 
According to the former Chief Executive of British Screen, 
Simon Relph (1991), where the typical British independent 
production might have obtained 60% of its financing from this 
source in the mid 1980s, it might have achieved, if anything, 
only 20% by the end of the decade. 
It is interesting to note the nationality of finance 
revealed by the case studies. The small London production 
company Working Title, for example, have, in addition to 'A 
World Apart, ' produced such films as 'My Beautiful Laundrette, ' 
'Personal Services, ' 'Caravaggio' and 'Wish You Were Here'. 
Their British finance sources have usually been limited to 
British Screen and television. Piersons is a Dutch merchant 
bank, and Working Title's corporate investor is also Dutch. The 
bulk of overseas revenues accrue to the foreign distributor. 
So where a film is successful, money does not come back to 
the UK film financing scene. 
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3.5 Structure, Conduct and Performance. 
At the outset, six points were identified (page 6) as of 
preponderating importance to the study of the Decline of the 
British Film Industry. Chapters 2 and 3 have looked at the 
first three of these factors - the British majors, the 
Hollywood majors in Britain and British government policy. 
A useful analytic framework for the consideration of these 
aspects is Structure-Conduct-Performance 
raised within the traditional context of 
the economic performance of the industry 
nature of market conduct, and whether the 
industry structure. 
In other words, has the inefficiency 
(S-C-P). Issues can be 
this model: whether 
follows from the 
is follows from 
of resource allocation 
to the industry been the result of such conduct variables as 
insufficient investment, restrictive practices, high prices, 
and an often dismal product strategy? And has conduct followed 
from a highly imperfect structure dominated by vertically 
integrated monopoly and a crucial American presence? 
A picture has emerged of the main characteristics of the 
structure of the industry, and of the nature of the complex 
variety of issues that comprise conduct and performance. These 
points are summarised in Table 18 below. 
The table is based on Scherer (1970), and formally itemises 
the components of the S-C-P model which evolved following the 
work of Chamberlin (1933) and Mason (1939), and, above all, 
(continued on page 185) 
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Table 18. 
SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE OF THE 
BRITISH FILM INDUSTRY. 
(a) STRUCTURE. 
Features of Structure: 
1. Number of sellers. 
2. Foreign direct in- 
vestment 
3. Number of buyers. 
4. Level of concentration. 
5. Product differentiation. 
6. Barriers to entry. 
7. Cost structure. 
8. Vertical integration. 
9. Diversification. 
10. Information. 
11. Public sector. 
The British Film Industry: 
Incipient duopoly; 
fluctuating independent sector 
Vast American presence. 
Distributor and exhibitor buyers 
integrated or aligned. 
Final consumers: large in number, 
but declining. 
High in distribution/exhibition. 
High. Complex. 
Access to production finance and to 
US distrution. 
No real barriers to exit. 
High fixed costs per project; low 
marginal costs in distribution. 
Fundamental from an early stage. 
Considerable for British combines. 
No major imperfections. 
Some actual - much potential - 
participation. 
(b) CONDUCT 
Features of Conduct: The British Film Industry: 
1. Pricing behaviour. Rapid exhibition inflation. Much 
price discrimination. 
2. Product strategy Erratic, imitative, timid. Dis- 
and advertising. tribution and exhibition of much 
American product. 
3. Restrictive practices. Fundamental, especially in the 
distribution-exhibition relation. 
4. Acquisition and Much acquisition in formation & 
legal tactics disintegration of combines. 
5. Investment. Continual 'crisis' in production 
investment. Extreme volatility, 
esp. with respect to US. 
6. Research and development. Almost invariable neglect of an 'R 
& D' sector of production. 
7. Regulation. Quota requirements. Little other. 
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Table 18 continued. 
(c) PERFORMANCE 
Features of Performance: 
1. Profits. 
2. Prices. 
3. Progressiveness. 
4. Allocative efficiency. 
The British Film Industry: 
Rapid onset of crisis of loss and 
debt invariably follows expansion. 
Prices in both factor and product 
markets generally driven down to 
eliminate rents. Migration of 
labour to US and capital to other 
sectors. 
Product often imitative, 
derivative; some major exceptions. 
Sub-optimal resource allocation to 
production: market failure & 
externalities not adequately 
priced - government market 
improving policy small in impact; 
no market displacing policy. 
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(continued from page 182) 
that of Bain (1951 and 1956). [Indeed, Shaked and Sutton (1987) 
refer to the model as the 'Bain paradigm'. ] These contributions 
established the traditional S-C-P framework of analysis of the 
economic organisation of industries. 
It is important to note that by the time of the second 
edition of Scherer's influential textbook (Scherer, 1980), the 
evolution of thought in the S-C-P area was beginning to lead to 
the widening of the network of relationships. 
Industry studies, such as the seminal work of Bain, had 
traditionally viewed market structures largely as questions 
of industry concentration ratios, and had invariably identified 
positive linear relationships between concentration and 
profitability. Weiss (1974), summarising more than fifty such 
industry studies, affirmed that this had been the overwhelming 
trend up to the early nineteen seventies. 
The work of Comanor and Wilson (1967), however, was one of 
a number of contributions to begin to introduce a wider range 
of factors. Its impact was that advertising, and barriers to 
entry created by advertising, came to be seen as indications of 
market power: concentration alone, without entry barriers, 
could not explain excess profits. 
Comanor and Wilson inspired a wider range of explanatory 
variables to be brought in to profitability studies. Lustgarten 
(1975), for example, considered buyer concentrations (as 
opposed to the usual structural concern with the concentration 
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ratio among sellers) and their impact on profitability; Caves 
and Porter (1977) introduced the concept of 'strategic groups' 
and barriers to mobility within industries (rather than 
industry structure) as the key to profitability studies; and 
for Bradburd and Caves (1982), the notion of industry growth 
was to be seen as a potential determinant of profitability. 
In the light of these developments, the S-C-P paradigm 
raises the question of the direction of causation. Is there a 
clear-cut relationship running from S to C to P, or is the 
industry one in which causation runs in the opposite direction 
- from P to C and S, and from C to S? Or is the network of 
relationships between these variables a more complex one with a 
variety of causitive and other links? 
While the traditional neo-classical approach would imply the 
S to C to P sequence, a more dynamic appraisal would allow for 
a reversal so that structure and conduct may have resulted from 
the feedback from past performance, or a given structure may be 
due to feedback from past conduct. 
In the methodology of 'New Industrial Organisation, ' the 
emphasis tends to be placed on a direction running from conduct 
to structure. Conduct is expressed in terms of a non- 
cooperative or Nash equilibrium under which firms select a 
strategy which is optimal given the strategies of the other 
participants. 
This can be based on Cournot or Bertrand equilibria. The 
Cournot Solution (Cournot, 1838), for example, analyses 
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equilibrium under duopoly when output decisions are made under 
the assumption that one duopolist can act without provoking a 
reaction from the other. 
In Cournot's model, equilibrium is approached under duopoly 
where output is divided equally between the sellers, and their 
combined output is two thirds of the output that the industry 
would produce under perfect competition. 
The model can be generalised to an oligopoly consisting of 
n firms. Equilibrium will be reached where combined output is 
(n/n+l) of the output that would be produced were the industry 
perfectly competitive. 
As opposed to Scherer's model of S-C-P, this model, having 
established such an equilibrium, regards conduct (and the basic 
conditions of supply and demand) as exogenous. 
It is not proposed to discuss the wide range of literature 
arising in this area, but, to take one example, Shaked and 
Sutton (1987) illustrate the implications of non-cooperative 
conduct showing that if vertical product differentiation is 
available as a stategy in an industry, this will lead to 
greater concentration among sellers. 
In some respects, the conduct of the film industry can 
indeed be seen as designed to reinforce structure. The 
restrictive practices in the distribution-exhibition link 
(barring, alignments, block and blind booking) can be viewed as 
intensifying monopoly power because of their adverse impact on 
the existing independent sector, and their role in creating 
barriers to entry. 
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However, it has been argued that the enactment of 
legislative controls on aspects of firms' conduct may lead to 
structural changes in industries, for example, merger as a 
structural solution to the outlawing of restrictive practice. 
And for the film industry, the pace at which monopoly power was 
developed was indeed accelerated by the effect of the quota 
legislation. 
What of performance as the starting point? If performance 
is poor, the environment created is likely to be such that 
interested parties - firms and/or their owners, and the 
government - take action on improving matters by changing 
structure and/or conduct. For firms, for example, if there is a 
crisis of profitability, this may lead to rationalisation and 
an increase in concentration through acquisition, or the 
implementation in the industry of new restrictive agreements. 
From the point of view of the film industry, these notions 
have some plausibility. But as far as government intervention 
is concerned, it might be argued that only a market displacing 
policy would have had a sufficient impact on the structure of 
the industry to have facilitated a meaningful change in 
performance. Nationalisation in the UK was indeed the main 
model of post-war government policy for declining industries - 
eg. the coal industry. 
The government implemented a market improving type of 
policy (NFFC; Eady) as a response to poor performance in the 
immediate post-war period. This policy included no overall 
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coherent statement of objectives with regard to a designated 
rate of activity and/or rate of decline of the industry. It had 
the effect of confirming in its essentials the continuation of 
the existing structure and conduct. As this was a state of 
affairs inimical to the success of the British sector, the view 
could arise that government policy might in fact have hastened 
decline. 
The Theory of the Second Best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) 
may be of relevance in this context. Is the film industry an 
example of a situation in which, in the absence of a socially 
optimum level of activity, the implementation of policy 
designed to push the industry as close as possible to a 
perfectly competitive structure is misguided? Ie. a situation 
in which it is not worse for society if a large number of 
optimality conditions are violated rather than only a few. 
The structure and conduct of the industry had caused 
suppression of competition, preventing independent producers 
and cinemas from competing on an equal basis. But it is 
doubtful whether the legislative measures enacted had a 
particularly beneficial effect on the extent of competition in 
any sector of the industry, let alone the promotion of 
increased output to the extent that the price/marginal cost gap 
was narrowed. It must be noted, however, that governments have 
never fully implemented film policy recommendations. 
Although the NFFC assisted independent productions, it was 
constrained by lack of both funds and control of distribution. 
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Meanwhile, independent exhibitors received virtually no 
assistance from policy measures. The Eady Levy often rewarded 
the existing competitive structure. The film education 
initiatives did not turn out to be a seedbed of capitalism. 
By implication the main model of government policy for 
the film industry can be seen as a structuralist approach in 
which the S to C to P sequence of events is assumed: increasing 
the participation of British independents (through NFFC and 
Eady measures) would feed through to an improved performance. 
Although, this would also imply that a policy on conduct 
was irrelevant in that structure will determine performance, 
it would tend to overlook some of the barriers to efficiency to 
be found in the conduct category - hence the intermittent 
question of a supplementary conduct approach to competition 
policy. This materialises in the form of the Monopolies 
Commission enquiries concerning restrictive practices in 
distribution-exhibition relationships. 
UK competition policy for thirty years from its inception 
in 1948 used both structuralist and conduct-based approaches 
through the MMC and the Restrictive Practices Court 
respectively. 
In the nineteen eighties, these approaches gave way to a 
Laissez Faire model of competition policy. The social cost of 
monopoly is regarded as small and what intervention is employed 
is reserved for attempts to ensure that there is free entry and 
free exit to and from the market in question. 
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This approach is sometimes expressed in terms of 
'contestable' markets which was introduced as an 'uprising' in 
the theory of market structures (Baumol, 1982). 
In contestable markets, there is ultra-free entry and exit. 
Industries with imperfect structures will be allocatively 
efficient because they are constrained by the sanction of 
instant entry whenever monopoly prices and profits are made. 
Critics such as Shepherd (1984) observe that the notion of 
a contestable market can be seen as a limited development of 
ongoing trends in economic thought (such as those identified on 
pages 185/6), and one with little practical application given 
the difficulty of locating practical examples of markets with 
ultra free entry/exit. 
However, the theory was intended by Baumol et al (1982) as 
a completely new approach which would be 'extraordinarily 
helpful in the design of public policy'. 
This would not seem to be the case for public policy for 
the film industry. Barriers to entry are extremely high, 
especially with respect to the distribution-exhibition sector, 
and there are potentially high sunk costs in production 
(comprising investment in the building of studio facilities and 
production capability generally, minus any scrap value). 
Were one to envisage entering, and then quickly leaving 
the industry, the writing-off of this investment cost would be 
considerable. It is safe to say that the industry has not lived 
in fear of hit and run entry designed to remove abnormal 
profits. 
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But what can be said from the point of view of the standard 
S-C-P sequence? Certainly, in the important immediate post- 
war period, the monopoly power of Rank and ABPC itself 
facilitated the unfortunate market conduct that was observed in 
terms of the choices made on the important decision variables 
of investment and product strategy. Moreover, pricing policy in 
the exhibition sector can be seen as having adverse performance 
consequences, and this was itself a form of conduct made 
possible by the power over the exhibition sector which was at 
the disposal of the monopolists. 
There have, however, been two central driving influences, 
on the decline of the industry in the post-war era: 
(a) the barrier to entry to the US distribution/exhibition 
sector. With a small domestic market, sustained British 
production of films of any real size is not viable unless an 
international audience can be obtained. 
(b) the fundamental fall in demand for the industry's product 
at the cinema box office continuously from the mid nineteen 
forties to the mid nineteen eighties, but at a crucially rapid 
rate in the fifties with the coming of television. 
As was noted in section 3.3, the success of the non-Rank 
financed Two Cities film 'In Which We Serve' numbered among the 
influences which led J. Arthur Rank to finance a brief and 
memorable age of expensive British independent production in 
the mid nineteen forties with the hope of capturing an 
international market. That 'In Which We Serve' had had access 
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to the American box office (where it had taken $2 million) had 
been made possible by a war time agreement between the British 
Ministry of Information and the Hollwood majors by which the 
latter would distribute eight British films a year in the US. 
And when Rank embarked in 1944 on his 'Attempt on the 
American Market' (Murphy, 1983), he was essentially trying to 
secure US distribution for the larger budgeted films among his 
output - those of IP, Two Cities and Gainsborough. His strategy 
was to facilitate perhaps eight big film productions a year, 
separated from the remainder of output, by gaining permanent 
and automatic US distribution. 
Rank was, in principle, in a strong negotiating position. 
His empire had become as large in terms of total assets owned 
as any of the majors, his ownership of two of the three main 
British circuits was potentially a bargaining counter in 
relation to the majors, and he already had relationships with 
Universal, Fox and United Artists. 
Early in 1944, Eagle Lion Films was founded by Rank to 
distribute on a world wide basis. But where its establishment 
in Britain merely meant the redeployment of resources from GFD, 
the requirements in terms of numbers of films and personnel for 
setting up in the US were a formidable barrier. 
While the building up of Eagle Lion was to continue, 
alternative arrangements were made with UA who agreed, in mid 
1944, to distribute Rank's larger budget films for two years. 
In the event, UA, in crisis following losses in 1944, performed 
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their role in relation to Rank poorly. 
As the holder of a 25% stake in Universal through his GCFC, 
Rank was, however, able to make alternative plans: a new 
organisation - United World Pictures - was set up with a $10 
million capital to be financed fifty: fifty by Rank and 
Universal. It would distribute annually eight films from Rank 
and eight from a prominent American independent producer, 
International Pictures, which was half owned by Universal. 
UWP was to commence operations at the beginning of 1947 on 
the basis of a remarkable strategy based on block booking. 
Traditionally, there had been resistance to British product 
among cinema managers, so the plan was to supply the American 
films of International Pictures only on condition that Rank 
films were taken with them! This ingenious plan was shattered 
when the Anti Trust Division of the Department of Justice won, 
in mid-1946, a court ruling which made block booking illegal. 
So Rank's films rested with Universal distributors and the 
growing Eagle Lion which had improved its facilities by merging 
with an existing independent US distributor, Producers 
Releasing. Other things being equal, the films stood little 
chance for they were to be hired by cinemas purely on their own 
merit. 
What changed matters was the growing perception in the US 
industry of the danger of the imposition by the British 
government of some form of import control on Hollywood films. 
Assuming - wrongly - that Rank had sufficient influence with 
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the government to ward off this threat, the majors, in 1947, 
awarded Rank's films space on their affiliated circuits. 
Bookings briefly rose.... until the 75% import levy was duly 
announced. At which point, distribution of Rank's films in the 
US collapsed once and for all. 
If Rank had lost his chance of the US market in this way, 
perhaps he could at least capture the British market where 
American films had dominated exhibition. As the US attitude 
became ever more unsympathetic to Britain and the loss of its 
market there, Rank eventually, in December 1947, complied with 
the government's request for him to raise production to fill 
the gap left by the missing imports. The programme of thirty 
two films was introduced. 
When the settlement between the government and the MPEAA 
came, Rank, who felt he had been double crossed by the 
government, refused to cancel bookings in his British circuits 
of his new films. He announced that he would only have room for 
25 Hollywood films in the remainder of 1948 and 75 in 1949. And 
at this point, the government lent assistance by raising the 
quota to 45%. 
The MPEAA threatened another boycott, refused to allow any 
American/British double bills, and were briefly forced to 
exhibit in smaller circuits, suffering a fall in rentals. 
However, the audiences voted with their feet, and Rank's 
circuits' attendances collapsed. By the end of 1948, Hollywood 
films were back in the Odeons and Gaumonts, and what had, two 
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years earlier, been a very real threat to the majors of a 
British studio which would compete with them in the US and 
elsewhere had now totally disappeared. 
Rank's loss in 1948 was £4,646,000. The retrenchment at 
Rank (as discussed in section 3.3) ensued. The programme of 
large scale film production was at an end and, without such 
films, there could be no hope of the US market. And the post 
levy production programme had shown that the circuits at home 
could not work profitably on the basis of British product. 
The rate of decline became extremely rapid. UK production 
in general collapsed. Between September 1948 and March 1949, 
for instance, more than 2,000 technicians in British studios 
were laid off (Porter, 1983). 
By the mid nineteen fifties, not only had Alexander Korda, 
momentarily a kind of replacement for Rank as a sponsor of 
large scale British cinema productions, passed away, but ten 
studios had closed or were no longer used for film making: 
Highbury, Islington, Isleworth, Welwyn, Teddington, Shepherds 
Bush, Ealing, Riverside, Wembley and Denham. 
If some of these (Ealing; Shepherds Bush; Riverside) had 
become television studios, there was, to some extent, a 
televisionisation of the remaining feature film product. The 
ubiquity of 'Carry On, ' Norman Wisdom, and television spin-offs 
like 'Steptoe' in the fifties and sixties has been noted. 
Of the British combines, it was ABPC which embraced 
television directly in the fifties to the extent of acquiring a 
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television franchise and integrating the ABPC Board with 
directors from ABC TV, and, as observed in section 3.3, briefly 
assuming the appearance of a fully vertically integrated film 
concern in the television era. In the longer term, any 
stability emanating from this was dissipated following the 
conglomerate takeover by EMI. 
Although Rank's strategy was one of unrelated 
diversification, it did accommodate television within Pinewood 
Studios in the mid sixties to the extent of building special 
quarters and a stage for MCA TV production, churning out, for 
example, the 'Court Martial' series of 26,48-minute episodes 
each made in nine days. Investment subsequently took place to 
make four further stages dual purpose for television and film 
production. And in those periods, such as the early nineteen 
ineties, of the recession phase in the cycle of Hollywood 
production in Britain, Rank's Studio survives by hosting the 
manufacture of television commercials. 
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4.1 Sources of Finance. 
There have been a variety of ways in which a British film 
producer can approach the notoriously difficult task of 
attempting to arrange for a film to be financed. To a 
considerable extent, the types of finance sources likely to 
be available to the producer of a particular film have, in 
recent years, varied with the planned size of budget in the 
following manner: 
(i) Low Budget Films. 
These are budgeted 
examples from the nine, 
Dark' (which cost £1.4 
Here' (£1.1 million in 
(£650,000 in 1985). 
As was seen in the 
to cost up 
teen eightio 
million to 
1986), and 
example of 
to £12 million - among 
:s are 'Dancing Through the 
make in 1989), 'Wish You Were 
'My Beautiful Laundrette' 
'High Hopes' in section 2.3, 
it has become customary for low budget films to be facilitated 
by British television money. Frequently, this has come from 
Channel Four. Taking the years 1987 to 1990, for example, 
Channel Four was able, from an annual budget of about £8 
million pounds, partly to finance about sixteen films per year. 
British Screen Finance Limited, the approximate successor 
to the National Film Finance Corporation, has played a vital 
supplementary role in this area. Between 1986 and 1989 
inclusive, for instance, British Screen put eighteen million 
pounds into forty four films - about half of which were in the 
low budget sector. 
-200- 
(ii) Medium Budget Films. 
The medium budget sector covers films costing between £12 
and £3 million pounds. Among recent examples are 'The Big Man' 
(£2.5 million in 1989), 'Maurice' (£1.6 million in 1987), and 
Paris By Night' (£2 million in 1987). 
As was illustrated in section 3.4 by the case study of the 
financing of 'A World Apart, ' medium budget productions require 
something substantial to be raised to add to the television 
and/or British Screen Finance money. The most frequently 
adopted method is that of pre-sales of distribution rights. The 
most important pre-sale is to a distributor in the United 
States, and this will be followed by pre-sales on a territorial 
basis elsewhere in the world. 
(iii) Larger Budget Films. 
British films costing more than £3 million include such 
recent examples as 'Henry V' (£5 million in 1988), 'Castaway' 
(£5 million in 1986), and 'Brazil' (£10 million in 1983). 
Here the television/British Screen financial support 
mechanism fades from the picture. These more expensive films 
CAN be financed direct by Hollywood majors (cf. 'A Fish Called 
Wanda, ' section 3.4), and occasionally there is a private 
individual investor. But pre-selling of distribution rights, 
whether to a US major or to an independent, is again likely to 
be of central importance. 
As Table 19 shows, the Channel Four/British Screen model 
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of finance developed during the nineteen eighties to account 
for the part or whole financing of perhaps half the low budget 
sector and a third of the medium budget sector. 
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Table 19. 
CHANNEL 4/BRITISH SCREEN FINANCE IN LOW AND MEDIUM BUDGET FILM 
PRODUCTION 1981 - 1989. 
NO. OF FILMS: NO. WITH NO. WITH 
Low Budget C4 SUPPORT B. SCREEN 
SUPPORT 
1981 14 2 
1982 20 10 
1983 21 7 
1984 22 14 
1985 20 13 
1986 14 7 1 
1987 19 11 7 
1988 18 9 6 
1989 12 4 4 
Medium Budget 
FILMS WITH C4 AND/OR 
B. SCREEN SUPPORT 
NO. % 
2 14 
10 50 
7 33 
14 64 
13 65 
7 50 
12 55 
10 56 
7 58 
1981 4 0 0 0 
1982 14 0 0 0 
1983 11 1 1 9 
1984 9 2 2 22 
1985 13 4 4 31 
1986 13 5 6 6 46 
1987 25 8 4 9 41 
1988 19 5 7 7 37 
1989 16 2 4 4 25 
Sources: adapted from 
(i) British Screen publicity brochure, 
Cannes Film Festival, 1990 
and 
(ii) 'Film on Four. Summary Information 
on Individual Films' - unpublished 
internal Channel Four document. 
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The Head of Drama of Channel Four, David Rose (interview, 
1990), pointed out that, in its remit, C4 was required to 
engage INDEPENDENT film and programme makers. This led C4 to 
invite film makers to approach it with film projects which 
would have a life in the cinema before being shown on 
television. This was despite the constraint of the three year 
bar then imposed by the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association. 
1981, the run-up. period to C4's launch, was the first year. 
It was, at this time, novel for British television to be 
involved in feature films. BBC 'drama' was not intended to 
translate to cinema distribution, and, if it had been, existing 
union agreements would have been constraining. Moreover, 
television drama was filmed on 16mm. where theatrical features 
are 35mm. which is more expensive 
In 1981, C4 decided to allocate £6 million to 'Film on 
Four' with a target of twenty films to be financed - in the 
event, twenty two were achieved. In the first year, the average 
total cost of the films involved was £400,000, and C4's average 
input was £275,000. 
There was no formula regarding the balance of C4's 
partners' investment. 
For example, 'Angel' 
C4 putting in 82% and 
the Irish Film Board. 
1982 production 'Heat 
maximum of £400,000. 
Some films were 100% 
(produced in 1981/82) 
the remainder of the 
Contributions ranged 
and Dust' (total cos 
financed, many less. 
cost £469,000 with 
finance coming from 
from £100,000 to the 
t £800,000) to a 
-204- 
By the mid nineteen eighties, depite the failure of the 
real value of its film finance to grow, C4 was sometimes 
referred to as the 'saviour of the British film industry'. 
However, it is interesting to note that there has been an 
element within the C4 funding philosophy which has considered 
it important additionally to part-finance some foreign 
projects. For example, films by Wenders, Tanner and Tarkovsky. 
How has it been decided which British films to finance? C4 
was set up as an alternative to ITV, and, by implication, to 
the BBC. It had to be experimental and innovative in content or 
form - but it still wanted to be popular. 
Thus in judging the fifty or so scripts received every 
week, C4 claims to opt for what seems 'fresh'. This often comes 
from writers who are new to cinema film writing. Indeed, of the 
one hundred and sixty films with C4 involvement up to mid-1990, 
fifty were by first-time feature length writers. Similarly, 
directors backed have often been those stepping up from 
television for the first time. 
If a film maker in the low budget sector has secured C4's 
participation to the extent of X% of the budget, his task is to 
raise the remainder of the finance elsewhere. Producers can be 
helped in this by C4's association with British Screen Finance. 
Ideally, the two bodies would assist different projects, but, 
given the lack of other finance sources, the overlap is 
unavoidable. For example, seven of the eight low budget films 
to which British Screen contributed a financial involvement in 
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1987 (and five of the six in 1988) were also C4 projects. 
British Screen was established in 1985. It is a private 
company which is run on a commercial basis with the stated 
objectives of playing a key role in the financing of new 
British feature films, and of encouraging young and less 
established producers and directors. It has a feature film 
fund, a short film fund, and a one third interest in a sales 
agency, The Sales Company. 
It is funded by a grant of £1.5 million per annum from the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and by private shareholders. 
For example, Rank and Cannon invested respectively £250,000 and 
£300,000 per annum from 1986 to 1989. 
British Screen is a commercial operation and makes loans, 
rather than grants or subsidies, to producers (at 22% above 
base rate) only where it feels that the film will be 
sufficiently popular in the exhibition market that it will get 
its money back. There is, of course, no guarantee that one's 
money will be returned when it is only secured on the film 
itself, rather than any more conventional asset. 
Despite the activities of the National Film Trustee Company 
which collects debts (for a 1% commission) on behalf of British 
Screen (and other film companies), British Screen has had to 
write off several million pounds. In 1989, it was also forced 
to seek the agreement of its own shareholders to a two year 
postponement of the repayment of their loans. This is 
indicative of the precariousness of this vital source of 
finance. 
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What of the role of the banking system as a source of 
finance for feature film production in the UK? The banks might 
appear to be an obvious source of funds. After all, the 
producer of the average commodity, the manufacturer of chalk or 
cheese, would probably think of turning to the banking sector 
for some form of loan to facilitate production. 
It is in the area of the pre-selling of distribution 
rights, noted in the introduction to this section as central to 
the financing of most medium and larger budget films, that the 
banks' main role vis-a-vis film production is to be found. That 
is, the film banking sector specialises in the discounting of 
distributors' contracts with producers thereby supplying the 
money which is spent on actual production. 
Rather than the High Street clearing banks themselves, the 
film banking sector tends to be populated by their merchant 
banking subsidiaries, and by independent merchant banks. This 
activity is based in London and Holland and does business with 
producers on both sides of the Atlantic. The four most 
important banks in terms of the volume of their lending in 
recent years have been Credit Lyonnais Nederland, Pierson 
Heldring and Pierson, Guinness Mahon and British and 
Commonwealth. 
Credit Lyonnais has been the largest lender with Piersons 
and British and Commonwealth in approximate joint second place. 
The latter went into administration in 1990 although not, it 
seems, as a result of its involvement in film banking. 
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Approximate levels of film industry lending outstanding in 
mid 1990 were: 
Credit Lyonnais - between $1 and $12 billion 
Piersons and British and Commonwealth - over $100 
million each 
Guinness Mahon - about $50 million. 
In both quantitative and qualitative terms, Credit Lyonnais 
has become accustomed to operating on a higher level than the 
others, extending revolving lines of credit to producers and 
distributors and lending to the largest projects. This is large 
scale finance which involves the permanent use of capital in a 
way which is inappropriate for the other, smaller banks. 
The Entertainment Business Division of Credit Lyonnais had, 
by 1986, been involved in the finance of over five hundred 
films and been in the habit of financing more than seventy 
American, British and other films per annum. Although its 
facilities have extended to input in some very large budget 
productions such as 'Superman' or 'Rambo, ' it has had a role in 
respect of the relatively small film which is more typically 
British, eg. 'A Room With a View' (total cost £2.3 m. in 1985). 
Although the film business is a notoriously uncertain one 
and banking is - or at least should be -a very conservative 
activity, contract discounting amounts to a viable concept of 
'film banking'. That is, such banks as the aforementioned 
Credit Lyonnais or Guinness Mahon view the method employed to 
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finance film projects through contract discounting as one which 
is directly tied to the basic principles of sound banking. 
In general such banking practice means lending only against 
proper collateral. So when making a loan to a film producer 
against his contracted pre-sales, a bank would consider itself 
to be making a loan against 'receivables'. Moreover, when 
discounting a pre-sales contract, banks invariably require that 
the producer has a completion guarantee in place. 
The fully discounted value for the sales received for the 
film are lent. The bank does not discount for risk as such - it 
either accepts or rejects the project and discounts for time. 
It is, in a sense, as if the bank is renting out the money for 
a period. 
The bank borrows money on the inter bank market and lends 
against receivables at the LIBOR rate plus a 'spread' of 
between one and three per cent. The smallest spreads would be 
if a loan were to be made to a Hollywood major - the loan would 
be seen as virtually risk free, and thus not very profitable. 
The highest spreads are indeed relatively high by banking 
standards generally. 
In addition to the spread, the bank also charges a fee 
which is typically between two and three per cent. The 
profitability of this activity (according to British and 
Commonwealth, interview 1990) is comparable with that which 
would be anticipated by the banks from such a field as, say, 
property lending. 
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The typical loan to a film maker is perhaps $10 million and 
would be expected to yield about $2 million. Such a loan would 
have an eighteen month repayment timetable synchronised with 
the coming to fruition of the distribution pre-sales contracts 
on delivery of the finished film. 
For the banks concerned, especially the relatively small 
merchant banks, activity in film banking is largely seen as a 
part of a 'niche' strategy of competition, and motivated by an 
overall objective of profit maximisation. Media finance in 
general is one such banking niche. Others are to be found in 
management buyouts, for example, or in local authority lending, 
property and leisure. 
Such specialist services are not routinely of interest to 
the big 'retail' banks. Indeed, of the latter, the only direct 
involvement in film contract discounting in the UK is that of 
Barclays Bank through its branch in Soho Square which is 
located in close proximity to the film production companies of 
the Wardour Street area. However, in practice, the bulk of 
Barclays' activity in this field finds its way into television, 
rather than feature film, production. (Interview, Barclays, 
Bank, 1990. ) 
The standard process of syndication when large loans are 
involved means that other banks who are not expert in the film 
finance area do sometimes participate. Such banks follow the 
expertise of the specialist bank. For example, suppose that a 
$20 million loan against sales contracts is required, a 
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merchant bank such as Guinness Mahon might undertake to lend 
£5 million of the £20 million and to find other banks to lend 
the remainder. 
Frequent participators in such syndicates in recent years 
have included Gotabanken, Samuel Montague, and Creditanstalt. 
And Piersons and Guinness Mahon have been in the habit of 
joining forces in this respect, and thereby finding a way of 
effectively competing with the larger Credit Lyonnais. 
It is useful to take Guinness Mahon's operations in the 
contract discounting field as an illustration of possible 
merchant banking practice. The bank's Entertainment Division 
says (interview, 1990) that it has a policy of lending only 
against acceptable distribution contracts. Such lending leads 
to its involvement in about a dozen films per annum. Before 
lending, it takes a view of the 'track records' of the creative 
personnel concerned and of the marketing prospects of the film. 
As of mid 1990, Guinness Mahon's lending in each case was 
usually between $5 million and $10 million dollars, with total 
loans at somewhat less than $100 million per annum. Total 
lending is constrained by banking criteria of sector exposure 
limitations, ie. a fixed sum which relates to the total capital 
of the bank. In this way, perhaps one sixth of the bank's 
lending is in film finance. 
For the Guinness Mahon bank as a whole, this activity was 
an important source of growth during the second half of the 
nineteen eighties. Where the bank's 'traditional' film customer 
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may have been the UK independent producer, further growth is 
expected to come by tilting the balance (at present 
fifty: fifty) towards the finance of American films. The 
typical British film maker's one-off one and a half million 
pound deal is thus not seen as particularly attractive in such 
a growth oriented model. 
Syndication is standard, and Guinness Mahon has been 
accustomed to doing much of its business with Piersons. 
Examples of recent films where finance has been syndicated in 
this way are 'Buster' (details of the financing of this film 
are discussed in section 3.1) and 'A Kiss Before Dying. ' In the 
latter case, Guinness Mahon provided $15 million secured 
against the contract of Universal Studios. 
This is an example of the financing of a 'negative pick 
up, ' ie. a picture which a major Hollywood studio has agreed to 
pick up for distribution. The studio does not finance such 
films directly, but, on delivery of the negative, will 
reimburse the producer in respect of the production cost. In 
the meantime, the studio's contract is discounted by the bank. 
At one remove from contract discounting is the less 
frequently observed method of bank involvement in film finance 
known as 'underwriting. ' When a bank agrees to underwrite a 
film project, it undertakes, for an additional fee, to lend the 
entire amount in question. The subsequent arrangement of 
syndication is not a source of concern for the producer because 
the deal is on whatever the difficulties the bank might face in 
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finding other lenders to participate. 
This is in contrast to contract discounting syndication 
where the deal is off should the bank be unable to find other 
lenders. In the UK during recent years, the field of 
underwriting has been largely associated with Hill Samuel whose 
annual commitment has been in the $30 million to $50 million 
range. (Interview, 1990. ) 
Underwriting is perhaps a somewhat more adventurous 
financial model than contract discounting. Hill Samuel's 
underwriting is of individual films usually with budgets in 
excess of $15 million. Its most well known involvement was with 
the Oscar winning 1986 production 'The Last Emperor, ' a film 
with a budget of £15.7 million. This finance was syndicated 
with four other merchant banks including Standard Chartered. 
Productions are selected on the basis that they are 
sufficiently weighty to secure international distribution by 
right as it were, rather than purely through good fortune. The 
films are selected on the basis that there is a very large 
international market for middle-to-high brow projects in the 
English language. That is, the field for underwriting has been 
narrowed down in this way and by Hill Samuel's requirements 
that films selected must have a first class producer and 
script, and reliable lawyers and sales agents. 
Track records of personnel and of organisations are said to 
be a crucial factor in the consideration of projects for 
underwriting. But they do not guarantee that participation will 
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be forthcoming. The producer and director team, Jeremy Thomas 
and Bernardo Bertolucci, had a major hit in both critical and 
financial terms with 'The Last Emperor, ' but they did not 
retain Hill Samuel and Standard Chartered finance for their 
next project, 'The Sheltering Sky'. 
Producers often express the view that banks are far too 
timid when it comes to involvement in the financing of film 
projects and that their involvement largely boils down to 
contract discounting and little else. Not only do banks face no 
risk in this, but they charge very heavily for their services - 
in the example of 'Buster' the producer said (interview) that 
financing a $5.6 million film involved incurring various bank 
costs totalling $400,000. 
The banks take a different view: wide and casual exposure 
to the unparalleled uncertainty of the film scene would be an 
outrageous abuse of their shareholders' interests. And in any 
case, they would argue, there is considerable risk even in 
contract discounting as the collapse of a number of independent 
American distributors in the last few years has indicated. 
Nevertheless, it is very much the case that there is a kind 
of 'Macmillan Gap' in the availability of film production 
finance with respect to the banking system. And it is a gap 
which is not likely to be filled. Many observers feel that the 
Japanese banks are about to enter the entertainment industry 
and will, in due course, play an increasingly important role. 
This may be of little comfort to the British because, not 
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only is the probable large scale of Japanese involvement 
unlikely to propel it towards small British projects, but the 
competitive effect of Japanese entry could easily be to force 
down the banks' 'spreads, ' below one per cent perhaps, and 
thereby drive existing contract discounters out of this field 
altogether. A major rationalisation could be the result. 
Indeed, Guinness Mahon is already owned by the Japanese Bank of 
Yokohama. 
Both underwriting and contract discounting relate to the 
finance of single film projects. But what of finance at the 
corporate level? In other words, what about the financing of 
film production companies as a whole - asset based as opposed 
to project based finance? 
In principle, there is considerable scope for investment in 
film companies. Such investment can, for example, be viewed as 
a suitable form of concentric diversification fora 
conglomerate parent. For instance, Pearson came, by 1982, to 
have £12 million invested in the British film company, 
Goldcrest (Eberts and Ilott, 1990). It saw its investment in 
Goldcrest as potentially a fifth division of the corporation 
next to Penguin Books, the Westminster Press, Longmans and the 
'Financial Times'. Its initial investment had been stimulated 
by the possible synergy from 'Watership Down, ' a film made by 
Goldcrest of a book published by Penguin. 
Moreover, investment in film companies is essentially a 
venture capital investment. Investment funds often have a sum 
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set aside for venture capital and it should be possible to 
attract participation from a variety of such sources. Again, 
the case of Goldcrest provides a useful illustration: its wide 
range of investors included City investment trusts and 
insurance companies, as well as the pension funds of the 
National Coal Board and the Post Office. 
In practice, however, it is usually relatively difficult to 
persuade investors to back the prospectus of a film company. 
The likely nature of a film company's business is that, rather 
than looking for a particular annual rate of return, one will 
expect to make very large profits only on an intermittent 
basis, that is as and when hits arise. 
While this can be one off-putting factor a further one is 
often the long memories in investment circles of past losses 
made on films. Eberts (ibid) has pointed out that 'most private 
investors who have put money into movies have lost every penny, 
and the film industry is generally given a wide berth by the 
investment community'. 
While film entrepreneurs might see . the turning down out of 
hand of film investment as irrational, a reinforcing factor in 
the UK, as opposed to the US, is a widespread absence among 
institutions and other financial sources of sector expertise, 
and a consequent reluctance to evaluate a film company 
prospectus favourably. 
Such a prospectus has to show that relevant people are on 
board in the form of specialist management with successful film 
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industry 'track records'. Indeed, it is indispensible that the 
major personnel of the film company seeking finance have track 
records specifically in the film business. 
For example, although television would appear to be the 
next door neighbour of film production, two of the most 
successful US television entrepreneurs, Norman Lear and Jerry 
Perenchio, were unable, according to Eberts (ibid), to raise a 
relatively moderate sum ($100 million) during the mid nineteen 
eighties to finance Embassy Pictures, their film company. 'Film 
is a high risk business in which success depends on luck and 
the astute creative and commercial judgement, as well as 
extensive personal contacts, of a few top executives. ' 
Creative track records are also important in this context. 
It is less expensive and less risky, and thus more attractive 
to potential investors, for a film company to have 
relationships with established producers and directors, etc. 
rather than specialising in the nurturing of new talent. 
That film making is very much a 'people' business where 
individuals and their creativity dominate is a further negative 
factor in relation to the task of attracting corporate 
investors. One can in fact go further and argue that a 
successful film company must be seen to have, at the head of 
its team of specialist accountants and lawyers, a single 
leadership figure -a creative decision maker who can dominate 
the organisation. For example, Hollywood studios normally have 
a studio chief, that is, one figure who is supported by, rather 
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than equal to, the team of senior managers. 
The role of this leadership figure is to indicate an 
unambiguous business and artistic direction for the 
organisation, and to facilitate deals with the majors and with 
the independent distribution sector by inspiring confidence in 
those quarters. 
An impoverished industry, such as that in the UK, cannot 
throw up such leadership figures more than on an occasional 
basis. For example, only Jeremy Thomas and David Puttnam have 
fallen into this category in the UK in recent years. And both 
do indeed have corporate investors. By the same token, however, 
the ability of the remainder of the British film industry to 
attract corporate finance is severely constrained. 
The sheer difficulty of finding corporate investors for a 
UK film company is illustrated by Eberts (ibid) who had 
succeeded in this task for a company confined purely to film 
development, but found it almost impossible in relation to a 
fully fledged production company. 
The idea of development is that one invests relatively 
small amounts in the progression of an initial idea for a film 
to the point at which both the script and budget are drawn up 
and the leading creative personnel are provisionally in place. 
Given the high risk/high return nature of the film 
business, one looks for investors who wish to participate on a 
venture capital basis. Such investors are attracted by the 
promise of a high rate of conversion of development ideas into 
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realised projects (the average in Hollywood is one in twenty; a 
good independent developer can offer three in ten), and by a 
situation in which there will be, say, ten films in development 
at any one time. An investment of perhaps £40,000 in this 
context would be valuable, and the investor would effectively 
have relatively little at stake in any given film. 
The problem with production, rather than development, 
finance is that the numbers must be much larger. Thus, in the 
case of Eberts, the successful raiser of corporate finance for 
development found that his first attempts to raise British 
production investment (in 1980) were futile. More than one 
hundred potential participants - insurance companies and 
pension funds; private investors and venture capitalists - were 
approached in the City, in Europe and in the US, but 'there 
wasn't even one close call'. 
Rather than such a solo search for specialist corporate 
investment, one can enlist the assistance of an investment bank 
with film business expertise such as the Wall Street banks 
Merrill Lynch, E. F. Hutton or Allen and Co. Their presence 
is required to enhance the credibility of one's prospectus, and 
their role will be to identify and afford introductions to 
suitable investors. 
Investment banks differentiate themselves not only from 
ordinary High Street banks but also from the European-style 
merchant banks. The main activity of an 'investment' bank is to 
find 'investors'. Investment bankers such as Faizal N. Syed, an 
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Associate of Merrill Lynch International (interview, 1990), 
feel that with respect to the film industry, 'investors are 
wary and tend to have very long memories in relation to any 
situation in which money may appear to have been squandered by 
a production company or individual film maker'. Hence, the 
investment bank then approaches would-be investors only when it 
feels able 'to tell a very strong story' about the film 
personnel involved. 
Taking the example of Merrill Lynch, films are a part of a 
'Media' financing section which also covers television and 
publishing. It raises money for the corporation concerned, ie. 
it deals at the corporate level rather than with individual 
film producers, although it claims to have understanding at the 
operating level. 
Money is raised by placing various highly differentiated 
'products' such as 'Zero Coupon Convertible Discounted 
Debentures, ' or, a further product variant, 'Senior 
Subordinated Discount Notes' (with a coupon as high, on 
occasion, as fifteen and seven eighths per cent). In 1987, such 
transactions for 'Media' as a whole led to the raising of 
almost $1 billion for Merrill Lynch's corporate clients. As far 
as the film industry was concerned, this included $250 million 
raised on behalf of Columbia Pictures. 
The scale of transactions in the investment banking sector 
suggests that in practice its services are unlikely to be of 
relevance to a new British film company. Perhaps a more 
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plausible corporate investment source in such cases is the UK 
venture capital market. 
The venture capital sector generally in the UK was a 
typical growth industry of the nineteen eighties. Its massive 
expansion, facilitated to some considerable extent by the boom 
in management buy outs, involved the growth of its investments 
from £20 million in 1979 to £1.65 billion in 1989. 
However, the provision of venture capital to film 
production companies is relatively rare. Such venture capital 
would be corporate finance supplied on an equity investment 
basis to a film production company, as opposed to the project 
finance involvement of the underwriting of specific films. 
Although the merchant banks in the film finance sector 
specialise in contract discounting in which they do not take an 
equity position as such in single film projects, there is a 
small amount of venture capital activity undertaken by, for 
instance, Guinness Mahon who have a venture role with the 
independent producer-distributor Palace Pictures, producers or 
co-producers in the second half of the nineteen eighties of 
eleven low or medium budget British films, including 'Scandal' 
(1988) and 'Dancing Through the Dark' (1989). 
A larger source of such venture capital is the National 
Westminster Bank through its venture capital subsidiary County 
Nat West Ventures (CNWV). For example, taking the year 1989, of 
its total venture capital investment of £75 million, it 
invested something over £1 million of pure equity in film 
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production. And in the twelve months ending June 1990, CNWV's 
film investment was about £750,000. 
CNWV's main involvement has been in The Bountiful Co. Ltd., 
the financing vehicle for David Puttnam's production company 
Enigma. Wholly untypical of British producers in his ability to 
generate investment in this manner and on this scale, Puttnam, 
coming back to British production after his period as head of 
Columbia Pictures, found it possible to raise a production fund 
of $50 million. The other participants in the fund initially 
were the late British Satellite Broadcasting, Warner Brothers, 
and the Japanese distributor Fujisankei Communications. 
The idea of venture capital in a general sense is to invest 
in a high growth and high return FIRM, rather than the 
particular sector as such. So the venture capitalist's response 
to a film producer's request for investment finance would raise 
the question of whether a film production company could be 
started now (by backing this producer), and then sold in, say, 
ten years. 
Such a model of investment does not usually fit very well 
with film production where activity is project-by-project, and 
where one cannot easily invest on a continuous basis over a 
period of years in a group of people (producers, directors, 
writers, actors, technicians) because they tend to disperse 
after each project. Due to this, the venture capitalist in the 
film sector will more typically look at the possibilities of a 
significant divided flow in order to replace the need for 
capital gain. 
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It was observed above that the film business is an area in 
which the people and their creativity tend to dominate. A 
venture capitalist like Charles Target of Patricoff Associates, 
(interview, 1990) is almost certain to be ill at ease 
with this type of activity. That is, investment in areas like 
cinemas, video rental shops or satellite television - 
activities which USE the product - might well be preferred to 
investment in the producers of the product itself. 
Moreover, the market structure of the film distribution- 
exhibition industry can be regarded as a further negative 
factor in relation to venture capital involvement with film 
production. Where a venture capitalist might, other things 
being equal, invest in, say, a record production company or a 
publishing firm, because he will assume that he will be able to 
get the records played on the air or the books into the 
bookshops, he will not invest in film making in the UK if there 
is a strong impression that the majors' control of distribution 
will prevent all but a small number of independent films from 
being distributed into the cinemas. 
In the UK, Puttnam's idea is the exceptional investment 
that has appealed to the venture capitalists. The latter must 
therefore have been convinced that The Bountiful Co. is a well 
managed organisation which is going to be worth a great deal in 
the future, and that its output, which is diversified across a 
slate of six films over about four years, will be profitable. 
Furthermore, the rights to these and other films will 
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constitute a valuable library. 
CNWV (interview, 1990) as suppliers of venture capital in 
the film industry initially have an investment team examine 
projects. They also have the right to approve budgets, and 
while they do monitor expenditure, they are concerned not to 
assume the role of producer. As a result, they do visit film 
sets during production from time to time. 
Enigma's first film under these new funding arrangements 
was 'Memphis Belle' which was made in 1989 at a total cost of 
£212 million -a very large budget for a British film. However, 
the early returns of this film from cinema exhibition alone 
were good. Although the American release of 'Memphis Belle' was 
not until mid-October 1990, it was the forty first largest 
grossing film in the USA for the year, taking $25.5 million at 
the American box office and becoming the highest placed British 
film in the 1991 US box office league table. 
Indeed only two other British films managed to find their 
way into the top one hundred of this table: 'Nuns on the Run' 
and 'The Witches' were in ninety third and ninety seventh 
positions respectively. Each grossed approximately $10 million. 
And in UK exhibition in 1990, 'Memphis Belle' grossed a 
further £4.8 million and was the only British film in the 
British top twenty box office table for the year. In fact, one 
could say that, with this particular film, Puttnam and the 
venture capitalists got off to a flying start! 
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4.2 The Financing Process, Risk and Film Investment. 
It is the customary practice in the film industry for the 
total cost of production of a film to be capitalised in the 
balance sheet of the production company as an asset. The future 
revenues throughout the anticipated income generating life of 
the film, discounted to present value, are estimated. The film 
is then amortised at the rate determined by the income 
forecast: if 50% of the anticipated revenues will arise in the 
first year, then the valuation will be written down by this 
proportion at the end of the first year. 
After several years, the asset's value will have been 
eliminated from the balance sheet altogether. In general, the 
average period for this is between three and five years as the 
film accrues revenue in theatrical exhibition and in the 
ancillary markets. In this way, the need to absorb the whole 
cost of the film in a single year is avoided. 
Films which do other than exactly break even on production 
cost will have been inaccurately valued as assets. The 
importance of this is that the amortised film costs at any time 
represent the main assets of a film production company. 
Films might be highly profitable, but their asset 
valuations cannot exceed their production costs. This can have 
the effect of constraining the ability of a film company to 
raise finance by understating the value of the organisation. In 
the case of Goldcrest, for example, potential investors in a 
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share issue in 1984 were presented with a lengthy prospectus 
which argued that the true value of the portfolio was 70% 
higher than its balance sheet value of £16 million (Eberts and 
Ilott, 1990). (And for the film, as opposed to the television, 
part of the portfolio, this claim did indeed, in due course, 
turn out to be roughly correct. ) 
In the opposite case, where films perform badly, the danger 
inherent in this conventional film accounting practice of 
income forecasting is over-optimism in the forecasts and the 
failure to amortise films fast enough. Moreover, if one weights 
one's over-optimism towards the later years of the revenue 
cycle, it is quite possible to initiate rapid growth. 
For example, suppose that on completion a film, which has 
cost £10 million to make, looks as if it will be a loss maker 
which will take only £5 million over a productive life of 
two years - £3 million and £2 million in years one and two 
repectively. 
Suspecting a probable flop, one nevertheless makes an over- 
optimistic and elongated forecast of revenues illustrated in 
this example by: (£ million) 
Year 1-2. Year 4-7. 
Year 2- 12. Year 5-8. 
Year 3-3. 
In the event, the film takes £3 million in its first year. 
The total of forecast income was £20 million, so £1.5 million 
(3/20 of total cost) is written off, leaving an asset value of 
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£8.5 million at the end of Year 1. At this point, things look 
very healthy: in addition to the remaining asset value, there 
is a paper 'profit' of £1.5 million (composed of the revenue 
minus the write-off), and one can make bullish claims about the 
film's better than expected performance. 
In this example, the effect can be continued in Year 2 
where the £2 million accruing will lead to a write-off of £1 
million, a book asset value of £7.5 million, and a year's 
profit of £1 million. Cumulatively, this £10 million production 
is showing profit of £2.5 million! 
However, now that there are to be no further revenues, the 
third year is the year of crisis. One is obliged to make a full 
write-down now that it has become clear that the revenues were 
over-estimated. The £7.5 million is written off, giving an 
overall loss of £5 million, (ie. £7.5 million minus the profits 
of years 1 and 2). 
It is interesting that, despite having administered a £10 
million project which could take no more than £5 million in 
revenues, it will have been possible to have initiated an 
expansion of production. Pointing to the 'profits' during the 
early years, one can increase one's overdraft and attempt to 
attract new investors. 
However, without a major hit among the new films, one can 
only survive in this scenario by releasing an ever increasing 
number of films in each succeeding year. The early 'profits' of 
the new films must exceed the expanding realisations of losses. 
-228- 
Further complications would be the expectation of taxation 
payments and dividends from purely artificial profits. 
During the nineteen eighties, The Cannon Film Group, run by 
the Israeli entrpreneurs Golan and Globus, rapidly burgeoned 
into a presence of world significance in the film industry, 
backing about nine hundred films in ten years, but without a 
single major hit. Their share price (Yule, 1987) rose from 20 
US cents in 1979 to $45 in mid 1986. 
After this date, however, the tide rapidly turned. A year 
later an accumulated operating loss of $92 million was 
announced for 1983 to 1986 (and Cannon's share price collapsed 
to under $5). The announcement included, with respect to the 
year 1985, for example, the writing off of $32 million of asset 
valuation which constituted the total elimination of profits 
previously shown for the period 1983 to 1985. Despite the scale 
of this, there remained in Cannon's books at this time over 
$500 million of unamortised film costs. 
The incoming revenue which one forecasts - accurately or 
otherwise - can come from a wide variety of possible deals. 
There is in fact a tendency for the main sources of finance 
available to the British film maker to change over time. The 
British majors were once the dominant source, but their role 
had all but disappeared by the late nineteen seventies. 
However, at that time, there was a trend in the direction of 
tax deals and 'tax shelter' finance. This in turn was followed 
by a period during the nineteen eighties in which new funding 
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sources emerged: Channel Four television, and the American 
independent distribution sector. 
The latter category has rapidly evolved further. As 
financiers, theatrical distributors have declined relative to 
video and cable distributors. Distribution to US network 
television to facilitate finance has fallen away very sharply. 
And the recent period has also been one with emphasis placed on 
domestic sales agents with specialist finance raising skills 
enabling them to tease out the best deals from this range of 
distributors both in the US and territory-by-territory. 
Indeed, the essential basis of the three main film markets 
- Cannes, Los Angeles and Milan - is the making of these deals 
and the pre-selling of products for distribution. That these 
gatherings have continuously expanded has not, however, 
necessarily meant a commensurate increase in the availability 
of finance. Boorman (1991) records frequent excursions over the 
years trying to drum up finance for his films. "At first, I was 
astonished at how easy it was, until I learned that a 'Yes' in 
Cannes was really only a 'maybe' back at the office. Executives 
feel a compulsion to make deals in Cannes but they don't feel 
bound by them. " 
If a deal is negotiated, its nature is of great importance 
because the structure of these financing arrangements will 
determine the extent to which a film which turns out to be 
successful in the range of markets in the territory concerned 
returns revenue to the film's maker. 
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The most important deal is for distribution in North 
America which constitutes about 65% of the world market. The 
usual arrangement is one which secures for the producer 
participation in 'net' profits. In practice, this may mean that 
the film must be outstandingly successful before a producer's 
share materialises. 
The sequence of access to revenues in such a deal is that 
the exhibitor is entitled to keep perhaps a half of the box 
office gross. The remaining half is known as the 'rental'. 30% 
of the rental is then accounted for by the distributor's fee, 
and the costs of prints and advertising expenditure incurred by 
the distributor are also reclaimed at this stage. 
If one assumes that such expenditure might typically 
constitute 25% of the rental, this would leave 45% of the 
rental (and under a quarter of the original box office gross) 
as revenue potentially accruing to the producer. However, from 
this net profit, the distributor is entitled to recoup the 
original advance that was made to the producer when the deal 
was struck. 
If anything is left, the producer is at last able to 
participate. This will be done in agreed proportion with the 
distributor, the producer getting perhaps 75% of this residue. 
However, in putting the project together a year or eighteen 
months earlier, the producer may have given away much of this 
share by way of incentive to investors as well as to leading 
cast, the director and possibly members of the crew. They will 
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have 'points' in the film which constitute a percentage of this 
net profit. 
It was observed in section 2.3 that the 'net' can be an 
extremely elusive area because deal structures can be envisaged 
in which the achievement of the breakeven point at which the 
producer's share materialises is delayed. So it is perfectly 
possible that a successful film can return profits to all but 
those who have actually made it. 
A producer's contract with a studio giving the producer net 
participation will spell out at what point breakeven is 
reached. This definition can be a source of aggravation for 
producers if they feel that the studio has incurred little or 
no overhead cost in relation to the film in question and yet is 
loading an arbitrary sum of perhaps several million dollars 
onto the deal. 
Thus a 'gross' deal is a more attractive proposition. Very 
major stars, for example, can have the negotiating power to 
exchange the optimism required of a net profit participator for 
the confidence of one higher in the pecking order with points 
in the gross profits to be taken before the producer's share. 
Similarly, the best deal that a production company can aim 
for is a gross distribution deal like that obtained by 
Prominent for 'A Fish Called Wanda' (section 3.4). Such a deal 
allows one to participate in the rental - the distributor's 
gross - in progressively larger measure as revenues arise. 
In the case of the early Goldcrest, Eberts' particular 
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skill was in the area of making deals of this kind.. For 
Puttnam's 1983 film 'The Killing Fields, ' there was a gross 
deal between Goldcrest and Warners. Goldcrest wholly funded the 
film at a total cost approaching £10 million. Warners bought 
all US rights for one third of this total cost, paying in 
advance. Goldcrest then had gross participation which entitled 
them to 30% of the first $20 million of rentals, 40% of the 
next $5 million, 50% of the next $5 million, 60% of the next $5 
million, and 65% of anything further. 
As far as other US markets were concerned on this deal, 
Goldcrest had gross participation of 75% on video, 77.5% of the 
first $6 million from cable and $4 million from network 
television sales. Eberts and Ilott (1990) record that this deal 
became something of a model to be aspired to (but never again 
quite attained) for subsequent productions. It was a deal which 
meant that Warners could only make about 25% of the grosses at 
the maximum. It is unusual for the majors to allow this figure 
to fall below about a third. 
Moreover, there was not a 'cross-collateralisation' clause 
in 'The Killing Fields'. This feature of many gross deals can 
be a further constraint on producer participation because it 
allows the distributor to recoup from the ancillary markets (or 
from a second film in a package deal) if the film's performance 
in cinema exhibition is not good enough for him to recover his 
outlays under the terms of the theatrical part of the deal. 
Where the gross deal for 'A Fish Called Wanda' was one 
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which covered the entire budget of the film, Eberts' structured 
his 'Killing Fields' arrangement carefully to leave a large but 
finite degree of risk with Goldcrest. Where MGM's purchase of 
the former film was for world rights and accounted for the 
entire budget, Warners' deal left two thirds of the budget 
uncovered. Goldcrest retained all world rights except the US to 
exploit further the project. 
In the event, 'The Killing Fields' made a net contribution 
of £24 million to Goldcrest. However, the danger with this type 
of finance is that during production, after the deal has been 
made, costs escalate over the planned budget and thus push up 
the assumed risk. For example, the model of 'The Killing 
Fields' deal was replicated (but with cross-collateralisation) 
for Goldcrest's subsequent and famously over budget production 
'Revolution' in 1985. Warners' contribution of one third of the 
initial budget was fixed leaving them with no responsibility 
for the ever rising excess. 
As it happened, with 'The Killing Fields, ' Eberts' strategy 
was that Goldcrest took a risk equal to one third of the 
budget. This meant that, in addition to Warners' deal, a 
further third of the project had to be pre-sold abroad. 
If a producer has struck a distribution deal covering only 
North America, a variety of other pre-sales deals can be made 
with independent distributors in other territories. As noted by 
Chambers (1989), these can be outright sales in which the 
foreign distributor retains all revenues in his territory for 
-234- 
the period, perhaps five years, of the sale. 
Alternatively, there can be percentage contracts with or 
without advances. The distributor recovers his costs and the 
advance (if made) from the gross rental. The negotiation of the 
'back end terms' determines what percentage of the remaining 
revenue goes to the producer. These sums, which can be 
relatively large, are known as 'overages'. Both the size and 
the timing of overages are unpredictable elements, contributing 
to the difficulty producers experience on cash flow forecasts. 
As Prescott (1991) has observed, cash flow is also 
influenced by the timing of any tax relief eligible in the film 
making project. Finance based on tax deals can be an important 
aspect of the financing process. Tax shelter financing in the 
1970s and early nineteen eighties facilitated many millions of 
pounds of film finance not only from sources in the UK, but 
also from Germany and Australia. 
Between 1979 and 1984 in the UK, expenditure on the 
production of the master negative of a film, given that the 
film had an expected life of not less than two years, qualified 
as investment in plant and was thus entitled to a 100% first 
year capital allowance from the Inland Revenue. The upshot was 
the introduction into British film financing of sale and lease 
back deals which had been developed to exploit first year 
allowances more generally. 
For example, Barclays Bank's through its leasing 
subsidiary, Mercantile Credit, was able to reduce its overall 
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tax liability. Barclays would buy an item of capital equipment 
which attracted the capital allowance, and lease it to the firm 
which wanted to use it. The latter would pay rent and would 
enjoy the advantage of obtaining the capital item without 
having to raise the initial investment funds. In exchange, 
Barclays could obtain the tax shelter attached to the capital 
equipment, thus reducing the tax liability of the bank overall. 
And so it was with film production after the Inland Revenue 
Statement of Practice SP9/1979 had extended the entitlement. 
For example, in 1980, Goldcrest and Barclays attempted to 
arrange a leasing deal whereby Barclays would buy the film 
'Gandhi' and lease it back to Goldcrest just as if it were a 
factory building or an oil tanker. 
In principle, such tax deals were extremely attractive to 
both sides. The lessor would reduce a high tax liability by 
making use of the production company's tax shelter. The latter 
facility would typically be irrelevant to the producer who 
would not be making any profits at this stage. There was a 
further advantage in that, if the film eventually did go into 
profit, the production company would not have to give a profit 
share to the lessor, whereas one would have been so obliged in 
a more conventional deal with a studio or the like. 
For the producer, the tax deal did not merely solve at a 
stroke the formidable problem of how to raise film production 
finance, it was also capable, on occasion, of giving rise to 
the notion in film financing of 'free money'. 
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In the best tax deals, such as those arranged by Eberts for 
Goldcrest, the lessor's purchase price for the film, unlike 
conventional finance lent by, say, a major studio, would not 
have to be repaid. Essentially, the seller would recieve a 
share of the lessor's tax savings, which would cover a part of 
the total production cost, and this would constitute the free 
money. For example, $2 million of the total cost of about $17 
million was raised in this way for Boorman's 1984 film, 'The 
Emerald Forest' (Boorman, 1985). 
However, another kind of deal often arose in practice in 
which repayment was made. Here, there was a role for 
distributors to act as middlemen. In these leasing deals, a 
film producer standing alone, unlike Goldcrest - an established 
film company with a conglomerate (Pearson Longman) parent, 
would appear too insecure a partner to attract a lessor. So a 
distributor would buy the film from the producer and act as 
lessee. 
At least one organisation, Albion Films, was set up (by a 
collection of City interests in 1981) to specialise as lessees 
for film deals. Silverstone (1985) notes the example of the 
financing of 'Educating Rita' which was made in 1982 by a one- 
off production company, Acorn Pictures. The cost of production 
(£2.8 million) was arranged by Albion who organised a leasing 
deal with the financial subsidiary of Marks and Spencers. 
The British tax regime which facilitated these arrangements 
was short lived because, from the point of view of the Inland 
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Revenue, the balance between its two effects - the opportunity 
for banks and other large corporations to reduce their tax 
liability, and the expansion of British film production - had 
tilted too far in the direction of the former. Film 
entitlements were scaled down in the Budget of 1982, and first 
year allowances in general were abolished two years later. 
Indeed, a variety of governments moved in this direction 
during the mid to late nineteen eighties on the basis that 
lessors had had no particular interest in the film business as 
such, let alone the national one. In Germany (Eberts and Ilott, 
1990), there had been counter productive results in the form of 
encouraging investment in films which looked likely to flop - 
profitable films would lead to profits tax more than wiping out 
the tax benefit of the deal; in Australia and Canada (Prescott, 
1991), the 150% and 100% respective first year write offs came 
to be seen as over-generous; while in the UK, there was a 
perception (Silverstone, 1985) that the arrangements faciltated 
tax avoidance unduly and did not always benefit British film 
production. Barclays, for instance, in 1981, had purchased from 
Paramount for £40 million a batch of purely American films. 
Tax shelter finance in the UK led to one of the occasional 
periods in which the City of London become a finance source for 
British film production. The Chemical Bank, for example, under 
a variety of leasing deals, financed such substantial British 
films as 'The French Lieutenant's Woman' and 'The Eye of the 
Needle' (which each cost £6.5 million to produce in 1980), and 
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'Local Hero' (£2.6 million in 1982). Other participants in film 
finance in this period included the Midland Bank, Bank of 
America and Manufacturer's Hanover. 
A second factor in City interest in films in this period 
was the coincidental success of the early Goldcrest and the 
demonstration of the high profitability that could accompany 
investment in British films. In particular, there were the 
returns to Goldcrest's modest investment in the 1980 film 
'Chariots of Fire' which gave it a rate of profit of about 
5,000%! 
The downfall of Goldcrest came hard on the heels of the 
abolition of first year allowances with the cumulative effect 
that, by 1985, there was almost no City participation in the 
British film industry. It is unquestionably part of the legacy 
of the Goldcrest debacle that, for the forseeable future, the 
City is again an unlikely finance source. 
The average City institution, unlike its counterpart in the 
US, has been constrained not only by a lack of sector expertise 
in relation to the film business which makes it an 
uncomfortable interpreter of a film company prospectus or 
investment proposal, but also by past losses which have arisen 
during the occasional periods of participation. 
Such negative experiences tend to lead to a prolonged 
general period of withdrawal such as that which followed Morgan 
Grenfell backing a production fund in the early nineteen 
seventies and losing the investment within two years. 
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Similarly, it is said that there is a generalised reluctance of 
Scottish funds to participate following an investment from that 
quarter of $9 million in 1985 in an abortive blockbuster, 
'Gunbus, ' which did not achieve UK theatrical distribution. 
Both this reduction in City investment and the changes in 
taxation policy do not mean that the British film industry 
remains totally without support from these sources. A handful 
of banks with a specialist interest in contract discounting and 
the like (section 4.1) constitutes a kind of irreducible 
minimum of City financial interest, and, although production 
cost is regarded as revenue rather than capital expenditure, a 
proportion can be written off annually against tax. 
One writes off in any given year a proportion of the film's 
total cost equal to the proportion of its expected total income 
that accrues in that year. This process of writing off can only 
take place over the income earning life of the film, ie. it 
commences after the film's production has taken place. 
In contrast, this taxation arrangement would be more 
supportive of production if it had the vital effect of 
assisting with cash flow during the various phases of 
production itself by allowing the write off to be brought 
forward. The British film industry has lobbied for a change of 
this kind through the recommendations of the Tax Incentives 
Working Party established following the 1990 Downing Street 
meeting. (Prescott, 1991). 
Investment in film production is a high risk activity as is 
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indicated respectively by Vogel (1986) and Goldman (1985): 
'Of any ten major theatrical films produced, 
on the average, six or seven are unprofitable, 
and one will break even. ' 
'Nobody knows what movie will work. (Never, 
NEVER forget that). ' 
There is, however, the possibility of high return. It was 
noted above that the typical distribution deal is structured in 
such a way that, once revenues are high enough for producers' 
shares to materialise, participation is at an increasing 
marginal rate. 
This can make make the initial investment very profitable 
indeed and, from time to time, individual investors are 
observed to be making huge returns from film investment - for 
example, following the successes of 'Star Wars' in the late 
nineteen seventies and 'Crocodile Dundee' a decade later. 
However, as Eberts puts it (Eberts and Ilott, 1990), 'rule 
number one' in film investment is 'never risk your own money in 
the movies'. Eberts' first involvement in the film business was 
as a private investor in an abortive blockbuster, the 1979 film 
'Zulu Dawn, ' and he had to carry the heavy burden of the 
resulting personal debt for many years. 
Thus one attempts to attract outside investors for a film 
project. The British are at a disadvantage: apart from it being 
notoriously hard to attract funds to a purely British project 
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in the first place, in practice the most difficult kinds of 
films to finance are low concept, period pictures - and the 
typical British film, at least according to conventional wisdom 
(the evidence is reviewed in Chapter 5), is a complex 
adaptation of a literary novel set in the past. 
This does not mean that investors have a real insight and 
that films with these attributes are not worth backing. For 
example, 'Chariots of Fire' was a vastly profitable Eberts 
project which was indeed a British period film. Moreover, it 
was low concept, ie. a film whose plot was hard to explain in a 
couple of lines. For Eberts: 'The chances of success in raising 
money for a film are in direct proportion to the ease with 
which you can tell its story'. 
On occasion, an investor might be attracted by expectations 
that, if the film in question is successful, returns will 
accrue both directly from the film investment and from another, 
related product of that investor. For example, Pearson Longman, 
important investors in Goldcrest, were prepared to invest in 
the 1978 film 'Watership Down, ' an early project of Eberts, 
because there was the possibility of a profitable crossover 
concerning the original book which they themselves published. 
Such a diversified investor would be ideal if, as in the 
case of Pearson, it also controlled a merchant bank! Pearson's 
ownership of Lazard facilitated the raising of the $1 million 
investment. Furthermore, once this sum had been raised in this 
way, it was relatively simple to unlock the remainder of the 
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investment finance required for 'Watership Down' by showing 
other City sources that Lazards was in already. 
That there is always a chance that a project will turn out 
to be a blockbuster endows film investment with possible 
returns which other, comparable forms of investment lack. For 
example, television production, as opposed to film making, does 
not have this upside potential: in each territory, there are 
usually a limited number of television purchasers, they will 
have a standard rate for most product based on a single showing 
of the programme and with the anticipation of no subsequent 
revenue earning life. 
Films, on the other hand, are different. Some films every 
year are going to make enormous profits. Because nobody knows 
in advance which particular films it will be that make these 
profits, it would thus seem clear that one must invest at any 
one time in a large number of films. In this way, the losses on 
the numerous failures will be more than covered by the vast 
profits on the few hits. 
However, the case of Cannon (Yule, 1987) makes it clear 
that simply investing at random in large numbers is not a 
sufficient strategy. Cannon invested in about 900 films in a 
decade to the late nineteen eighties, but not one single 
picture was a major hit. 
So, although it is crucial to invest in large numbers, one 
must also be very selective in the choice of projects. As 
Eberts put it (interview, 1990), the indiscriminate approach to 
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a portfolio would simply be 'like going to a casino and backing 
every bet that came up. It is inevitable that you would 
eventually lose all your money'. 
In principle, unsystematic risk can be managed by 
diversification, but one must go to a very great deal of 
trouble to protect the downside. One attempts to put projects 
into one's portfolio according to principles of risk 
management. These rules seek to control exposure to risk, and 
to maximise the chances in the market of each project: 
(a) there is a ceiling on investment in any one picture. 
(b) a completion guarantee is in place for each picture. 
(c) exposure is further reduced through securing pre-sales 
contracts with distributors. 
(d) high quality is sought for the distribution secured. 
(e) attention is paid to how the marketing of completed 
films is to be conducted. 
(f) personnel: one's investment is only in producers, 
directors, editors, etc. with 'track records'. 
(g) films in one's portfolio have the kind of subject 
matter with potential appeal in a range of territories 
including the USA. 
(h) subject matter will have enduring appeal, helping to 
build a valuable asset in the form of a library. 
(i) the portfolio management organisation has low 
overheads. 
(j) the organisation has a recognised senior figure whose 
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decisive creative leadership is a factor in attracting 
investment and building confidence among investors. 
There is a continuum for the degree of risk-return for film 
, financiers. At one extreme is the very low risk and low return 
position which arises if involvement is pared down to a role 
akin to that of a conventional banker. In this role, one merely 
hopes to get one's money back plus interest. 
At the other extreme, the position is like that of the 
venture capitalist: interest is in net participation 
which can be high - but this is coupled with retention of risk. 
The portfolio is positioned somewhere along this spectrum 
by deciding to what extent one will reduce risk - and potential 
return - by laying off some proportion of the risk. That is, 
one pre-sells and pre-sells, laying off more and more of the 
risk, until one is satisfied to retain what is left as one's 
own risk. 
For Goldcrest in 1984, for instance, the main constituents 
of the portfolio were five large films including 'Revolution, ' 
then expected to cost $15 million, and 'The Mission, ' costing 
£17 million. The strategy was to cover a large proportion of 
these budgets through pre-sales and to hold risk to the extent 
of only $4 and $5 million in 'Revolution' and 'The Mission' 
respectively. 
This would be in accordance with the more general point 
that one is able to reduce the degree of risk in the portfolio 
on favourable terms if there is a capital market in which one 
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can lend at the risk free rate of interest. If one reduces risk 
by moving along the Capital Market Line, this is a more 
favourable option than reducing risk along the Efficiency 
Frontier in the conventional Mean-Standard Deviation diagram. 
The optimal portfolio, which depends on the shape of the 
investor's utility function and degree of aversion to (or 
preference for) risk, will lie on a higher indifference curve 
than under conditions of no capital market. 
The Goldcrest case (discussed in section 2.3) was one in 
which most - but not all - of the above rules of risk 
management were broken. But Goldcrest's downfall is most 
closely associated with the ceilings rule. Ceilings on 
investment in any single picture are a crucial part of such a 
risk management strategy. Sooner or later, the rule is likely 
to mean the exercise of considerable self-restraint because, to 
stick to this rule in the case of promising but expensive 
projects, one must bring in third party investors, giving away 
a percentage of future profits. 
Indeed, the ceilings rule is a hard one in several ways. A 
particular problem with it comes when you have a project in 
which you have invested a substantial amount already and then, 
during production, the budget suddenly has to be raised (as 
with both 'The Mission' and 'Revolution'). New external 
investors are not forthcoming, and one faces the choice of 
losing the existing investment, or breaking the ceilings rule. 
No matter how carefully one's risk-managed portfolio is 
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assembled, there is, of course, no absolute guarantee of 
success. And when portfolio productions continue for a 
significant period without a box office hit, it becomes ever 
more essential that there is such a success. The danger is then 
that, in looking for this elusive success, one becomes obsessed 
with a single project and the portfolio ideal, to all intents 
and purposes, is abandoned. 
Moreover, after a period without a success, the hit that is 
now sought must be of major proportions in order to cover the 
accumulated overheads and expenditure on the ever increasing 
list of other films. 
For example, at the time 'Revolution' was being made in 
1985, 'Dance With A Stranger' was on release. In relative 
terms, the latter was a massive success for Goldcrest which 
received almost 50% profit on its investment. However, by this 
point only a 50% return on a very large outlay would do. The 
£108,000 profit on Goldcrest's £253,000 investment in 'Dance 
With A Stranger' was far too small even if considered only in 
the light of the accumulated investment. (Goldcrest's 
predicament in this respect was compounded by the loss of 
control of overheads which had risen to £2.7 million a year. ) 
The case of Goldcrest shows how a sound and careful 
portfolio strategy in the film business can rapidly degenerate. 
It shows, moreover, that it is likely to do so if one does not 
have control over the distribution sector - an absence of such 
control contributes to poor returns which undermine the whole 
strategy. 
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The situation evolved to the point where, just before the 
downfall, Goldcrest's risk was largely in just four films. All 
these budgets rose during production leading to a rapid 
increase in Goldcrest's exposure to risk. This wrecked the risk 
management techniques and forced a total change in strategy: 
the sole objective became survival. 
As many partners as possible were frantically sought in the 
hope of fending off collapse and, in place of a conservative 
portfolio model there came to be a crude and increasingly 
desperate strategy of staying alive. In the words of Eberts and 
Ilott (ibid), Goldcrest eventually reached the stage where it 
simply hoped to survive long enough to stay in the game until 
it threw a double six. 
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4.3 The Structure and Control of Production Costs. 
The costs of production of a feature film project have an 
unusual profile: costs are mainly 'front end, ' ie. they are 
concentrated on the high fixed cost of producing the master 
negative. There are relatively low variable costs for the 
subsequent making of a number of prints (and the purchase of 
advertising space) to facilitate the exhibition of the film in 
one, a few or many cinemas. In fact these latter costs are 
normally incurred by the distributor of a film rather than by 
its producer. 
The negative costs (sometimes referred to as 'certified' 
costs) of a film are those incurred up to the point of the 
film's delivery to the distributor. The nature of the costs 
which almost invariably arise as the project evolves are 
identified by Vogel (1986) as follows: 
(a) Story Rights Acquisition - concepts, scenarios, books and 
screenplays 
(b) Pre-production - the drawing up of the budget, location 
scouting, costume and set design, crew selection, casting and 
script development. 
(c) Principal Photography - the producer, director, cast and 
writers. Set construction and sound stage/studio facilities. 
Labour costs. 
(d) Post production - soundtrack, special effects, dubbing, 
credits, scoring and editing. 
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However, in order to analyse the structure of costs, it is 
useful to refer to the customary categorisation of the costs of 
production of any particular film that are made by production 
accountants. There are three categories: 
1. Above the Line. 
2. Below the line. 
3. Indirect. 
1. above the line: 
This category relates to the costs of story rights acquisition, 
the fees of the producer, director and writer, and the payment 
to the principal artists - the stars of the film. 
Although producers are not particularly forthcoming with 
information concerning costs, it has been possible to study the 
final cost statements of thirty British films made between 1986 
and 1989 inclusive. These statements were made available to 
this author by British Screen Finance. 
The thirty films have an average budget of £1.6 million. 
Fourteen are low budget productions costing below £12 million, 
ten cost between £12 and £2 million, and a further five cost 
beween £2 and £3 million. The final one amounted to slightly 
over £3 million. 
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Table 20(a). 
The Structure of Production Costs: Above the Line Costs, 
Average Percentage of Total Budget of 30 British Films, 1986 - 1989. 
1. Above the Line. 
A. Story and script. 2.7% 
B. Producer's Fees 2.6 
Director's Fees. 1.9 
E. Principal artists. 5.2 
Total Above the Line. 12.4 
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One of the long term developments in relation to costs in 
British film making has been the reduction of relative above 
the line expenditure. On the kind of low and medium budget 
productions which comprise the films in this survey, it is of 
the greatest importance to hold down this component in order to 
leave as large a proportionate amount of the budget for the 
making of the film. 
By way of illustration, one can compare the figure of 12.4% 
for average above the line costs in very recent years in the 
above table with a corresponding figure of 20.7% in the case of 
fifteen films which were the subject of the PEP Report (1952). 
It is interesting that the higher cost productions among 
the thirty films surveyed exhibit well above average 
proportional above the line costs. The producers of the single 
film which cost more than £3 million ('The Big Man, ' £3.122m) 
spent 18.5% of the budget on above the line items. And three of 
the projects with costs between £2 and £3 million, had high 
above the line costs at 19.5%, 18.6% and 15.5% [respectively 
'High Season' (£2.005m), 'Loser Takes All' (£2.482m) and 'Tree 
of Hands' (£2.388m. )] 
Also in this category, however, are 'Paris By Night, ' where 
above the line was severely held down (to 6.25%), and 'A World 
Apart'. In considering the latter on a case study basis in 
section 3.4, it was observed that the producer found it most 
unusual that above the line costs could be kept down to 8.6% 
for such a film. In fact, it is probable that the Principal 
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Artists category was somewhat underbudgeted. 
2. below the line: 
these are costs concerned with the physical task of making the 
film, as opposed to the payments to the major participants 
which comprise the above the line category. The composition of 
below the line cost is shown in Table 20 (b) below, and the 
relative importance of the components is again illustrated with 
reference to the sample of thirty recent films. 
The series of codes on the left hand side of the table, and 
of Tables 20 (a) and (c), and the tables' general layout, is 
that of the standard cost statement form used in the industry. 
It is interesting to note that the design of this form was 
developed after the introduction of the Eady Levy in 1950. 
The headings were designed to facilitate the analysis of 
the labour content of the film in the light of the Levy. The 
segregation of information in this way made it easier to gauge 
the extent to which the the producer had employed British 
labour and would thus be entitled to a distribution from the 
British Film Fund. 
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Table 20(b). 
The Structure of Production Costs: Below the Line Costs, 
Average Percentage of Total Budget of 30 British Films, 1986 - 
1989. 
2. Below the Line: 
C. Production Unit Salaries. 
1. Production management and secretaries. 2.8% 
2. Assistant directors and continuity. 1.7 
3. Technical advisors (inc choreographers). 0.2 
4. Camera crews. 2.3 
5. Sound crews. 0.8 
6. Editing staff. 3.2 
7. Stills camera staff. 0.2 
8. Wardrobe staff. 1.4 
9. Make-up artists. 0.8 
10. Hairdressers. 0.4 
11. Casting. 0.4 
12. Production accountancy. 1.5 
13. Projectionists. 0 
14. Misc. studio staff. 0 
15. Foreign unit technicians. 0.7 
D. Art Department Salaries. 2.6 
E. Artistes. 
1. Cast other than principals. 3.7 
2. Stnd-ins, doubles, stunt men. 0.4 
3. Crowd. 1.6 
F. Musical Direction, Musicians, etc. 1.2 
G. Costumes and Wigs. 1.0 
H. Misc. Production Stores (excl. sets). 0.8 
I. Film Stock and Lab. Charges. 5.7 
J. Studio Rental. 3.3 
K. Equipment. 4.1 
L. Power. 0.2 
M. Travel and Transport. 
1. Location. 5.4 
2. Studio. 0.3 
N. Hotel and Living Expenses. 
1. Location. 5.5 
2. Studio. 0.2 
0. Insurances. 1.6 
P. Social Security. 4.2 
Q. Publicity Salaries and Expenses. 0.2 
R. Miscellaneous Expenses. 1.4 
S. Sets and Models. 
1. Labour: construction. 2.0 
la. Materials: construction. 1.0 
(contd. ) 
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Table 20(b) Continued. 
T. 
U. 
2. Labour: dressing. 
3. Labour: operating. 
4. Labour: striking. 
5/6. Labour: lighting and 
7. Labour: foreign unit. 
8. Properties. 
Special Effects. 
lamp spotting. 
Special Location Facilities. 
Total Below the Line. 
0.9 
1.5 
0.1 
1.6 
0.1 
2.0 
0.6 
1.9 
72.1% 
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3. indirect costs: 
The final category includes various overheads - see Table 
20(c) below. There is a considerable variation in the amount of 
production company overhead which is likely to be assigned to 
the budget of a particular film: at one extreme, if a Hollywood 
major studio were involved, it might introduce a twenty per 
cent overhead to contribute to head office expenses, while, at 
the other extreme, the producer of a small independent film 
will usually be entirely unencumbered by cost in this 
particular category. The NFFC had a policy of limiting this 
item in films in which they participated to 24% of budget. 
Another component of indirect cost is the cost of the 
participation of a completion guarantor which is required by 
most films of any significant size made in the independent 
sector. It is the early acquisition of a completion bond which 
facilitates the binding of the relationship between a film's 
producer and its financial sources. 
For a fee, usually in the region of 6% of the film's 
budget, the guarantor acts as an insurance company, 
guaranteeing to investors that the film in which they have 
placed their funds will actually be produced, that it will be 
produced within its planned budget, and that it will be a 
reasonable manifestation of the proposed film that attracted 
their investment in the first place. 
The final area of 'overhead' is the contingency fund. The 
fund is normally 10% of combined above and below the line 
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costs. According to Harcourt et al (1986) in a discussion of 
independent film production, the contingency is a cost which it 
is essential to incur. This is both because such a fund will 
often be needed in practice and because finance sources are 
unlikely to be forthcoming if a contingency is not built into 
the budget. 
Moreover, completion guarantors normally require that a 
contingency be in place and that, in the event of a claim, it 
be spent before the completion bond becomes payable. There is a 
slight variation in the case of finance from Channel Four, the 
main source in the British production sector from the early 
nineteen eighties, which has depended on contingencies for 
specified items rather than the more usual overall percentage. 
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Table 20(c). 
The Structure 
Percentage of 
of Production Costs: Indirect Costs, Average 
Total Budget of 30 British Films, 1986 - 1989. 
3. Indirect Costs. 
Y. Finance and Legal Fees. 5.1% 
Z. Overheads: 2.4 
Completion bond. 1.5 
Production company. 0.4 
Contingency. 6.0 
Total Indirect Costs. 15.4% 
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When a film is being made, the Guild of Film Production 
Accountants and Financial Administrators usually has one of its 
members on the production team. In one sense, the role of the 
film production accountant is to advise the producer where the 
project will be with respect to the budget if expenditure 
continues as at present. 
For the Secretary of the Guild (interview, 1990), it is 
difficult to generalise about vulnerable areas of production 
cost. However, for location filming, it is not rare for hotel 
and transportation costs to be sensitive areas. Progress in 
production is often dependent on reasonable good fortune with 
weather conditions and it is therefore easy to fall a day 
behind schedule. This can set in motion an unfortunate domino 
effect subsequently on costs when there are a succession of 
locations. 
Thus on location one must take out a kind of cost insurance 
policy by having a weather cover interior location available, 
or a standby set built in a studio somewhere. To have a 
production unit standing idle until the weather improves means 
incurring costs of perhaps £20,000 per hour. 
Location work in Britain, and particularly in London, is 
not always as cheap as elsewhere. It is perhaps a cultural 
factor which means that, where most cities in America, for 
example, routinely have a Films Office which facilitates the 
location film maker (on the basis that this is in the city's 
own interest given the publicity spin-offs, etc. ), going on 
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location in Britain can be somewhat problematic. 
Producers frequently complain of an unhelpful attitude on 
the part of the authorities in terms of such areas as roads, 
parking and policing. This may mean, for instance, that one is 
forced to shoot on a Sunday if one wishes to film in a central 
location. The labour costs of Sunday filming are, of course, 
higher than at other times. 0 
One is similarly constrained if wishing to film in a tube 
station. Moreover, filming for, say, two hours on the London 
Underground means a fee of perhaps £1,500. This might include a 
payment of £200 for a replacement station manager - an item 
which would be a source of annoyance for many film makers as it 
appears to them to be typically petty and obstructive. 
A low budget film maker, Jacobsen (1990), discusses the 
obstructive bureaucracy and high costs of filming in London. He 
records being charged £1,500 by the British Museum for two 
hours filming in the courtyard there, £150 an hour by Camden 
Council for permission to film in a library, and £350 by the 
Port of London Authority for filming beside the Thames. 
(Greenwich Council's parking fee was £400 per day - 'Every day, 
I wrote out cheques for hundreds of pounds just to enable us 
to park! ') 
A further qualification in relation to the achievemennt of 
cost reduction through location filming concerns sound 
reproduction. An advantage of studios is that one can assume 
that the sound quality obtained will be perfect. Numerous 
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problems can occur in this respect however in the uncontrolled 
environment of an external location. And this can give rise to 
possible added cost in post production if one has to re-loop 
the sound. Furthermore, as re-recording does not necessarily 
give the authenticity of the original, there can be costs in 
creative, as well as financial, terms. 
This gives rise to a wider point about costs and post 
production. It is far from unknown for a director, dissatisfied 
with with the raw material obtained from the principal 
photography stage, to try to make amends while assembling the 
film - and to do so in a way that does not reflect the budget. 
The ten weeks originally envisaged for post production can now 
seem insufficient. This can become an area of tension on cost 
control because a producer may wish to make amends in the 
opposite direction, ie. in respect of earlier cost over runs. 
Completion guarantors insist on a contingency to cover all 
items on the cost form from A to Z. However, some items, such 
as rights acquisition, for example, are fixed in cost. Thus, if 
one has a 10% contingency, there is, in effect, a somewhat 
greater than 10% leeway on movable, below the line items. 
This is not to say that 10% is the invariable size of the 
contingency. If one had a good track record and were operating 
in the controlled environment of a studio, it would be possible 
to negotiate a lower contingency - down to, say, 5%. But, by 
the same token, in the absence of a track record, contingencies 
of 122% are sometimes insisted upon. 
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The completion guarantee itself has a cost which can 
be, in small part, recoverable. A completion guarantor's 
fee of 5%, for instance, sometimes has a no claims bonus, 
enabling its net cost to be reduced to perhaps 4%. It is worth 
noting that the completion guarantor is an important influence 
on cost control, monitoring cost statements because they - the 
guarantors - are potentially vulnerable. 
In the case of Goldcrest (Eberts and Ilott, 1990), the 
company provided its own completion guarantees on 'The Mission' 
and 'Revolution'. While the former film was not over budget 
(but had several agreed upward revisions), the latter was 
approximately 50% over. 
Eberts (interview, 1990) agreed that providing one's 
own completion guarantee was unsatisfactory and was not 
standard practice outside the major studios. "Goldcrest did it 
because their experience on 'The Killing Fields' was that it 
was alright not to have had a completion guarantee at all - 
only war insurance was taken out - given that David Puttnam and 
Iain Smith were absolutely reliable. And 'The Mission' was not 
over budget. However, the situation in relation to 'Revolution' 
was particularly unsound. It may have come about because actual 
production was started in such a hurry. " (Puttnam and Smith 
were producer and associate producer respectively. ) 
'Revolution' raises a further and somewhat unorthodox issue 
of budgetary over runs in relation to the exchange rate. 
Puttnam was a board member of Goldcrest and Goldcrest's major 
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film maker. He said (interview, 1990) that, among other 
factors outside the control of Goldcrest which he felt had 
conspired against, it was the volatility of the exchange rate. 
There were indeed huge exchange rate losses. 'Revolution' 
was first budgeted at $12.6 million when the pound Sterling was 
at $1: 05. But the receipts were in dollars after deliiery, by 
which time the pound had risen to $1: 55. Even if the film had 
been made at its budgeted cost, this would have meant a $6 
million gap. As it happened, of course, 'Revolution' famously 
over ran its budget. The total final cost was £19 million 
which, at $1: 55, came to about $30 million. Thus the shortfall 
was about $18 million. 
But, like much else in the saga of Goldcrest, the highly 
profitable earlier film 'Gandhi' had given a misleading 
precedent. On that occasion, the currency fluctuation had 
worked in Goldcrest's favour. Sterling fell between budget and 
completion from $2: 40 to $1: 50, giving a $9 million windfall. 
In a sense, it seems wholly typical of the story of 
Goldcrest that it did not cover forward on exchange rates on 
'Revolution'. When Eberts subsequently returned to Goldcrest 
and discovered this situation, he was 'unable to believe my 
eyes' (Eberts interview). 
'Buster, ' made in 1987, is another recent British 
production which was budgeted in dollars but incurring most of 
its expenditure in pounds. The budget was formed when 
Sterling's external value was at $1: 58. During production, the 
-264- 
rate rose (to $1: 71) thus forcing down the operating budget of 
the film. 
Reference to 'Buster' in section 3.1 threw some light onto 
the financing of an independent production. The project also 
offers a number of useful illustrations concerning costs. For 
example, as a result of the enforced stringency following the 
rise in the exchange rate, the production designer's budget was 
reduced to £225,000 - and this to include construction 
materials (although not labour). 
On 'Buster, ' above the line costs were held down as a 
result of a lack of acquisition costs. Although the film deals 
with one of the Great Train Robbers, the script was not based 
on any particular book or confession. There were, however, a 
significant number of costly legal consultations concerning 
about twenty pages of the script particularly with respect to 
the police role and to the position of British Railways. [The 
latter declined to extend filming facilities - the sequence in 
the film showing the mail train leaving Glasgow was footage 
from an earlier film (Peter Yates' 'Robbery, ' 1967), while the 
robbery itself was filmed on a private railway line. ] 
An important part of the film concerns the escape of the 
train robber to Mexico. With cost considerations in mind, it 
was initially thought better to film in Spain. However, this 
turned out to be no cheaper than location in Mexico itself. 
The Mexican location was intended to be for two weeks of 
the total ten week shoot. During this period, however, film was 
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lost in the laboratory, an insurance claim followed, and the 
stay had to be extended to three weeks. This raises a further 
example of how filming on location, in sacrifices a controlled 
environment, can result in cost over runs. 
A more fortunate situation followed the designation of an 
arbitrary sum of £75,000 to the music budget. An album 
materialised with the very profitable and unexpected spin-off 
of three top ten hits in the US. And by the same token, £25,000 
was put aside from the budget for the making of another film - 
a video of "The Making of 'Buster'. " This, like the 'Buster' 
enterprise as a whole, was expected to turn out to be a 
profitable venture. 
'Buster, ' despite the problems noted, was produced at 
$300,000 under its budgetet cost. Ms. Heyman (interview, 
1990) pointed out that her fee as producer and the fee of 
the director had been deferred. Apart from this, she did feel 
that the film's coming in under budget was attributable to any 
particular point. It was more a case of careful line control. 
While projects like 'Buster' and Goldcrest's 'Revolution' 
offer an important lesson for film makers whose budgets are 
struck in dollars but who are spending in Sterling, the typical 
British producer, raising money from such parochial sources as 
Channel Four television and British Screen, will focus on what 
are perhaps somewhat more mundane areas of cost saving. 
At the earliest stages, this can boil down to the film's 
projected cast. If the cast has not yet actually been 
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contracted, a compromise is frequently necessitated. A star 
role is downgraded to a supporting one. The feeling might be 
that the cast is an area where such savings can be achieved as 
opposed to, say, the camera department where one simply cannot 
manage without the fourth man. 
During principal photography, one could enact savings by 
the cutting of the schedule. But this is such a drastic step 
that one might wish to look for gains from reducing particular 
items of expenditure. 
For example, the size of a projected crowd might be cut. 
Crowd scenes can be a not insignificant expense if crowd 
artists are paid, say, fifty pounds per day for eight hours 
with additional location costs of catering and travel (the 
latter probably at overtime rates) bringing a total per capita 
crowd cost per day into the region of one hundred pounds. 
The size of crowds might be reduced, but most film 
producers would resist the temptation to save money by putting 
local bystanders in the place of professional crowd artists - 
the former tend to stare at the camera making the producer wish 
that he had incurred the expense of bussing out the extras. 
As is noted in section 4.4, there has been a trend from 
the studio to location pictures in the post-war period. While 
this has been a trend motivated by the relative cheapness of 
location, a further factor has been a desire for maximum 
authenticity. Studio pictures can achieve an authentic look. 
For example, in 1961, much of the action in 'The Guns of 
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Navarone' was filmed in a tank at Shepperton Studios, and the 
Spanish Steps of Rome were built on an elaborate set at Elstree 
for 'The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone'. To ensure further that 
the appearance of the latter film was plausible, Italian extras 
were flown in from Rome and the relevant GM model from the US. 
For the typical British film maker in recent years, with a 
budget of between Elk and £3 million, such ideas of expensive 
studio fabrication have been entirely academic. The lowest of 
low budget British films have been those made by Derek Jarman 
whose 'Sebastiane' (1976), for example, cost £35,000. 
It is hard to find examples of cheaper films than this 
although there is at least one: Bill Forsyth's first film 'That 
Sinking Feeling' in 1979 is said (Hacker and Price, 1991) to 
have been made on a budget of £6.000! It is interesting to note 
that the raising of this tiny budget was a task every bit as 
difficult as the raising of more conventional sums. Forsyth 
eventually achieved a patchwork of sponsorship from such 
diverse sources as brewers, chain stores and youth clubs. 
Forsyth's initial success enabled him to graduate to rather 
larger budgets - £200,000 in the case of his second film, 
'Gregory's Girl' in 1980. This was followed by budgets of £2.6 
and £1.5 million for 'Local Hero' (1982) and 'Comfort and Joy' 
(1984) respectively. Forsyth then went to Hollywood and the two 
films that he has directed there, 'Housekeeping' (1987) and 
'Breaking In' (1989), were each made for between £3m. and £4m.. 
Jarman, however, has not had at his disposal quite such a 
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ladder of escape from ultra low budgets. The successor to 
'Sebastiane' was 'Jubilee' (made in 1978) for which the budget 
had risen from the earlier £35,000 to only £70,000. And, by the 
time of 'Caravaggio' in 1985, this upward trend had still to 
reach half a million pounds. 
While Jarman himself is unhappy about this situation, 
feeling that he is a victim of a process of 'financial 
censorship' which he sees as prevailing in Britain, he is able, 
as the most financially constrained of all film makers, to give 
insight concerning very low cost-film making. 
For example, the task of script writing becomes a highly 
specialised one. Jarman has usually had to write his own 
scripts for he feels that there is no one who would know quite 
how to write the script that would facilitate a realisation of 
the subject for such a low outlay. There has to be a sixth 
sense about what can and cannot be put onto the screen for such 
miniscule sums. 
For 'Caravaggio, ' the entire art department budget was only 
£40,000 but the standard of set design achieved did not convey 
the message that the film was under budgeted. Examples of the 
skill involved: a lavish collection of art which was too 
expensive to be reproduced in the film is brought to mind for 
the viewer through the device of showing many apparently 
recognisable objects covered by dust sheets. And as Hacker and 
Price (ibid) put it, 'the opulence and foreboding of the 
Vatican is suggested merely by showing a long corridor of black 
velvet lit through muslin'. 
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Peter Greenaway's "The Draughtsman's Contract" (1982) was a 
comparable project in that, although it had at, £300,000, a 
somewhat more generous funding than 'Caravaggio, ' it was 
another art film in which the attempt was made to put sumptuous 
production value on the screen despite a low budget. The main 
factor in the film's success in this regard was the acquisition 
of a suitable location at a low price. 
The location -a country house and grounds - was very 
important to the look of the film. And this house was rented at 
a cost of only £600 per week. Moreover, it was full of elegant 
antiques, the use of which further enhanced the desired 
appearance of the film. Indeed, the film makers were amused to 
gather that the antique china in this stately home had recently 
been valued at a figure which was about three times the total 
budget of the film. 
"The Draughtsman's Contract" was a project for which the 
British Film Institute put up the initial funding. And, as was 
noted in the case of 'Distant Voices, Still Lives' in section 
3.4, the BFI's presence in a production can help to keep formal 
costs down in a variety of ways. Specifically with "The 
Draughtsman's Contract, " the BFI negotiated agreements with the 
unions - on the basis that BFI films would not be profitable - 
whereby the usual minimum rates were waived so that everyone on 
the film worked for a flat rate (of £199 per week). 
Nevertheless, as is generally the case with low budget film 
making, the project had to be accomplished in a short period of 
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time. Only seven weeks could be afforded for pre-production, 
and the shooting of the film lasted but five weeks. 
The working of very long hours for the duration of a five 
week shoot may be seen as an important part of the key to the 
bringing in on budget of a cheap film. Section 3.4 has raised 
several other aspects of successful cost control, especially 
the importance of careful planning in the pre-production phase 
as illustrated by 'Distant Voices, Still Lives. ' 
However, for Stephen Frears, who has had a lengthy career 
in the making of low budget films for both television and 
cinema, the key to cost control in a low budget environment is 
a rather different matter. It is embodied in the word 
'decisiveness': 'decisiveness at the point of shooting is 
crucial' (Hacker and Price, ibid). For Frears, there comes a 
point during shooting when a director gains a sufficient 
insight into how the piece can be filmed and made to work. Such 
decisiveness is then of the essence, enabling the. reduction of 
the number of set-ups, and facilitating speed in the filming. 
It is interesting to note, however, that there have been 
occasions when film makers faced with very limited budgets have 
been able to make a virtue of necessity so that the cost 
constraint has, ironically, the effect of contributing a 
memorable quality to the finished film. 
For example, Lindsay Anderson's most well known film is 
'If, ' made in 1968. It is a film which is in colour-in some 
sequences and black and white in others. This comes across as 
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a notable device to raise the issues of reality and fantasy. 
However, filming in colour was more expensive [as illustrated 
(Walker, 1974) in 1962 in the case of 'Doctor No, ' the first of 
the James Bond series, where a decision to film in colour added 
$50,400 to a budget of $900,000], and it transpires that the 
origin of Anderson's use of monochrome was simply the by- 
product of an inability on low budgets to afford to light 
certain interiors adequately for colour. 
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Cost statements of 30 films were examined. 
(a) low budget. 
Produced in 1986: Rita, Sue and Bob Too. Total cost £0.891m. 
1987: American Roulette 1.174 The Dressmaker 1.275 
Eat the Rich 0.75 
The Nature of the Beast 1.199 
Sammy and Rosie 1.389 
1988: Joyriders 1.171 
Venus Peter 1.203 
1989: Reflecting Skin 1.32 
(b) medium budget. 1986: 
Empire State 1.642 
The Kitchen Toto 1.767 
Prick Up Your Ears 1.986 
Paris by Night 2.015 
Stormy Monday 1.65 
Just Ask For Diamond 1.4 
On the Black Hill 0.744 
Vroom 1.462 
Ladder of Swords 1.265 
We Think the World of You 1.368 
The Belly of an Architect 1.925 
High Season 2.005 
Personal Services 1.651 
1987: Dream Demon 1.94 
Soursweet 1.987 
A World Apart 2.7 
1988: Danny the Champion of the World 1.78 
Diamond Skulls 1.648 Loser Takes All 2.482 Tree of Hands 2.388 
(c) higher budget. 1989: The Big Man 3.122. 
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4.4 Surveys of Production Costs. 
For British films, the question has often been asked as to 
the relative importance of the various components of the 
negative cost. In section 4.3, the structure of production 
costs was illustrated with reference to thirty recent films, 
and it was seen that 72% of expenditure was in respect of below 
the line production items rather than fees to major 
participants or overheads. 
A much earlier breakdown of costs of British production was 
that produced by Gater (1949). The Report of the Working Party 
on Film Production Costs, under the chairmanship of Sir George 
Gater, was one of several official documents produced during 
the period of post-war crisis in the industry. 
The Working Party studied the costs of production of a 
sample of forty three first-feature films produced between 1946 
and 1948. Table 21 on page 276 shows the percentage breakdown 
across all the films studied. 
The Gater sample films were divided into five cost 
categories, and into two period groups - twenty one of the 
forty three films were finished before 30/9/47, and the rest 
after that date. 
The finding on cost categories was that proportional direct 
labour costs (ie. those costs in the first part of the table) 
fell as the total cost of the film rose. Where labour costs 
were 49% in the highest two categories (total costs of 
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production between £250,000 and £350,000; and over £350,000), 
they averaged 57% in the least expensive category (total costs 
less than £100,000). This pattern did not vary between the two 
periods looked at. 
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Table 21. 
COMPONENT COSTS OF PRODUCTION, 1946-48. (Z) 
Labour Costs: 
'Production staff' (including producer, 
director, writer, and technical staff) 18.5 
'Actors and musicians' (including extras) 18 
'Other staff' (including craftsmen and 
general labour) 14 
Total labour costs: 50.5 
'Materials and third party services' 15.5 
'Stage rents and equipment hire' 14.5 
'Overheads' 10.5 
'Other costs' (including story acquisition, 
script, insurance, publicity) 9.0 
100.0. 
(Source: Gater Report, 1949. ) 
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It is interesting to compare the Gater findings with the 
situation revealed by the thirty recent films (1986 to 1989) 
for which cost statements have been available - see Table 22 
below. 
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Table 22. 
COMPONENT COSTS OF PRODUCTION, 1986-89. (%) 
Labour Costs: 
Production staff 26.8 
Actors and musicians 12.4 
Other staff 10.2 
Total labour costs: 49.4 
Materials and third party services 8.6 
Stage rents and equipment hire 23.7 
Overheads 3.0 
Other costs 15.2 
99.9 
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The categories in the above table contain, as far as 
possible, the same items as those in Table 21 showing the 
Gater findings. However, 'Production Staff' in the 'Total 
Labour Costs' category in the 1986 to 1989 period includes the 
cost of story rights acquisition. This item, which was counted 
in the non labour section of the Gater table, cannot be so 
separated in the later survey. 
Assuming a figure of 1% for story right acquisition, the 
labour costs total in the nineteen eighties survey is 48.4%. It 
is notable that this figure, after a period of forty years, 
remains close to Gater's total labour cost of 50.5%. 
While this might appear to suggest that, on a fractional 
basis, labour costs in British film making are a constant 
factor, there has, however, been some variation in the 
components of this total. 
'Production Staff' formed 18.5% of total costs in the 
nineteen forties but has subsequently risen to 26.8%, or 25.8% 
allowing a nominal 1% for acquisition costs. Within this 
category, as is discussed subsequently in this Section, the 
fees of producers and directors relative to budgets have fallen 
sharply, while those of writers have also subsided but at a 
somewhat slower rate. 
Thus the remaining item in this category, 'technical 
staff, ' has been the major factor within labour costs to have 
risen. This is composed of items C and D of the cost statement 
form, ie. salaries of the production unit and art department. 
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While this area of total wage expenditure relative to 
bugets has risen, the 'other staff' category, which consists 
of the wages of craftsmen and general labour, has moved in the 
opposite direction, falling from 14% to 10.2%. 
This might suggest that, rather than a long term trend of 
generally increasing relative wages in the industry, there has 
been a necessity for producers to increase expenditure on the 
services of hiring their own technical personnel for a 
particular project as film making during the post war period 
has moved away from the studio and become more location based. 
As noted above, the Gater Report also found that, as total 
budget increased, proportional labour cost fell from 57% for 
the least expensive films to 49% for the most expensive. For 
the 1980s survey, the four most expensive films (those costing 
more than £2 million), had total labour costs averaging 47.3% 
compared with the overall average of 49.4%. However the picture 
is somewhat ambiguous in that, of the three cheapest films - 
those costing below £1 million, two had total labour costs 
slightly below the overall average. 
One of the problems of the Gater Report was the variation 
in that element of total cost that depends entirely on the type 
of film being made - elements such as the cost of music, 
costumes or locations. In producing a more detailed survey of 
costs in 1952, the PEP Report took this aspect into account and 
allocated a 'type factor' to its breakdown of costs. 
The PEP survey looked at fifteen first-features made in the 
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period between October 1949 and October 1951. The Report's 
breakdown is shown in Table 23 below. 
To make the 'direct labour costs' of the PEP survey (see 
last row of Table 23) comparable with Gater, one must add the 
cost of musicians (which are assigned to the 'type factor' 
category in the PEP Report). And the Report suggests a figure 
of 3% for musicians. Resultingly, as with Gater, labour costs 
amount to approximately half of total production costs. 
Although only fifteen films are looked at, it could also be 
argued again that labour costs as a proportion fall with a 
rising total budget - only in the most expensive category does 
direct labour cost fall below 40% (for two of the three films 
in that category). 
A report published in 1973 by the ACTT on 'Nationalising 
the Film Industry' expresses the view that these labour cost 
percentage breakdowns still held good at that date. However, 
sufficient data for a full survey had been unforthcoming. 
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Table 23. 
BUDGET ANALYSIS OF FIFTEEN BRITISH FIRST-FEATURES (%). 
FOUR FILMS WHOSE Al 
£109,000 
Producer & director8.6 6.8 12.0 6.0 
Story 5.2 4.4 7.9 4.5 
Acting: 
Two stars 9.2 7.7 9.5 5.1 
Support 9.3 9.6 10.1 11.3 
Salaries and wage s: 
Unit 11.2 14.4 12.9 11.8 
Manual labour 6.9 8.0 6.2 9.1 
Set materials, 
props & special 
effects 3.7 3.5 3.0 5.8 
Type factor: 
location, costume 
& music 9.5 3.3 8.3 8.1 
Film and 
laboratory 8.0 4.4 6.1 6.4 
Studio: rent, 
equipment, etc. 10.6 19.8 9.5 16.9 
Finance & misc. 
insurance, 
legal, etc. 17.8 18.1 14.5 15.0 
Direct labour 
costs * 45.2 46.5 50.7 43.3 
IERAGE COST WAS: 
£152,000 
5.9 3.4 9.6 
3.9 2.0 10.4 
9.3 5.9 9.1 
5.6 10.0 7.0 
13.6 11.3 10.6 
11.2 13.9 8.5 
5.1 5.5 3.0 
4.5 2.8 1.9 
4.9 4.2 3.7 
20.8 36.2 18.9 
15.2 4.8 17.3 
8.2 
10.1 
8.2 
8.1 
13.3 
7.0 
4.2 
6.3 
5.5 
14.4 
14.7 
45.6 44.5 44.8 44.8 
(Continued. ) 
[* 'Direct labour costs' exclude musicians' salaries and 
consist of the fees of producers, directors and actors plus 
unit and manual labour wages. ] 
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Table 23 continued. 
FILMS WHOSE AVERA( 
£221,000 
(4 films) 
Producer & director 10.0 10.3 7.5 13.5 
Story 2.1 8.4 4.8 4.2 
Acting 
Two stars 8.8 3.2 5.2 14.6 
Support 5.4 8.8 8.1 9.8 
Salaries & wages 
Unit 12.8 11.8 13.6 13.5 
Manual labour 6.8 13.5 9.3 8.6 
Set materials, props 
& special effects 2.9 5.2 2.9 3.0 
Type factor: locatio n 
costume, & music 8.1 4.9 12.2 8.7 
Film & laboratory 4.1 4.8 4.6 4.0 
Studio: rent, 
equipment, etc. 21.4 15.8 20.3 7.3 
Finance & misc. 
insurance, legal 17.6 13.3 11.5 12.8 
Direct labour costs 43.8 47.6 43.7 60.0 
COST WAS 
£360,000 
(3 films) 
9.0 4.1 6.8 
2.6 4.3 0.7 
8.4 5.4 3.9 
10.8 5.3 7.3 
12.4 11.3 11.4 
5.7 12.0 9.5 
3.7 7.6 5.7 
14.4 6.4 21.2 
3.8 10.1 4.7 
17.4 24.9 21.3 
11.8 8.6 6.9 
46.3 38.1 38.9 
(Source: PEP Report, 1952. ) 
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Perilli (1983) offered an updating of the PEP analysis - 
see Table 24 on page 285. Percentage figures for each of the 
PEP categories are given on a decade by decade basis from the 
nineteen thirties. Perilli's cost percentages were deduced from 
film budgets held by the library of the British Film Institute, 
although no indication of the number of films looked at in this 
way is given. 
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Table 24. 
ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION COSTS BY DECADE. (X). 
1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 
Story & script 4.7 7.9 10.4 3.2 6.7 1.2 
Producer & 
director 11.3 14.5 9.5 8.1 9.5 4.2 
Production unit 
salaries 8.9 5.6 7.6 10.4 15.6 16.6 
Craft labour 6.7 6.4 7.7 8.0 1.6 4.4 
Sets & materials 4.9 6.4 3.5 6.0 6.6 
Acting PI .2 17.5 18.5 12.7 18.0 21.5 Film & laboratory9.2 8.0 4.2 11.5 10.6 5.1 
Studio facility 18.1 17.8 11.3 11.3 6.1 6.6 
Type factor 5.2 2.9 1.3 2.5 1.6 2.2 
Finance & ins. 9.0 10.7 16.6 18.0 2.2 11.5 
Miscellaneous 6.0 3.8 6.5 10.8 22.1 20.1 
(Source: Perilli, 1983. ) 
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From Table 24, the aggregate of the direct labour 
categories is as follows: 
1930s - 45.1% 1960s - 39.2% 
1940s - 44.0% 1970s - 44.7% 
1950s - 43.3% 1980s - 46.7% 
These figures are fairly stable over the long term, and, 
with an additional allowance for musicians, direct labour costs 
remain close to half total production costs throughout the 
entire period. 
However, the question of direct labour contains both above 
the line and below the line items. Above the line costs are 
those of story and script, producers' and directors' fees, and 
principal cast. The Perilli figures indicate that 'acting' has 
remained roughly constant - and the most expensive category - 
hovering around 18% throughout. Here 'acting' includes the 
leading players and the below the line cast (ie. cast other 
than principals). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that there has been a downward 
trend in relative above the line costs with the proportional 
salaries of producers and directors falling from the 1940s, and 
story and script costs falling from the 1950s. 
Below the line labour costs average 21.5% in the PEP survey 
(1949 to 1951) and 16.6% over the whole of the Perilli survey 
(taking production unit salaries plus craft labour from Table 
24). However, production unit salaries (which cover production 
staff, set designing, camera crew and stills, sound crew, 
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hairdressing, costumes and make-up staff) are seen to have 
risen sharply within below the line labour costs, approximately 
doubling over the whole period. 
So it would appear that the main labour cost trends 
revealed are: 
(i) direct labour costs as a whole constantly approach half the 
total costs of film making. 
(ii) above the line costs have been squeezed, pushing up the 
proportion of the budget available for the actual making of the 
film, ie. the below the line category. 
(iii) there has been a downward trend in producers' and 
directors' salaries as proportions of total costs, but a 
significant upward movement in proportional costs of production 
units. 
(iv) on a proportional basis, actors' salaries have been fairly 
constant. 
In an environment for the production industry of endless 
financial constraint, the question of reducing production costs 
has been central. Point (iii) [above] has sometimes been 
accomplished by a tendency for producers and directors to 
exchange salary for participation in a film's profits. And the 
deferment of fees in the independent sector is a frequent 
contemporary practice. 
But the main emphasis of cost control is to reduce the 
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number of days spent on shooting the film. For instance, an 
account by Boorman (1985) of the excruciating pains suffered by 
a film maker in setting up and financing a project (in this 
case, the 1985 film 'The Emerald Forest') explains that high 
set-ups-per-day productivity is the daily lot of the film 
maker, and that the power of the completion guarantor usually 
makes over-runs impossible. (Ie. the latter sacks the producer 
and/or director. ) 
The idea of film production as a business -a marriage of 
creativity and the balance sheet - is itself, in a sense, a 
kind of contradiction in terms. The point was once made to 
perfection by the director Billy Wilder: "No one has ever said, 
'I must go and see that movie -I hear it came in under 
budget'! " 
The Gater Report in 1949 gave a figure of ninety five 
camera days as an average duration of principal photography for 
the films in its survey. To illustrate the trend to cost 
control in this area, the ACTT (1973) offers an average of 
forty one camera days in the four years to 1972 for films 
financed by the NFFC. 
Another measure of productivity is screen time per camera 
day - how much film eventually exhibited is shot per day. Gater 
and PEP gave figures of 1.29 minutes and 1.18 minutes from 
their respective surveys (twenty two films completed in the 
year ending 30/9/48; twenty eight films financed by the NFFC 
and completed in the year ending 30/9/50). That is, there was 
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no productivity improvement apparent in that short period. 
That expenditure by producers on the production unit has 
risen in spite of the tendancy for reductions in camera days 
per film may be partly explained by the significant overtime 
payments required to keep production within tight schedules. 
The industry has a history of poor labour relations. The 
PEP Report noted this with particular regard to the then ACT. 
The Report asserted that the ACT was at that time (May, 1952) 
the only union in the economy whose members had, since the war, 
suffered high unemployment. Casualisation of labour was seen as 
an explanation for the uncompromising attitude on closed shops 
and high overtime. The industry's costs could be significantly 
reduced, it was felt, by studios introducing security of 
employment. 
In the Perilli table, the second highest cost category for 
the period as a whole is that of studio facilities: the rent 
for stages, theatres, and equipment hired, and the studios' 
fees for overheads. While this averaged 18.4% in the PEP 
survey, it has shown a very substantial decline over successive 
decades, falling to below 7%. And for the thirty films of the 
1986 to 1989 period, rental and other costs related to the use 
of studios had fallen to 3.8%. 
Until well after the war, almost all films were made in the 
studios, and it was inefficiency in this sector which drew the 
attention of the Gater Report in its explanations of production 
cost problems. Considerable spare capacity in the studio sector 
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was the norm, and resultingly large studio overhead apportioned 
to any single production constituted a major cost penalty. (The 
PEP Report found that studio capacity utilisation in the period 
studied was only about three fifths. ) 
So, in addition to reducing the number of camera days, a 
second important form of cost control in the industry has been 
the move from studios and onto location. Consequently, the 
studio sector has undergone considerable rationalisation - the 
1973 ACTT survey observes that where, in September 1948, twenty 
five British studios operated with twenty seven features 'on 
the floor, ' there were, on the corresponding day in 1972, only 
fourteen studios - and six of these were making only 
commercials. 
By September 1990, there were only three important studios, 
and the production unit lists published in 'Screen 
International' indicated that the vast majority of production 
activity was location filming. 
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4.5 The Economics of the Firm. 
In developing an analysis of the economics of film 
production and the firm, one is confronted by a spectrum of 
models of the firm ranging from the smallest producer 
operating on a one-off basis, through more established 
independent producers, through 'mini-majors, ' to the Hollywood 
major with vertical integration, multi-national operation and, 
in recent years, conglomerate parents. 
Taking the independent part of this continuum, activity of 
an almost uniquely high risk nature is carried out. To 
emphasise this, a survey of film industry finance by 'Screen 
International' (1988) indicates a useful dichotomy between 
film production as 'project' investment and the typical 
manufacturing industry as 'product' investment. 
Product investment - motor car or furniture production, for 
example - is seen as the kind of activity which has an initial 
high risk period of product development, followed by a lengthy 
period of continuous manufacture during which marketing 
feedback enables intermittent fine tuning of the basic product 
in the light of consumer taste. High initial fixed costs of 
product development and factory investment are placed into an 
economies of scale context. 
Film production, on the other hand, is a project based 
activity: every single film is a discrete exercise, carrying 
its own specific costs of development and production. Consumer 
sensibilities change more rapidly in this sphere than in most 
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other sectors of the economy. And yet the development and 
production of each project, the costs of which can be as high 
as those of constructing a small factory, must take place 
entirely in advance of marketing. 
Once the film in question has been manufactured, one must 
return to the starting line for the development of the next 
project. For the independent producer, this is about the best 
that can happen - if the first project has been a commercial 
failure, the sources of finance for the second project will 
probably not be forthcoming. 
Against this background of project risk can be seen, as one 
moves along the continuum and away from the independent sector, 
the impetus for the development of the major studios in the US 
and for their imitators in the UK: risk is spread across an 
annual output of a large number of film projects. Furthermore, 
vertical integration reduces some aspects of the basic risk 
situation by ensuring that each project will be adequately 
distributed and exhibited. 
In a sense, the industry in the major studio sector is 
converted from 'project' to 'product' based. The firm's 
activity adopts a continuous flow appearance -a never ending 
procession of films runs smoothly from studio through 
distribution and into cinemas. 
Fixed costs no longer relate to the single film project but 
to the overall investment in the studio-distribution-exhibition 
operation as a whole. The expense of any one film produced can 
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be seen as an incremental, rather than a fixed, cost. Simple 
managerial decision making ensues: do the incremental revenues 
anticipated from this film - in a market environment which is 
substantially under control - exceed the incremental costs? 
Success breeds success, and the firm can build a large 
capital base to fund its production. From time to time, an 
incremental loss is sustained, but it can be apportioned 
across the board as if it were an overhead. In this manner, as 
the 'Screen International' survey observed, "Twentieth Century 
Fox could survive 'Cleopatra' in much the same way as Ford 
survived Edsel. But Goldcrest could not survive 'Revolution'. " 
That is not to say that the Hollywood major studios are 
completely immune from the threat of financial disaster. From 
time to time, there is rampant inflation in film production 
costs and, in the extreme, a "Heaven's Gate" - United Artists 
debacle (Bach, 1985). 
Vogel (1986) notes that production costs of feature 
films distributed by the US majors rose at a compounded annual 
rate of 21.5% during the 1970s -a period of Hollywood self- 
indulgence, poor management, and unrealistic expectations of 
profitability. Such expectations were particularly encouraged 
by 'Star Wars' which made over $150 million profit in the first 
four years of its release on an initial investment of $11 m.. 
However, the advantages of the major studio model of the 
firm in the film industry are so large that the impetus for 
activity to be based on this model meant that from the mid- 
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1920s, the 'Studio System' in Hollywood was firmly established. 
There were eight majors: Warners, Paramount, 20th. Century-Fox, 
MGM, RKO, Universal, Columbia, and United Artists. 
The first five of these were fully vertically integrated 
combines, while Universal and Columbia owned only production 
and distribution facilities. United Artists was different again 
- it was solely a distribution company for independent 
producers. 
The Hollywood studios had a highly developed internal 
division of labour (Staiger, 1979). They were large scale 
manufacturing firms: the studios, in the words of Storper 
(1989), 'explicitly used Henry Ford as their role model'. That 
is, the organisation of a studio - or 'film factory' - was an 
assembly line approach to the manufacture of perhaps fifty 
films per year. As a result of such mass production, the studio 
film was a standardised product made in accordance with a 
formula approach to the western, musical or gangster film. 
The apotheosis of the Hollywood Studio System was reached 
in the mid 1940s - just before the onset of decline. MGM, the 
wealthiest studio, had about 5,000 employees on the 178 acres 
of Culver City (Kelley, 1991). MGM boasted 'more stars than 
there are in the heavens, ' ran a school for child stars, a 
private zoo and thirty one sound stages. 
When decline set in, there were a variety of causes 
(i) 'divorcement' came in 1949 under the decision of the US 
Supreme Court in'United States v Paramount Inc.. By the mid 
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nineteen fifties, the major studios had completed the enforced 
divestment of their exhibition chains. 
(ii) television: for Storper (ibid), the studio system had 
meant 'mass production for stable oligopolistic markets. ' The 
coming of television constituted an upheaval in these markets. 
(iii) The Star System was central to the mechanics of the 
Studio System. But, in 1945, the (Olivia) de Havilland Decision 
of the Supreme Court of California meant that the 'suspension 
clause' (ie. the practice of indefinite extension of the stars' 
seven year contracts through the addition of suspension time) 
was declared illegal. 
What is interesting is that the British film industry in 
general - including its own Studio System - was simultaneously 
subject to comparable undermining pressures (the arrival of 
television; the withdrawal of Rank from large scale 
production). But where the British film industry embarked upon 
a continuous decline from this era (ie. the nineteen forties), 
its Hollywood counterpart was able to emerge in such a way as 
to continue to dominate both home and world markets. 
Thus it is interesting to ask whether there have been 
aspects of the film firm in the British case that have been 
inimical to British recovery, and, if so, how have the British 
differed from the more successful American model. 
As Storper (ibid) has demonstrated, the Hollywood model of 
the firm in the film industry evolved during the post-war 
period as an early example of post-Fordism, that is of a 
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transition, noted more recently in a wide variety of 
industries, from a system of mass production to one comparable 
to the flexible specialisation model of Piore and Sabel (1984). 
'Legal Eagles Rule The Roost - Hollywood lawyers cut the 
big deals, but some doubt they deserve the big cuts' 
('Variety, ' 1990). These were the headlines to a survey in the 
Hollywood trade newspaper alluding to the present model under 
which powerful lawyers and agents 'package' projects which they 
take to the studios. Complex deals concerning taxation, the 
sharing of revenues and the financing of the film are then 
struck with the studios. 
As opposed to the moguls of the mass production era, the 
studios are, in turn, often run by former lawyers and agents. 
They facilitate a range of producing firms: the studio puts its 
logo onto the film, finances it and - crucially - distributes 
it. The major studios control 90% of the American distribution 
sector, and in this way they are the very hub of the wheel of 
American film production. 
In contrast, what has happened in the British case in the 
post-war period in terms of the firm is that there is no 
British major studio or other organisation able to play on a 
permanent basis this role at the hub of the wheel of 
production. As a result, an occasional British production firm 
of importance will grow up, but its rapid demise is always 
imminent. From time to time, a bright star will light up the 
skies of the British industry for a few brief years before 
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inevitably coming crashing down to earth. 
Ealing, London, British Lion, Hammer, Woodfall, Bryanston, 
ACC and Goldcrest - all have had periods as firms producing a 
number of good, enduring British films. Then comes the fall: at 
best, the firm rapidly dwindles as a productive force: at 
worst, and more usually, there is debt, loss and liquidation. 
The model of the firm which emerges in the British film 
industry is a kind of Destructive Creation, as it were. There 
is a disastrous cycle of boom and bust, reflecting pure and 
unfettered capitalism, extreme entrepreneurial risk taking, 
greed and megalomania. 
Such boom and bust of the British firm can be reviewed as 
follows: 
(a) Ealing. 
Life Span: 1931 (Ealing Studios built) to 1959 (Ealing 
production terminated by ABPC following takeover). 
Entrepreneur: Michael Balcon. 
Notable British Films: Passport to Pimlico (1949), Kind Hearts 
and Coronets (1949), The Man in the White Suit (1951), The 
Cruel Sea (1953), The Ladykillers (1955). 
Reason for Downfall: Rank's rationalisation caused the sale of 
the Studios, and the gradual demise of Ealing production 
followed. (Rank's retrenchment accounted for the downfall 
of a number of other British firms - see Section 2.4. ) 
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(b) London Films. 
Life Span: (i) London Films f. Korda 1932 to 1942. 
(ii) Korda's return from Hollywood: 1946 to 1956. 
Entrepreneur: Alexander Korda. 
Notable British Films: (i) The Private Life of Henry VIII 
(1933), The Scarlet Pimpernel (1934), The Four Feathers 
(1939). 
(ii) Anna Karenina (1948), The Third Man (1949), Richard 
III (1956). 
Reason for Downfall: (i) Heavy debt following high production 
expenditure led to Rank takeover of Denham Studios, 1938. 
(ii) Korda died, 1956. There were expensive flops in a 
period where London was a sort of successor to Rank as 
facilitator of independent producers. 
(c) British Lion. 
Life Span: f. 1927. (i) 1946 to 1954: Korda's distribution arm. 
(ii) 1955 to 1963 - NFFC owned. 
(iii) 1964 to 1966. 
(iv) 1966 to 1975. 
Entrepreneur: (i) Korda. 
(ii) The Boultings, Launder and Gilliat. 
(iii) Balcon 
(iv) Barry Spikings and Michael Deeley. 
Notable British Films: (i) see London (above). 
(ii) I'm All Right Jack (1959), The L Shaped Room (1962). 
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(iii) The Family Way (1965). 
(iv) Don't Look Now (1973), The Man Who Fell To Earth 
(1975). 
Reason for Downfall: (i) despite NFFC loan (1948), losses 
connected to those of London (above), and bankruptcy in 
1954. 
(ii) sale to private sector. (See Section 2.5. ) 
(iii) Lack of access to exhibition circuits. 
(iv) Persistent financial crisis. The strategy evolved into 
one of making American, rather than British, films. In 
1975, EMI, attracted to this, tookover and absorbed British 
Lion, and Spikings and Deeley. EMI's American strategy 
culminated in Honky Tonk Freeway (1981): the greatest 
commercial failure in film history in terms of its 
production cost: box office ratio. 
(d) Hammer. 
Life Span: f. 1947 - sale of Bray Studios, 1970. 
Entrepreneur: James Carreras. 
Notable British Films: The Quatermass Experiment (1954), The 
Curse of Frankenstein (1956), 
Reason for Downfall: gradually declined after 1970 when lack of 
film finance sources in the UK led to the move to Elstree. 
(e) Woodfall. 
Life Span: from 1958. 
Entrepreneurs: Tony Ricardson, John Osborne. 
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Notable British Films: Look Back in Anger (1959), Saturday 
Night and Sunday Morning (1960), Tom Jones (1963), The 
Knack... and How To Get It (1963), Kes (1969). 
Reason for Downfall: Dispersal of the original 'angry' era 
creative personnel to Hollywood and the theatre; the 
Woodfall name was subsequently behind a variety of mainly 
indifferent films. 
(f) Bryanston. 
Life Span: 1959 to 1965 
Entrepreneur: Michael Balcon. 
Notable British Films: The Entertainer (1960), Saturday Night 
and Sunday Morning' (1960) (both with Woodfall), The System 
(1964). 
Reason for Downfall: Lack of finance for the development of an 
alternative strategy when the 'angry' era ended. 
(g) Associated Communication Corporation. 
Life Span: 1974 to 1981 
Entrepreneur: Lew Grade. 
Notable British Films: The Eagle Has Landed (1977), The Medusa 
Touch (1978), The Long Good Friday (1980) 
Reason for Downfall: Huge ambition (the production of 80 films 
in six years), production expenditure (including $35 
million on 'Raise the Titanic, ' 1981) and investment (with 
EMI) in distribution in the US and in exhibition - but no 
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major hits. The highest estimates of ACC losses: $100 
million. ACC takenover by Robert Holmes a'Court, 1981 and 
its British film production all but eliminated. 
(h) Cannon. 
Life Span: in Britain, Cannon tookover Screen Entertainment, 
including Elstree Studios, in 1986. 
Entrepreneurs: Menahem Golan and Yoram Globus. 
Notable British Films: None. 
Reason for Downfall: Cannon had engaged in indiscriminate over- 
expansion worldwide, producing 900 films in ten years but 
without a single major commercial success. 
(j) Goldcrest. 
Life Span: 1977 to 1985. 
Entrepreneurs: (i) To 1983 - Jake Eberts. 
(ii) James Lee and Sandy Leiberson. 
Notable British Films: (i) Gandhi (1982), Local Hero (1983). 
(ii) The Killing Fields (1984), The Emerald Forest (1985), 
A Room With A View (1986). The Mission (1986). 
Reason for Downfall: Large losses in television programme 
making. And the ideal of a balanced film portfolio gave way 
to open-ended expenditure commitments to three large budget 
commercial failures (including Revolution, which itself 
contributed a loss of £9.616 million). 
-301- 
The downfall of the British film firm is, it would seem, 
inevitable. Talking of Balcon (at both Ealing & Bryanston) and 
of Korda, Michael Winner points out that 'the tragedy 
of the British film industry is that people equate periods of 
great film making with periods of success. Of course, they are 
a success because there are great films. But invariably, 
they've gone hand in hand with bankruptcy for the people who 
made them' (J. Walker, 1985). 
This is in complete contrast to the majority of sectors of 
the economy. Indeed, there is a body of economic theory 
concerning the growth of the firm which would suggest that, 
other things being equal, there will be growth in industries at 
the level of the firm. 
Incipient growth theory can be traced back to Marshall 
(1890) who offered a dynamic model based on a biological 
analogy. This model rapidly met its demise (although its 
resurrection in the case of the film industry is suggested 
below) and a long period ensued during which purely static 
models of the firm with determinate equilibria were developed, 
for example by Robinson (1933), Chamberlin (1933) and Sweezy 
(1939). 
During this period, however, there was clear evidence of a 
long term trend towards concentration in manufacturing, and 
therefore the implication that some firms were growing rapidly. 
In the 1930s, the only model which sought to explain this was 
Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect (1931). 
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Given an economic environment characterised by uncertainty, 
Gibrat's Law predicts that it is inevitable that the 
distribution of firm sizes in an industry will become 
positively skewed over time. A few firms will grow to a very 
large size while the majority remain relatively small. 
This was tested by Prais (1976). He found that if the 
Gibrat model had been applied to data on British manufacturing 
industry in 1910, it would have been a reasonably accurate 
predictor of the increase in concentration which took place 
over the following sixty years. In fact, it would have slightly 
underestimated concentration and the growth of the large firm. 
For Penrose (1959), firms are capable of continuous growth. 
A major impetus for such growth arises from indivisibilities in 
factor inputs which give rise to unused resources and economies 
of growth. But the firm will also undergo costs of growth which 
will constrain the overall rate at which it grows. 
Marris's model (1964) is both a continuation of the ideas 
of Penrose and a development of the managerial branch of the 
alternative theory of the firm. That is, it is based on the 
notion of separation of ownership and control (introduced by 
Berle and Means, 1932) and it assumes that the objective of the 
firm's managers is to optimise - in this case, the maximisation 
of the rate of growth of the firm is the goal. 
Marris's managers are concerned with the maintenance of a 
minimum share-valuation ratio which is both a constraint on the 
managerial objective of growth and a component of managerial 
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utility - it implies security from takeovers. The limits to a 
firm's growth are embodied in the need for a safe growth path 
in which the supply of capital and costs of demand growth are 
balanced. 
There have been a number of empirical studies of aspects 
of the Marris growth model and these have led to somewhat 
ambiguous results, for example, Radice (1971) and Sorensen 
(1974). 
The behavioural branch of the alternative theory of the 
firm was established following the work of and Simon (1959) and 
Cyert and March (1963). Rather than the prescriptive, 
optimising approach of a managerial theory such as that of 
Marris, behavioural theories set out to be positive. They 
assume satisficing goals. 
The model of Nelson and Winter (1982) is in the behavioural 
tradition. It assumes that the structure of an industry at a 
point in time is the result of evolution. It is a biological 
analogy in which the 'genes' in the process of evolution are 
represented by the 'routines' of firms, ie. the established 
procedures in production, advertising or personnel, etc. 
One inherits routines, and growth lies in the discovery of 
new routines. One can also copy other firms' newly discovered 
routines and, in this way, the evolutionary process is more 
rapid than the biological one. 
A further strand of economic literature which gives a 
rationale for the growth of the firm is that founded by Coase 
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(1937) who raised the question: why do firms exist at all? 
The reason lies in the notion of the firm displacing markets in 
order to reduce the number of contracts involved in the 
production of a commodity, and thus to reduce the transactions 
costs involved. 
For Williamson (1975), high transactions costs stem from a 
mixture of human factors (like bounded rationality) and 
environmental factors (such as uncertainty) and lead to market 
failure. This encourages firms to grow by vertical integration 
- internal organisation is substituted for the market 
mechanism. Moreover, internalisation has an important role to 
play in the analysis of firms' growth through overseas direct 
foreign investment. 
There are a variety of theories concerning such 
multinational growth. Vernon (1966) explained the post-war 
expansion overseas of US multinationals in terms of product 
life cycles. During the maturing product phase of the cycle, 
direct foreign investmemt would constitute both a necessary 
defensive strategy and an accessible source of corporate growth 
The Hymer-Kindleberger model (Kindleberger, 1969) envisages 
imperfections in both goods and factor markets, and in the 
market for knowledge. These are pull factors in a corporation's 
international growth. Buckley and Casson (1985) regard this as 
purely a short term theory applying only at the time the firm 
first crosses an international boundary. 
In the tradition of internalisation, Buckley and Casson 
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envisage an internal specialisation in the multinational firm 
in such 'market-making' activities as contract specification 
and negotiation, and payment - and avoidance - of taxes. The 
firm is seen as backward integrated from the production of the 
market-making activity to the production of goods or services. 
If one considers the range of British film firms discussed 
on pages 297 to 301, there is little indication of sustained 
growth. The typical pattern (for all except ACC and Cannon) is 
the enjoyment of a brief period of success before the 
inevitable demise. 
It is interesting to envisage a model in which, at the time 
of each British film firm's success it had embarked upon a 
modest rate of growth - equal, say, to that of the economy as a 
whole. Such a conservative rate of expansion would have had a 
cumulative effect by which a large British film industry would 
have evolved, producing hundreds of feature films every year, 
ie. a British 'Hollywood'. 
What then are the crucial differences between British and 
American film firms? 
The US model is a hub with spokes. The Hollywood major 
studios form the hub and connect to the spokes formed by 
production firms and packaging agents. The traditional role of 
the studios as factories may have disappeared after the late 
nineteen forties, but the studios have remained in control of 
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distribution. As such, they can act as facilitators of a wide 
range of producing firms. 
Moreover, a US studio's position in this regard is 
strong due to its ability to distribute each film into a vast 
domestic market. And a continued control of distribution in 
overseas territories (like Britain) is a further reinforcement. 
In contrast, the British combines did not perform the role 
of the hub after the brief era in the nineteen forties when 
Rank was a major facilitator of production firms. This is 
discussed in section 3.3 where it is observed that Rank's 
retreat was largely in response to the high barriers to entry 
to the distribution sector in the US. 
It is extraordinary that the model of the growth of the 
firm with the greatest applicability is that of Marshall 
(1890): that is, an analogy with the trees in a forest. This 
model is, of course, normally thought of as hopelessly out of 
date, subsequently even by Marshall himself! 
The industry looks like a forest composed of trees of 
varying heights. At any two points in time, the trees which are 
tall and those which are short are different. The tall trees 
inevitably die; young trees grow, fighting for their share of 
air, water and light. 
The firm, by the same token, enjoys a period of growth 
during the life of its founding entrepreneur, but, on his 
death, his children will lack aptitude and enthusiasm and the 
firm itself will die. From 1862, however, the law had widely 
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extended the possibility of forming joint stock companies with 
limited liability. This meant that the firm had a separate 
identity from the entrepreneur - there was no reason for the 
firm not to survive when he died. 
The British film industry, however, remains an environment 
in which Marshall's analogy is a good fit: 
(i) Marshall's trees were growing as long as the founding 
entrepreneur was strong and involved. There is, at a 
fundamental level a very real importance in the film firm of a 
founding entrepreneurial figure who is dominant and decisive in 
the context of creative decision making and leadership. And the 
entrepreneurial figure - Korda, Balcon, Carreras, Lew Grade, 
Golan and Globus, Eberts - is indeed one of the characteristics 
of the British firms considered above 
(ii) Marshall's trees would grow as a result of gaining access 
to air, water and light. The distribution sector is the 'air' 
which the film firm must breathe, and, when the supply of this 
air is cut off (barriers to entry to the distribution sector, 
especially in the US), asphyxiation rapidly sets in. 
The 'water' is production finance without which the firm 
will not enjoy growth even to an average stature - like a 
dehydrated tree, it will keel over and die without even living 
its full life cycle. And without light, a tree will be 
vertically challenged - light is what is projected onto the 
cinema screen, but there is monopoly control of the exhibition 
circuits and access is restricted. 
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(iii) As a forest, the British film industry is rather like a 
Brazillian rain forest: it shrinks over time. The trees in it 
at any one time are both different and less numerous than at a 
corresponding point ten or twenty years before. 
During the nineteen eighties there was a total of 342 trees 
in the forest, and although some were taller than others, there 
were no giants. Many of the trees have already withered and 
died. 
In that decade, the structure of the British production 
company industry was fragmented to the extent that the 454 
films produced required the participation of 342 firms. 
Alliances of production companies, often on a one-off basis, 
were a typical characteristic: 214 (63%) of these firms were 
involved in at least one such co-production. 
The following table shows the largest firms in the decade. 
None has a dominant position. For example, a market share of 5% 
of the number of films produced in the decade would require 
participation in at least 23 films. Channel Four/Film Four 
International is the only firm to exceed this figure, solo 
producing 2 films and having a co-production role in 37 others. 
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Table 25. 
The 1980s: British Firms in the Production of More Than 10 
Films During the Decade. 
Total No = Solo + Coprodns. 
Channel 4/Film Four International 39 2 37 
British Screen 20 1 19 
British Film Institute Production 19 11 8 
Handmade 17 16 1 
Goldcrest 16 3 13 
Cannon 14 11 3 
Enigma 12 6 6 
Zenith 11 6 5 
Palace 11 3 8 
(Source: Primary. ) 
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Analysis of the nineteen eighties shows that barriers to 
entry to production are extremely low - 250 companies came in 
and produced a single film in the period. There were no 
barriers to exit. 
Regarding the above table, Cannon and Goldcrest both 
collapsed during the decade, Palace went into administration in 
1992, while the level of activity of most of the others has 
fallen. 
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5.1 Background to Product Competition. 
If product differentiation is interpreted as the use of any 
factor, apart from price, designed to raise revenue in markets, 
then consideration of the film industry would suggest the 
importance of a variety of types of product differentiation. 
Phlips and Thisse (1982) discriminate between horizontal 
and vertical differentiation. The former occurs where, for 
example, different consumers prefer different film stars. 
Vertical differentiation would be exemplified by the higher 
quality to be found in a West End auditorium as opposed 
to a local multi-screen. Consumers can recognise such vertical 
variation in an unambiguous way and are willing to pay premium 
prices for the higher quality product variant. 
Whether a film is a British production, from Hollywood or 
from elsewhere is itself an important question of product 
differentiation. Moreover, it is possible for the production 
sector of the industry to achieve strong differentiation in 
terms of the studio or production company involved. This can be 
noted in relation to the Hollywood studio system in its heyday, 
eg. the MGM musical, or the Warners crime film. And the more 
recent corporate strategic importance of this aspect is 
illustrated by Bach (1986) in the case of Trans America's 
ownership of United Artists. 
In the British case, differentiation by studio or by 
production company has been applicable from time to time, for 
example with Ealing Studios productions under Sir Michael 
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Balcon, or, more recently, with a Channel Four production. 
The mode of distribution of a particular film is also of 
relevance, sending signals to the consumer - the perceptions 
about a film with an initial exclusive run in a flagship 
cinema (and, in the extreme, with a Royal Command Performance 
thrown in) are likely to be somewhat different from reactions 
emanating from a film which has been subject to a blanket 
release on the bottom half of a four walled double bill! 
In exhibition, film censor certificates differentiate, as 
does the particular cinema chosen for the presentation: West 
End, circuit, Art and independent venues themselves signal 
packaging messages to consumers. 
Entrepreneurs in the film industry have always varied the 
mode of exhibition to follow the waxing and waning of mass 
audience demand. The 'nickelodeon' gave way to the 'Picture 
Palace' and 'Super Cinema' as the audience grew in the late 
nineteen twenties and into the thirties. With the decline of 
the mass audience after the war, there were of course cinema 
closures, but there was also a shift to the 'Split Screen' 
cinema. The Odeon, Nottingham was the first split screen in 
Britain when it was sub-divided in 1965. The mass audience 
demand had gone, but the smaller audience could sustain 
exhibition of a variety of films in smaller auditoria. 
The 'Multiplex' mode of exhibition enjoyed rapid expansion 
in Britain from the late nineteen eighties. Such a cinema has 
perhaps twelve screens under one roof. The evident level of 
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demand for each film is monitored, and the films are switched 
around between auditoria at very short notice in order to match 
the perceived levels of demand. 
The exhibition sector - whether large halls, split screens 
or multiplexes - also has an important overall role to play 
within the context of product differentiation in the sense that 
the product gains its status as a 'film, ' as opposed to just 
another television programme once it has enjoyed a release in 
the cinema and been advertised and reviewed on this basis in 
the national press. Activity in cinemas i"s vital in that it is 
cinema exhibition that gives to a film its credibility and 
reputation. In turn, this establishes the film's desirability 
from the point of view of the television and video audience, 
and thus the terms of its sale to television and its 
performance in the video market. 
However, the most fundamental way in which product 
differentiation in the film industry takes place is by means of 
genre: the Musical at the Empire Cinema might be attracting 
large audiences and the Western at the Rialto moderate ones, 
while almost nobody is in attendance for the Costume Drama at 
the Ritz. Competition is not through price - for the consumer, 
the respective costs of admission to the Empire and the Ritz 
are neither here nor there. 
In order to take an initial step in the direction of 
analysing the product strategy of the British film industry, it 
is interesting to look at the subject categories which British 
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film makers have favoured. The table in the Appendix records 
the British long film output by category of subject matter for 
the period 1927 to 1989. 
It can be seen that Comedy, Crime and, to some extent, 
Drama are the genres with consistently high relative 
frequencies over the whole period. Between 1930 and the mid 
nineteen forties, Comedy films are the most important category, 
forming between a quarter and two fifths of annual output. 
Crime is in second position in some years during this era, but 
at other times it is in third place due to the high output of 
Musicals. The British Musical became something of a genre in 
decline by the end of this period. 
From the late forties to the late sixties, Comedy and Crime 
are, by a considerable distance, the prevailing categories for 
British film makers. These two genres account for at least half 
the films throughout much of this period. 
After the nineteen sixties, the picture changes in that, 
although there is a downward trend in the annual total number 
of films made, the major genres do not predominate to quite the 
extent that can be observed for the earlier years. This allows 
for a greater proliferation of subject categories than before. 
In the mid 1970s, for instance, product strategy is distributed 
relatively evenly across a variety of genres: not only Comedy, 
Crime and Drama, but also Horror, Musicals and Sex. 
While sexual intercourse for Philip Larkin began only in 
1963, it was even later, in 1970, that the British film 
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industry first penetrated this particular sector of product 
differentiation. As a genre, Sex immediately accounted for 
about 10% of films in 1971. There followed a proliferation of 
such titles as "I'm Not Feeling Myself Tonight" (1976) and "Can 
You Keep It Up For A Week? " (1974). 
As it happens, the industry was able to keep it up - at 
above 10% - for most of the 1970s. Sex was the largest category 
in 1976, and was only allowed to subside after 1979. 
Sex is not alone as a new or previously neglected genre 
materialising and assuming major relative importance. Horror, 
for example, is a subject category which lies dormant until the 
mid fifties when it begins a steady climb until it attains a 
double digit share of output in the mid 1960s. Horror maintains 
this relative importance in most subsequent years - it is the 
largest subject area in 1974 - until falling away after 1981. 
In contrast, War is an example of a genre which is 
represented by at least one film in almost every year and which 
is subject to a cyclical variation. There are peak years of 
popularity for War as a choice of subject matter by film 
makers: the late 1920s, the middle years of the Second World 
War, and towards the end of each subsequent decade. 
The question arises as to whether the British film industry 
has been unable to halt its long decline because it has failed 
to locate its product in the right sectors of the product 
differentiation landscape. 
Before examining a variety of aspects of this question by 
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means of the clustering analysis of the subsequent sections of 
this chapter, it is interesting to consider the pattern of 
Hollywood films by subject category in comparison with the 
British picture. 
Table 26 on page 321 gives an approximate comparison of the 
distribution of national American and British film production 
across the main film genres. The US figures are adapted from a 
survey by Finler (1988) of the American releases at ten yearly 
intervals of six of the Hollywood major studios, that is 
excluding Columbia and RKO. 
The British figures are adapted from the data assembled for 
the table in the Appendix. They show the percentage in each 
category of all British films released. The subject categories 
used in the table in the Appendix are those of Gifford (1986), 
are rather more numerous than those offered by Finler. Hence, 
it has been necessary to redesignate some films from their 
categorisations in the Appendix table. 
For example, Sex and Horror are British subjects according 
to Gifford's categorisations, but are not part of Finler's. 
After considering the plot summaries of the films concerned, 
they have been placed as appropriate under Comedy, Drama, etc.. 
Although one might therefore have some reservations about 
a comparison based on these classifications, it is interesting 
to observe that there appears to be some correspondence between 
the subject categories into which the British and American 
industries have distributed their respective outputs of films. 
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Table 26. 
American and British Releases by Subject Category. (%) 
1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 
US GB US GB US GB US GB US GB 
Action/ 
adventure 9.0 7.9 6.5 2.6 12.8 5.5 8.5 8.3 22.7 6.2 
Comedy 16.8 29.2 16.6 13.2 8.7 38.4 18.5 19.4 17.3 26.6 
Crime 17.2 13.5 15.4 15.8 12.8 28.8 15.4 25.0 21.3 15.6 
Drama 28.5 19.1 26.0 34.0 32.9 15.1 23.8 16.7 22.7 28.1 
Fantasy 1.9 3.4 3.0 7.9 3.4 1.4 6.9 15.3 4.0 7.8 
Musical 18.0 24.7 16.6 15.8 12.8 4.1 7.7 9.7 6.7 14.1 
War 1.5 2.6 8.9 10.5 4.0 6.8 9.2 5.6 1.3 1.6 
Western 7.1 0 7.1 0 12.8 0 10.0 0 4.0 0 
[Source: adapted from Gifford (1986) and Finler (1988). ] 
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Correspondence in terms of the relative importance placed 
on genres by the US and British industries is at its closest in 
the earlier years: the coefficient of rank correlation for 1935 
and for 1945 is near to + 0.8 in each case. 
Figure 3 (below) presents a picture of the data in 
the above table and suggests that, over the entire period 
concerned, the British have not tended to distribute their 
product in a wholly different way from Hollywood. 
The shape of the scatter indicates a weak to moderate 
positive association. The overall product moment correlation 
coefficient is + 0.55. 
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Figure 3. 
Scatter Graph: Association of American and British Releases by 
Subject Category, 1935 to 1975 (see Table 26 above). 
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As a means of examining the nature of consumer choice 
between differentiated goods, the characteristics approach of 
Lancaster (1966) can be considered. This would suggest that the 
consumer attempts, subject to a budget constraint, to maximise 
the utility derived from the consumption of the attributes of 
films, rather than from the films themselves. 
The economic theory of horizontal differentiation is 
considered in detail in section 5.5. But in the context of the 
fortunes of the British production industry, the importance of 
the question of similarity in the characteristics - and the 
cross elasticities - of British and Hollywood films exhibited 
can be stressed. 
And if one takes the full range of product characteristics, 
the question arises as to how the market might manage to 
sustain such a diverse range of characteristics, and why there 
is no market rationalisation of this variety. This sustained 
differentiation would appear to stem from a kind of 
interdependent production model in which economies of joint 
production are conferred, rather than simply from consumer 
demand itself. 
The issue of agglomeration economies, analogous with 
spatial and location theory, is useful in the context of 
the location in product space of product characteristics, and 
the tendancy for the clustering of characteristics. Shaw (1982) 
and Swann (1985) have examined product competition in 
characteristics space in the Fertilisers and Microprocessors 
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industries respectively. 
These studies are considered in section 5.5 in the light of 
the clustering of characteristics of British films. 
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5.2 Clustering Analysis 1: Genre, Budget and Censorship 
Certification. 
By way of analogy to product differentiation in the film 
industry, the location model originating with Hotelling (1929) 
would imply that the advantages of agglomeration would lead to 
several producers making films which were similar in terms of 
important product characteristics such as their subject matter, 
source material or use of film stars. 
After this initial phase, a subsequent entrant would aim to 
locate his or her film in an open area of the product 
charateristics space. Avoiding the crowded locations by making 
a film which offered different attributes from the currently 
popular ones would now be a suitable strategy for the 
maximisation of market share. 
The decision to deglomerate in this way would, in turn, 
lead to a new agglomeration as other producers, with films 
imitating the new product variant, joined in in search of 
market share in the new location. 
In the light of the decline of the British film industry, 
it is useful to use the product characteristics approach to 
investigate the British product strategy and to ask whether 
this strategy has contributed to the poor performance. 
The following analysis covers the period of the nineteen 
eighties and incorporates three important aspects of the 
product differentiation of British films released for 
exhibition in Britain during that decade. As noted above, films 
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as goods competing with one another in markets are 
differentiated in a variety of ways. The following analysis 
considers differentiation 
(i) by genre - is the film a Musical, a Comedy or a 
Western? 
(ii) by size of budget - is the film able to show lavish 
special effects and to use expensive talent? 
and 
(iii) by censorship certification - is the film competing 
in an 'X' certificate niche, or for a more general 
audience?. 
NB In the following tables, abbreviations for the subject 
classifications of films are as follows: 
Adv = adventure 
Ani = animated cartoon 
Ch = children 
Cri = crime 
Dra = drama 
Fan = fantasy 
His = history 
Hor = horror 
Mus = musical 
Com = comedy 
Re = revue 
Ro = romance 
Sp = sport 
We = western 
And the use of production budget categories is as follows (at 
1985 prices): 
Low = below £1.5 million. 
Medium = between £1.5 and £3 million. 
High = in excess of £3 million. 
Censorship categorisations = U, A, AA, X, PG, 12,15,18. 
1=a Britsh film released in Britain during the year. 
-327- 
Table 27. 
19 80 to 1 989: British Films Released For Exhibition in Britain. 
Lo cation of Product Characteristics in t he Decade As a Whole. 
Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U1 11 111 1 1 11 
L A/ 1 111 111 1 111 111 1 11 11 
0 PG 111 111 1 
W 111 111 
111 111 
B 11 
U AA/ 111 111 111 111 1 1 111 11 11 1 11 111 
D 15 111 111 111 111 1 1 11 
G 111 111 111 11 11 
E 111 1 111 
T 111 111 
111 111 
1 111 
111 
111 
11 
x/ 11 111 111 111 11 111 111 11 111 
18 111 11 111 
111 
M U 11 11 1 
E A/ I 111 11 111 111 1 1 1 11 111 
D PG 111 111 111 1 
I 1 1 
U AA/1 111 111 111 1 111 111 11 1 111 
M 15 111 111 111 11 
111 111 111 
B 1 1 111 
U 11 
D X/ 1 111 1 11 1 111 1 11 111 
G 18 111 11 
11 
H U1 111 
I 11 
G A/ 111 11 111 111 111 111 
H PG 1 111 111 111 
111 111 1 
B 11 111 
U 111 
D 12 1 
G AA/11 1 111 111 111 111 111 111 1 111 
E 15 111 111 
T 111 1 
1 
XJ 1 11 1 1 11 111 
18 1 
Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
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For the nineteen eighties as a whole, Table 27 shows that 
the main areas of clustering are in columns running across from 
Com (Comedy) to Fan (Fantasy). This block contains the four 
routinely popular subject locations - Comedy, Crime, Drama and 
Fantasy. They happen to be contiguous alphabetically. 
To the left of these columns is a block with a width 
from Adv (Advanture) to Ch (Children). This thin strip consists 
of largely virgin, unexplored territory despite a small measure 
of Adventure in the high budget area. There are few films in 
the Children category, and only a single Animated Cartoon. 
And to the right of the table is a wider area 
running from His (History) to War. Ten years' prospecting has 
left, in this terrain, a handful of small clusters here and 
there looking rather like abandoned settlements in a hostile 
landscape. 
A brief propensity for low budget Sex and Musical projects 
accounts for some of these settlements. As a whole, the right 
hand block of the table shows the limited extent of accumulated 
1980s agglomeration in these areas and in War, Romance, History 
and Horror. 
The question which arises is whether the apparent lack of a 
full exploration by British film makers of the territory in the 
left and right hand blocks has mattered. For instance, has the 
British film industry failed in relation to the Hollwood 
industry in the competitive market during the nineteen eighties 
because of a constraint in terms of its product location 
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strategy? 
In order to examine this issue, one can superimpose upon 
the distribution of product location by the British in the 
nineteen eighties the most successful films of the decade in 
their respective product characteristics locations. 
To facilitate this exercise, the Top Ten films at the 
cinema exhibition box office in Britain in each year of the 
nineteen eighties has been added in order to constitute Table 
28 below. 
Of these box office hits twenty seven were British (denoted 
in the Table below by £), two were Australian (*), one was 
Canadian (&) and the remainder were American ($). 
Table 28 on page 331. 
1980 to 1989: The Top Ten Box Office Films in Britain, and All 
British Films Released For Exhibition in Britain. Location of 
Product Characteristics in the Decade As a Whole. 
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Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U 1 11 111 1 1 11 
L A/ 1 111 111 1 111 111 1 11 11 
0 PG i£1 111 
W 111 111 
111 111 
B il 
U AA/ 111 111 111 111 1 1 ill 11 11 1 11 111 
D 15 111 111 111 111 1 1 11 
G 111 111 111 11 11 
E 111 111 
T 111 111 
111 111 
1 111 
111 
111 
11 
X/ &11 111 111 111 11 11 111 11 111 
18 111 11 111 
111 
MU 11 11 1 
E A/ 1 $11 11 111 111 11 1 1 11 £11 
D PG 11$ 111 111 1 
I 1L$ 1 
U $1 
M AA/ 1 £11 111 111 1 ill 111 11 1 iii 
15 £$1 111 111 11 
B 1$$ 111 111 
U 111 111 
D 111 111 
G X/ 1 111 1 1 1 111 1 11 111 
18 111 11 
11 
HU $1 $$$ $$1 $ 
I $$ $$$ 
G 1L£ 
H £ 
A/ 1$£ $ $11 111 $£$ 1£$ £11 $ $$ 
B PG $1$ $$$ £1£ 11£ ££1 ill 
U 1$ $ L££ $1$ i£1 1 
D 1$1 
G £1$ 
E $$1 
T 12 1 11$ 
AA/ $11 $$$ 111 $11 111 £1£ 1$1 111 1$ 11$ 
15 ** $$$ £11 1$ 1 1$ 111 
£$$ 11$ $1$ 
$ 111 
£$ 
X/ £ 1$£ 1$ $11 11 11$ $ $$$ 
18 11 
Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
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Has the British industry competed poorly with Hollywood in 
the British market during the nineteen eighties because of its 
product location strategy? 
As previously noted, the main area of the table in which 
British producers have located their films is the block between 
Com and Fan. This turns out to be an area which is indeed very 
productive in terms of competitive success. Sixty eight of the 
hits in the period are located there. 
Comedy, the first constituent of this block, is seen to be 
mainly located by the British in the low and medium budget 
areas. This is not infertile ground because Comedy is unique in 
being able to offer hits, albeit with a rather low relative 
frequency, for low budget films. And it is almost unique in 
offering hits for medium budget projects. 
But where the British have failed to compete in the Comedy 
market is in the high budget segment. Although Table 28 shows a 
remarkable clustering of hits in high budget comedy, the 
British were only able to supply four films in this category in 
the entire decade, and, of these, two became hits. 
The remainder of the cluster of high budget comedy hits is 
thus comprised of expensive Hollywood comedies which have faced 
next to no competition in this segment of the market. 
Indeed taking a more general view, Table 28 implies that 
you are only to be a real competitive force in the British 
market with films differentiated by characteristics 
that require high budget. British drama, for example, is a 
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prolific area with thick clusters in the medium and 
(especially) low budget areas where there is not a hit in 
sight. 
Looking at Table 28, it turns out that it is Crime 
and Fantasy where the British have been effective competitors 
in the high budget segments - there are substantial clusterings 
of high budget British Crime and Fantasy hits. 
If one turns to Crime, it would appear at first sight that 
the British were able to compete very well despite the 
budgetary requirement. However, of this cluster of successes, 
six are James Bond films. Clearly Bond says nothing about the 
competitiveness of the industry in general - even when British 
film business fortunes are at their lowest ebb, one would still 
expect Bond finance to be be forthcoming. 
'Fantasy' covers 'dramatic or humorous films with a 
fantastic or impossible story, including science fiction' 
(Gifford, 1986). This category includes many of the all time 
biggest blockbusters - 'Back to the Future, ' 'Ghostbusters, ' 
'ET'. The special effects required for Fantasy usually make 
high budgets compulsory. So how have the British managed to 
compete so well? 
The apparent British success (Table 28) in this 
particular market is largely accounted for by that category of 
films which one could characterise as American Production in 
Britain. The cluster of 'British' hits includes for example 
'Superman' (Parts 2 and 3) and 'Batman. ' As with Bond, these 
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films say little about the fundamental competitiveness of the 
British industry at large. As has been noted, American 
investment in British production is extremely volatile. After 
all, 'Superman Part 4' was made in the US and plans for the 
production of a 'Batman Part 2' in Britain fell through (due to 
concerns about British taxation). 
Turning to the left hand block in the Table 28, British 
producers during the nineteen eighties, as noted above, left 
this territory almost entirely unexplored. This lack of 
adventure (in two senses) was costly in terms of competitive 
strategy because, largely unhindered by competition from 
domestic sources, a clustering of foreign hits can be seen in 
the first column of the above table. 
There is a further such cluster in the second column. These 
hits were reissues of Walt Disney cartoons like 'Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarves, ' 'The Jungle Book, ' or '101 Dalmations'. It 
would seem that there is a big audience for animation, and it 
could be argued that the British would be equipped to explore 
this territory. The American animation hit detached in the 
Table from the Disney cluster is 'Who Framed Roger Rabbit? ' 
which was drawn in London by British artists. 
Turning to the wider block on the right of the table from 
His (History) to War, the high budget area is a landscape from 
which the Hollywood industry has struck oil in several 
places, while, with the single exception of History, the 
limited amount of British drilling has struck only rock. 
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American prospecting in the regions of Musicals, Romance, Sex, 
Sport and notably Horror and War has taken place in the absence 
of much British competition and has paid off as indicated by 
the scatter of $ in the lower right hand quarter of the table. 
Where there is British competition, it is ineffective. For 
example, there are small clusterings of unsuccessful British 
large budget films in both Horror and War categories. 
A further interesting question concerning the location of 
products is whether the British have been purely imitative in 
their product differentiation strategy and have made their way 
to locations only AFTER Hollywood successes there. 
Table 29 (below and on pages 338, and 340 to 342) considers 
the Top Ten British box office hits and the evolution of 
British product location during the 1980s. 
The subject category abbreviations and other symbols are as 
before. ) 
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Table 29. 
1980 - 1989: The Top Ten Box Office Films in Britain, and All 
British Films Released For Exhibition in Britain. Location of 
Product Characteristics, Year By Year. 
1980: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U1 
LA 111 
0 1 
W AA 11 1 1 1 1 
X 1 111 1 111 
MU 1 
EA $ 1 1 11 1 
D AA £ 1 1 
X 1 1 
HU $$ 
IA1 1 $ 11$ 1 
AA $ 11 1 
HX 11$ $ $ 
TOTAL11$ 111 111 111 111 1 11$ 111 11 11 111 1 11$ 
£$1 111 $ $ 1 $ 
$$ 
Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
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In 1980, the most productive territory for success in 
Britain was high budget Fantasy. In this area, there were three 
films, two 'U' and one 'A' certificate, among the box office 
hits. In general, the period from a film's conception to its 
theatrical premiere varies widely, but one can assume that most 
projects fall within a range from nine months to two years. 
Thus, if British producers in 1980 used the High-Budget- 
Family-Viewing-Fantasy as their model in formulating their 
product differentiation strategies, one would expect to find 
clusters of British productions in the corresponding area of 
the table for 1981,1982 and/or 1983. 
Reviewing the section of the table for 1981 (below), there 
is indeed a notable cluster of high budget British Fantasy, and 
these films include three British hits! Furthermore, although 
there is no British presence in this area of the map in 1982, 
another small British cluster does appear in 1983, and this 
includes one box office success. 
In the light of the 1980 pattern above, it is possible 
however that, given the perennial scarcity of finance, the most 
attractive area for British producers in 1980 would be Comedy: 
this was productive of two hits made on medium, rather than 
high, budgets. In fact, it is not until 1982, when a small 
cluster begins to materialise in the relevant area, and 1983, 
when it thickens somewhat, that the British arrive in this part 
of the landscape. 
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Table 29 continued. 
1981: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
LU1 
0A11 11 
W AA 1 11 1 
X1111 11 
MU 
EA111 
D AA 1 
X111 
HU$1 
IA$ 11£ £ £££ 
G AA $$ 11£11 
HX1 
TOTAL$ $ 1$$ 111 111 111 it 111 111 11 11 11 
11£ £ 11£ 111 
££ 
1982: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
LU 
0A£ 
W AA 11 111 111 11 
1 
X&111 
MU 
EA 11 11£ 
D AA 11 
X 
HU$$$$ 
IA11$ 
G AA $ if 11 $ 
HX 
TOTAL$ $ 111 111 111 11$ 11 11$ 111 £$ $ 
1£& 111 11 
$ 1£ 
1983: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
LU1 
0 PG 1 
W 15 11 111 11 
1 
18 11 
MU1 
E PG 11$ 111 
D 15 11 11 
18 111 
HU $$ 
I PG $ £1 $ £11 £ 
G 15 1$ 11 
H 18 £1 
TOTAL 111 111 111 11£ £ 11 11 1$ 11 1 111 
111 £ 111 $$ 
1£$ 111 
$$ 
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In contrast to the production of British Fantasy and Comedy 
films in the wake of the 1980 successes, one can observe that 
in 1980, large budget 'X' certificate Horror, War and Sex 
yielded one hit in each case from largely solo locations but, 
the subsequent period, examined in the above tables, did not 
generate any imitative British location decisions whatsoever, 
let alone clustering, in the respective areas. 
In general, the clustering revealed throughout Table 29, 
both in the above sections and in those for 1984 to 1989 which 
follow, indicates that, on at least a dozen occasions, 
there was no British locational behaviour in the wake of a box 
office hit. The factor inhibiting a higher frequency of 
migration of British product to those locations which have 
proved profitable has been the financial constraint. 
Ninety of the 1980s box office hits were high budget films, 
costing over £3 million. Of course, many of these films 
enormously exceeded this threshold and thus suggest little 
likelihood of being followed locationally by the British. For 
example, when the average finance available to a British 
producer was well below $5 million, the estimated negative cost 
('Variety') of the 1980 War hit, 'Apocalypse Now, ' was $31 
million, and the 1980 Horror hit, 'The Shining, ' $18 million. 
Table 29 is continued on page 340: 
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Table 29. (continued). 
1984: Adv Ani Ch Cofl Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U 1 
L PG 111 1 1 1 11 
0 li 
W 15 
18 1 1 
MU 
E PG 1 1 
D 15 £$ 11 11 
18 1 1 
HU $ 1 
I PG £$ 1 £ 11 11 $ 
G15 $ $ 1 1 
H 18 1$ 
T0TAL£$ $ ill 111 111 111 1 1$ 1 11 1 111 1 
111 1£S ill 111 
111 111 
1£$ $ 
$ 
1985: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U 1 1 
L PG 1 11 
0 15 11 111 111 1 11 1 
W 1 
18 1 
M PG 1 1 
E 15 li$ 11 1 1 
D $ 
18 
U $ It 
H PG 1 £ £ $ 1 
I 15 1 ill 1 1 1 1$ 
G $ 
H 18 1 
TOTALI $ 111 ill 111 111 111 111 11 1 11$ 
11 111 ill 1£$ $ 
l$$ lit ill 
$ £ 
Adv Ani Ch Co© Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
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Table 29 (continued). 
1986: Adv Ani Ch Co© Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U 
PG 1 1 1 
L 15 1 111 1 11 11 
0 111 
W 18 1 
MU 
E PG £$$ 1 1 1 
D 15 11 
18 1 1 1 
HU It 
I PG 1$ $ 11$ 11 $ 
G 15 1 1 11 1 $ 
H 18 $ 
TOTAL1$ 11£ 1 111 111 111 11 1 111 $ 11$ 
$$ 111 111 111 
111 £$$ 
11$ 
1987: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
LU 1 1 
0 PG 1 111 1 
W 15 111 11 11 1 1 1 
1 
18 1 1 1 
MU 1 
E PG 1 1 
D 15 11 1 111 1 
18 1 11 11 1 1 
HU1 £ 
I PG $ it $$ 11 
G 15 1* $$ 1 1 
H 18 £$ 
TOTALII* 1 111 111 111 111 111 11 11 1 111 1 111 
111 111 111 £$$ £$ 
11$ £ 111 
$$ 1 
Adv Ant Ch Com Cri Drs Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
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Table 29 (continued). 
1988: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U1 
L 12 
0 PG 1111 
W 15 1 111 11 
18 11 111 
U 
H 12 
E PG 11 1 
D 15 1 11 1 11 
18 1 
U$ 
H 12 
I PG $ 
G 15 * £$ it £$$ 
H 18 1$1 
TOTAL1* $1 111 111 111 ill 111 $ 11 11 1$ 
$$ £ 111 11 £ 
111 
1989: Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
U1 
L 12 
0 PG 1 111 1 
W 15 11 11 11 11 1 
18 11 
U 11 
M 12 
E PG 1 11 
D 15 1 111 111 11 111 
1 
18 111 
U 
H121 $ 
I PG 1$ $ $$ 1$ 111 1 
G 15 $ $$ 1$ 
H 18 11 1 
TOTAL111 $ 11 111 111 111 111 111 11 11 11 111 
$1 111 111 111 111 1 
1$$ 111 111 $ 
$ $$ 11$ 
Adv Ani Ch Com Cri Dra Fan His Hor Mus Re Ro Sex Sp We War 
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Sources. 
Tables 27 to 30 were compiled from various sources: - 
Gifford D. (1986) 'The British Film Catalogue, 1895 to 1985. ' 
David and Charles. 
'Monthly Film Bulletin. ' Various issues. British Film 
Institute. 
Romer S. (1990) 'British Film Production Data. ' Department of 
Economics, Brunel University/British Film Institute. 
'Screen International. ' Box office data. Various issues. 
'Variety Movie Guide' (1991) Edited by D. Elley. Hamlyn. 
References. 
Hotelling If. (1929) 'Stability in Competition' in 'The Economic 
Journal, ' Volume 39. March 1929, pp. 41 to 57. 
Variety. 'The Big Buck Scorecard' in 'The Variety Annual. ' 
Various editions. 
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5.3 Clustering Analysis 2: Nostalgic and Literary Attributes - 
the Nineteen Eighties. 
It was observed in Section 3.2 that such commentators as 
Walker (1974) have argued that the British film industry is 
placed at a permanent competitive disadvantage because there is 
a lack of a specifically cinematic sensibility within the 
British creative imagination. This has meant that, rather than 
the British film product variant being sufficiently 
differentiated as 'cinema, ' it has typically remained 
more redolent of a culture which is literary and theatrical. 
Park (1990) cites the inadequacy of British filmscripts as 
a fundamentally weakening factor for the British: after the 
demise of the British studio system, he argues, 'producers 
.... have relied on the ideas of novelists and playwrights with 
no deep interest in the cinema.... or worse, they have simply 
transposed plays and novels to the screen, producing work at so 
many removes from the original stimulus to creation that the 
prospect of the finished film having any appeal to a 
contemporary audience was almost non-existent'. 
For Petrie (1991), there has accordingly been an over- 
emphasis in British films on such characteristics as verbal 
primacy, social realism and the comic mode. And where in the 
Hollywood case it is the ideology of the American Dream which 
has informed the classic American genres, the British 
counterpart, in the absence of an equivalent cultural myth, has 
been a tendancy to resort to nostalgia. 
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Hence, for these critics, the typical British film, 
irrespective of budget size, genre or censorship certificate, 
has been disadvantaged by two further attributes: it has been 
set in the recent past, and based on a pre-existing work in the 
form of a novel or a play, rather than on an idea originated 
specifically for the cinema. 
What does clustering of product characteristics reveal in 
relation to this point? Has the British film clustered largely 
in the area of nostalgic literary adaptation? And have the box 
office hits clustered largely elsewhere? 
In the following tables, films are categorised in terms of 
whether they are Set in the Recent Past, by which is meant 
the last one hundred years. This is an attempt to embody the 
alleged propensity of British film makers to over-indulge in 
nostalgia. 
It is an imperfect indicator of nostalgia. For example 
while most films looking back at the nineteen sixties 
('Buster, ' released in 1988, or 'Scandal, ' 1989) are captured, 
a few are not: 'The Return of the Secaucus Seven, ' 1980, and 
'The Big Chill, ' 1983, are epics of sixties nostalgia but are 
set in the present. 
And what of the eighteen sixties? For instance, 'The French 
Lieutenant's Woman' (1981) is partly set in 1867, just out of 
reach when one casts a one hundred year net, but arguably a 
film with a strongly nostalgic aspect. 
Similarly, this arbitrary cut-off point eliminates films 
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set in the American Civil War and Westerns when they are set 
before the eighteen eighties (or where the date is not 
apparent). Again the view could be advanced that any American 
tendancy to nostalgia could include the Civil War and the West. 
Films are also located in this space in accordance with 
the categories on the left hand side of the tables. These cover 
the basic sources of the films, ie. Were they Projects 
Originated for the Cinema, or were they based on one of a 
variety Pre-Existing Works? 
Whether those works are Literary might be seen as simply 
a question of whether the film is based on a play or a novel - 
any novel. However, this would probably not be an adequate 
definition; after all, one would not say that the origins of a 
film like, say, 'The Dogs of War' were Literary. But the 
film IS based on the Frederick Forsyth novel. 
So 'The Dogs of War' is recorded against Novel while, to 
take further examples, movies of 'Great Expectations, ' 'Tess of 
the d'Urbervilles' or 'A Passage to India' are unquestionably 
Literary. 
In general, any film based on a novel, short story or play 
which could be considered part of the 'canon' of literature is 
recorded in the Literary spaces, rather than as a plain Novel, 
Short Story or Play. A film of a play by Shakespeare, Shaw, 
Miller or Pinter is categorised as Literary; Lloyd Webber or 
Ray Cooney as Play. 
Thus, in many cases, a subjective judgement has necessarily 
-346- 
been made: where Fleming's novels are not Literary, Greene's 
almost certainly are. But what about le Carre? Or Kingsley 
Amis? (In the event, le Carre is Literary; Amis not. ) 
A further concern with the Literary categorisation is that, 
there is occasionally a film which is steeped in literary 
attributes but is in fact a Project Originated for the 
Cinema. For example, 'Privileged' (1982) which concerns an OUDS 
production of 'The Duchess of Malfi'. 
This Literary-Nostalgic analysis of British and American 
films exhibited in Britain - Table 30 on pages 348 to 352 - has 
been compiled from a range of sources: Gifford (1986), 
Hallivell (1991), Variety (1991), 'The Monthly Film Bulletin' 
(various) and Milne (1989). 
Tables 31 and 32 on pages 354 and 358 give a summary of 
trends emerging from this analysis. 
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Table 30. 
Literary and Nostalgic Attributes of American and British 
Films Released For Exhibition in Britain, 1980 to 1989. 
A- an American film released for theatrical exhibition 
in Britain; Baa British film. 
$- US film in UK Top Ten. £- UK film in UK Top Ten. 
*- other nationality film in UK Top Ten. 
1980 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBAAAAAI 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$$ 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
TV sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
TV sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short storyi 
novel 
Play 
literary 
M 
BB 
BA$ 
BBA 
AAA 
AAA 
BBBBBBBAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AA$$ 
BA 
BBAAA 
BAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
B 
BBBAAAAAAA$ 
AA 
BBAAAAAAAAAA 
AAA 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, kA 
AAAAAAAAA$$$ 
BBB££AAAAAA 
AA 
LA 
AA 
BBAA$ 
BBBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAA 
BAAAAAAAA 
BAA -348- 
BBAAAAAAAAAAA$ 
A 
£AAAAA 
A 
BAAAAAAA 
A 
BBBB£ 
Table 30 (continued). 
1982. 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
TV sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
1983 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
TV sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
Play 
literary 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO YES 
BBBBBBBBBBBB£AAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AS 
B£AAAAAAAAAAA* 
BBAAAA$$ A 
A 
AA 
AA 
BBBLAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
A$$$ 
BBAAAAAAAAA 
BAAA 
BA 
BAA 
BAA$ 
BA 
BBBBBBBBBAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
$$$ 
BU£AAAAA$$$ 
BBBB£AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AA 
BA 
B 
BBBBAAAAAAAAAAAA 
BBAAA 
BBBA 
AA 
BBBBAAAAAA 
BAA 
BBA 
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Table 30 (continued). 
1984 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT sequel 
BASED ON radio 
A PRE- TV sitcom 
EXIST. TV series 
WORK comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
1985 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAA$$ 
BBBBBBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
A 
B£AAAAAAAA$$ 
BA 
B 
BAAA 
BBBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$ 
£AAA 
BBBAA$ 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB 
BBLAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
$AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$$$$ 
B£AAAAAAAA$$ 
BBBBBBAAAAAAAAAA$ 
AAAA 
BA 
$ 
BAAA 
A 
BB£AAAAAAA 
BBA 
BBAA 
BBBBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAA 
A 
AAA 
BBAAAA 
BBBAAA 
B£A 
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Table 30 (continued). 
1986 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT sequel 
BASED ON A radio 
PRE- TV sitcom 
EXIST. TV series 
WORK comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
1987 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
TV sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB££ 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
A$$ 
AAAAA$$$$ 
AA 
A 
BA 
AAA 
BB BAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
A 
B BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB£* 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAA$$$ 
BBBBBBAAAAAAAAA$ 
A 
AAAA 
BBBBAAAAAA 
BAA 
B$ 
BBBB 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$ 
B£AAAAAAA$$ 
A 
A 
B 
BBAAAAA 
BBBAAAA 
BBBAAAAA 
BBAAAA 
A 
BBBA 
BA 
BB£AA 
AA 
BBBA 
I 
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Table 30 (continued). 
1988 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT sequel 
BASED ON radio 
A PRE- TV sitcom 
EXIST. TV series 
WORK: comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
1989 
PROJECT BASED ON A 
PRE-EXISTING WORK: 
sequel 
radio 
TV sitcom 
TV series 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
BBBBBBBBBB£AAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$$ 
$$ 
AAAAAAAA* 
A 
B 
AA 
$ 
BBB BBAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
BAAAAAAAAA 
BAA 
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
$AAAAAAAAAAAAAA$$$ 
BBBB££ 
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA$ 
AA 
BAAA 
BAAAAAAAA 
AA 
BBBBBAAAA 
BBBBB 
AAAAAAAAAAA$$ 
BBLAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 
$ 
A 
BAAA 
BBBBBBBBAAAAAAAAAAAA$ 
BBAAAA 
BBBBBAAA 
B$ 
BBBAAAAA 
B 
BBBAAAA 
AA 
BBA 
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Sources: adapted from: Hallivell (1991) 
Gifford (1986) 
Monthly Film Bulletin (various) 
Screen International (various) 
Variety (1991) 
In considering the clustering shown throughout table 30, it 
is also useful to refer to table 31 on page 354 which gives a 
summary in the form of a percentage breakdown of product origin 
during the decade for the British and American industries 
respectively. 
Table 31. 
Summary: Proportion of Total British and American Output 
Originated For the Cinema or Based on Pre-Existing Works. 
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Table 31. 
PROJECTS PROJECTS BASED ON PRE-EXISTING WORKS: 
ORIGINATED TV TV Comic NonFic 
FOR THE CINEMA Sequel Rad io Sit com Series Strip Book 
UK US UK US UK US UK US UK US UK US UK US 
1980 44% 60% 3% 1% 3% 0% 5% 0% 3% 1% 5% 1% 8% 8% 
1981 46 61 14 5 0 0 0 0 01 31 3 5 
1982 54 55 7 6 0 0 0 0 01 00 4 4 
1983 39 69 11 8 0 0 0 0 31 30 0 2 
1984 55 65 5 8 0 0 0 0 00 21 5 2 
1985 64 73 5 8 0 0 0 0 00 00 0 2 
1986 73 58 0 8 0 0 0 0 02 01 3 14 
1987 51 72 4 7 0 0 0 0 02 01 9 1 
1988 53 61 0 5 0 0 0 0 02 30 3 3 
1989 44 63 7 13 0 0 0 0 00 20 6 4 
PROJECTS BASED ON PRE-EXISTING WORKS continued: 
ShortStory Novel Play Literary 
UK US UK US UK US UK US 
1980 0 4 23 20 3 3 5 3 
1981 5 3 11 18 3 6 16 1 
1982 4 2 18 20 11 10 4 1 
1983 0 0 22 15 8 4 14 2 
1984 2 3 14 16 7 3 11 3 
1985 0 0 18 11 7 5 7 1 
1986 0 2 19 18 3 7 3 2 
1987 6 5 13 5 6 5 11 4 
1988 0 1 19 16 3 7 19 4 
1989 4 2 20 11 4 4 13 3 
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Has the British film clustered largely in the areas of the 
Literary and Nostalgic adaptation as is argued by critics of 
the industry's product poicy? And, if so, has such clustering 
inhibited the commercial success of the industry? 
Taking the most purely cinematic locations in Table 30 
(pages 348-52), that is the top left hand corners in which 
Projects Originated For the Cinema and Not Set in the Recent 
Past are located, there are large clusters of both British and 
American films there. Like the Americans, the British have had 
a policy of locating heavily in this sector. 
Some British Projects Originated For the Cinema ARE Set in 
the Recent Past, but this would not be a disproportionate bias 
in British strategy when the extent of American clustering in 
this region - the top right hand corner of the tables - is 
observed. Hollywood is rarely criticised for a lack of 
commercial perception in product policy, but, as the clusters 
indicate, it was a consistent feature of product location in 
the nineteen eighties for some original American cinematic 
material to be Set in the Recent Past 
The balance between setting original material in the Recent 
Past or not varies from year to year. However, the British 
typically have Set in the Recent Past about 20% of their 
Projects Originated for the Cinema, and the Americans about 
18%. So one cannot conclude that, during the nineteen 
eighties, the British have had a distinct bias towards 
'nostalgia' in their original screenplays. 
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Where film products are Based on a Pre-Existing Work, the 
data indicates the degree of importance of those areas which 
come closest to the pure Literary adaptation (as defined on 
page 346). Clustering is observed for the Play and, 
particularly, the Novel. But these are not areas in which the 
British are over-represented when compared with Hollywood's 
location. The summary table (31 above) indicates no consistent 
disparity of proportion between British and American 
utilisation of Novel and Play sources. 
Over the whole decade, the British balance between the 
Recent Past and otherwise in respect of Novel utilisation is 
roughly similar to that of Hollywood, although the balance is 
titled in the direction of the Recent Past in 1983,1984 and 
1986. 
However, critics of British product location, who argue 
that the British cinema has been uncompetitive due to its 
propensity to emphasise Literary-Nostalgic attributes, would, 
with respect to Table 30, point to the Literary area itself. 
In the Literary section of the product landscape (the last 
row of each year's table), absolute numbers of British Projects 
Based on Pre-Existing Literary sources equal or exceed those of 
Hollywood in eight of the ten years. The summary table 
indicates the relative position. 
Moreover, the evidence indicates that the allocation of 
British Literary product between Set in the Recent Past or not 
tends to favour the Recent Past - the indicator of a Nostalgic 
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product character. This is particularly so in the second half 
of the decade. 
But if this evidence does suggest a tendancy in the 
direction of British Literary clustering in the Recent Past, it 
does not confirm the argument that such product policy has been 
a cause of the decline of the industry: the tables show two 
British box office hits during the decade among the Literary- 
Nostalgic clusters. 
Thus the evidence would suggest that, despite the extreme 
difficulty for the British in competing in their own market, a 
certain amount of fishing in Literary-Nostalgic waters in the 
nineteen eighties led to two catches. 
Table 32 on page 358 shows, for each part of the Literary- 
Nostalgic landscape, a 'strike rate, ' ie. the number of box 
office hits (in the annual British top ten) per film made in 
each category. 
Such a strike rate for the Literary-Nostalgic category 
for the British film industry in this period (0.0869) is more 
than twice as high as the rate for the supposedly more 
cinematic category, non-nostalgic Projects Originated For the 
Cinema (0.0361). Horeover, the US industry also has higher 
success rates in the Literary category than the Projects 
Originated For the Cinema. 
However, while one might conclude that calls to abandon the 
Literary area would not be sound strategic advice, it is 
important to observe that (continued on page 359) 
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Table 32. 
Literary-Nostalgic Characteristics of British and American 
Films Released For Exhibition in Britain During the Nineteen 
Eighties, and the Rate of Box Office Success Per Film Made. 
PROJECTS 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
SEQUELS 
NON-FICTION 
BOOKS 
SHORT STORY 
NOVELS 
PLAYS 
LITERARY 
STRIKE RATi 
NOT SET IN 
THE RECENT 
PAST 
UK US 
. 0361 . 0384 1 
. 4762 . 1954 
00 
0 . 0869 
. 0213 . 0513 
. 0769 0 
0 . 05 
OVERALL 
STRIKE RATE 
UK US 
. 4545 
. 0625 
0 
. 0422 
. 0476 
. 0488 
.2 
. 0208 
. 0690 
. 0377 
. 0135 
. 0909 
FOR FILMS: 
SET IN THE 
RECENT PAST 
UK US 
. 0979 . 04 
0 . 25 
. 0769 . 0270 
00 
. 0833 0 
0 . 0476 
. 0869 . 1538 
. 0483 . 0387 
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(continued fron page 357) 
the highest strike rates for both British and American products 
is in Sequels. 
Table 32 indicates that Hollywood achieved a 20% Overall 
success rate for the Sequels, and the British about 45% - as 
close as you can come to a sure thing in the film industry. 
In a Goldmanesque product differentiation environment where 
there will be hits among new projects, but nobody has the 
slightest idea which films they will be, strategy is a matter 
of making large numbers of films in a variety of generic 
categories. 
The largest absolute numbers of successes came, in the 
nineteen eighties, from Projects Originated For the Cinema. 
There were thirty four such American hits in Britain during the 
period. 
However, as is recorded in table 32, adaptations of certain 
kinds of pre-existing work have offered a higher rate of 
success than Projects Originated For the Cinema - adaptations 
of Non-Fiction and Literary works in the British case, and 
Short Stories and Literary works in the American. 
Whatever its source, a success is then typically remade in 
the form of a sequel. As the table shows, the probability of a 
repeat purchase by the consumer is relatively high. 
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5.4 Clustering Analysis 3: Nostalgic and Literary Attributes - 
the Post War Period. 
It was observed above that an important point about product 
strategy during the period under consideration, the nineteen 
eighties, was that films were produced in various categories, 
but principally in the area of Projects Originated For the 
Cinema. And as and where hits resulted, Sequels often followed 
and frequently facilitated further success. 
It can also be observed that on a relative basis - shown by 
the strike rates in the last column of of table 32 British 
films were highly competitive in the British market. 
However, the drawback for the British industry of the 
random-hit-with-instant-sequel model of product strategy is 
that it requires large absolute numbers of films to generate a 
sufficient quantity of activity to enable one to dominate one's 
market. 
But if it is the importance of numbers - the so-called 
critical mass of product - that is to be underlined, the 
problem for the British industry in this period is that the 
numbers (recorded on page 92) had never been lower. 
Kay (1992) has likened this situation in the film industry 
to the notion of a 'dominant standard' emerging in the VCR 
industry. Like the British film, he argues, there is nothing 
inherently inferior about the Sony Betamax video system. 
However, the VHS system (produced by JVC) prevailed over 
Betamax, just as Hollywood won out against its British 
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counterpart and became the dominant film standard, mainly 
because, Kay argues, the VHS product variant was made more 
widely available in larger quantities from an earlier date. 
Table 33 on page 363 summarises British output during the 
eighties and indicates its paucity. It can be seen that, 
despite relatively few British Sequels, there were a number of 
successes in this area. However, the cycle only operates if 
there is simultaneously a large supply of new box office 
material coming through. 
For example, during the decade, 879 Hollywood films based 
on Projects Originated For the Cinema were released for 
exhibition in the UK. Although the success rate was only 0.0387 
in this category (compared with the British figure of 0.0483 - 
table 32, page 358), there were 34 hit films. 
In the British case, as is illustrated by table 33, there 
is a fluctuating clustering of British Projects Originated For 
the Cinema which is almost invariably too small to provide a 
supply of successes each year sufficient to feed the machine. 
Table 33 (page 363). 
The Literary and Nostalgic Attributes of British Films Released 
For Exhibition in Britain in the 1980s, and the Location of the 
Annual Top Ten Films at the British Box Office. 
Numbers indicate British releases: 
each film first exhibited in 1980 is denoted by 0, 
in 1981 by 1,1982 by 2, and so on. 
£, $ and * indicate top ten hits at the British box 
office for British, American and other films 
respectively. 
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1980 - 1989 inc. 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT 
BASED 
ON A 
PRE- 
EXISTING 
WORK 
sequel 
radio 
TV series 
TV sitcom 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
play 
literary 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
000000000000000$$$ 
11111111111111$£$ 
222222222222$£ 
333333333$$$ 
444444444444444444$$ 
555555555555555555555 
55£$$$$ 
666666666666666666££$ 
£7777777777777777777$ 
8888888888£$$$$ 
9999999999999999999$$ 
--------------------- 
$1££22$$ 
3£££$$$ 
£4$$ 
55£$$ 
SSSS 
7£$$ 
99£$ 
0$£13 
00 
0£48 
467 
1$ 
477$9 
000000$$ 
111 
222$$$£ 
333 
444$ 
55555$ 
666 
777 
88888 
99999999$ 
022 
337778999 
000 
1 
333 
444$ 
555 
77 
8 
99999 -363- 
0 
1$ 
£3333 
444444 
5555 
666666$ 
7777$ 
8888££$ 
99999$$ 
$ 
9$ 
0 
00$£247778999 
2 
79 
00 
11 
2 
3333 
44£ 
55 
6666 
77£ 
8 
999 
12$ 
344556 
1111£ 
2 
33 
44 
5£ 
6$ 
777 
88888 
99 
What of the earlier post-war period? 
Tables 34 (a) to (d) review the Literary-Nostalgic 
characteristics of the output of the British film industry 
between 1946 and 1979. As before the the main commercial 
successes are indicated. 
However, due to availability of data the basis is the 
American, rather than the British, box office. The locations 
are indicated for the top 50 films for the nineteen fifties, 
sixties and seventies, and the top 25 in the case of part (a) 
of table 34 (page 365) which deals with the second half of 
the nineteen forties. 
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Table 35 (a) to W. 
THE LITERARY ORIGINS AND THE NOSTALGIA CONTENT OF 
BRITISH FILM RELEASES AND OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL 
NORTH AMERICAN BOX OFFICE. (By Decade. ) 
Table 35 (a). 
The 1940s: 1946 to 1949. 
POST-WAR 
FILMS AT THE 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
------------------ 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
------------------ 
PROJECT sequel 
BASED 
ON A 
PRE- 
EXISTING radio 
WORK 
TV aeries 
TV sitcom 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
novel 
Play 
literary 
------------------ 
--------------------- 
6666666666$$$ 
7777777777777$$ 
8888888888888888£ 
999999999999999999999 
9999999999999$ 
--------------------- 
$ 88 
9 
6 
---------------------- 
666666$$$ 
7777 
88$$ 
999999 
S 
888 
999 
79 
66666$$ 
777777777777777777$$$ 
88888888888888 
99999999999999999 
666666 
7777 
8888888888888888 
999999999999 
66 
77 
888888 
999 
--------------------- 
$ 
666$$ 
777777$ 
8888888 
999 
6 
7$ 
88 
99 
7 
88 
999 
---------------------- 
($ for non-fiction - 1946. ) 
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Table 34 (a) indicates that, between 1946 and 1949, there 
was considerable clustering in the area of Projects Originated 
For the Cinema and Not Set in the Recent Past. And as the 
industry expanded at the end of the period, there was a 
disproportionate rise in clustering in this area rather than a 
tendency to expand by locating more product in the Recent 
Past/Literary categories, 
There was further clustering in the area of Non-Literary 
Novels, but the relative popularity of this fell at the end of 
the forties on both sides of the nostalgia divide. 
Activity in general was considerably biased towards the 
left hand aide of this divide. The Literary clustering was 
small and, on the whole, dwindled. 
-366- 
Table 34 (b). 
The 1950s: 1950 to 1959. 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
0000000000000000000000000 
00 
1111111111111111111111$ 
2222222222222222222222222 
22$$$ 
33333333333333333333333$ 
4444444444444444444444444 
444444444$$ 
555555555555555555$$ 
6666666666666666666666666 
666666$ 
7777777777777777777777777 
777777777 
88888888888888 
99999999999999999999999$ 
0000 
ill 2222 
333 
444$ 
66 
7 
8888888888$ 
99999 
(continued) 
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Table 34 (b) continued. 
PROJECT sequel 00023 
BASED 55$ 
ON A $ 
PRE- 777$ 
EXISTING 8899 
WORK. radio 001123469 
TV series 3455578889 
TV sitcom 8 
comic strip 4 
non- fiction book 025 
7 
9 
short story 24 
55$ 
677 
88 
99 
novel 0000000000000 
11111111111 
2222222222222 
3333333333333333333333333 
4444444444444444444444$$ 
555555555555555555$ 
666666666666666666666$ 
777777777777777777777777$ 
8888888888888888888888888 
88 
9999999999999999$$$ 
play 000000000 
111111111111 
222222222222222222 
33333333333333$ 
44444444444444 
5555555555555555$$$$ 
66666666 
7777777777$ 
8888888888$ 
99999999999 
literary 00000 
111111111 
22222£ 
3333 
444 
5555 
66666$ 
7777 
8888$ 
999999 
368 
01335555 
666$ 
7777 
888888 
4 
00000000 
22 
3333$$ 
4 
555$$$ 
66666$ 
77777$ 
888888888 
99999 
00 
11111 
222 
3 
444 
5$ 
6 
77 
9999 
222$ 
333 
444$ 
5 
7$ 
99 
Considering the nineteen fifties, the category with the 
highest frequency is Projects Originated For the Cinema and Not 
Set in the Recent Past. During the decade, the total number of 
films produced is fairly stable, and the proportion distributed 
into the top left hand corner of the table is around one third. 
The industry shows little tendency to introduce nostalgia 
into its original screenplays - there is only a small cluster 
in the top right hand section of the table. The exception is 
1958 when the balance between the Recent Past and otherwise is 
reversed. 
Projects based on Non-Literary Novels Not Set in the Recent 
Past are also an important variant. The nostalgic side of the 
divide is neglected in comparison. There are several American 
hits there in the middle of the decade, followed by a small 
boom in 1958 in British Novels (and Originals) in the Recent 
Past. 
But one cannot conclude that product location is determined 
by the position of hits in this space. After all, there are 
four Hollywood hits in 1955 resulting from Projects Based on 
Plays, but no subsequent agglomeration of British Play 
adaptations. 
As with the 1940s, the emphasis of the clustering 
throughout table 34(b) is largely on the left hand side of the 
nostalgia divide. Where this might disabuse critics of the 
notion that the British film industry had a tendency to 
nostalgia, the observation that Literary projects were few in 
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number might further counter the standard criticisms. 
The Literary clustering did not grow despite major hits, 
including one British, in this area. And of the six American 
Literary hits, four were in the nostalgic section. 
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Table 34 (c). 
The 19609: 1960 to 1969. 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT sequel 
BASED 
ON A 
PRE- 
EXISTING 
WORK 
radio 
TV series 
TV sitcom 
comic strip 
non-fiction book 
short story 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
0000000000000000000000000 
000 1111111111111111111111111 
111111111$ 
2222222222222222222222222 
222222222 
3333333333333333333333333 
3333333$$ 
4444444444444444444444 
5555555555555555555555555 
5555555 
6666666666666666666666666 
6666666 
7777777777777777777777777 
7777 
88888888888888888888888$ 
9999999999999999999999999 
9999$$$ 
000 
1111111 
2£$ 
33 
4444 
55555$ 
66 
777$$ 
888 
99999$ 
000012223333 
4444£ 
555£ 
666 
777£ 
888889999 
057 
0 
6 
99 
012333455777 
888£ 
9 
8 
0022$ 
3555799 
(continued) 
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Table 34 (c) continued. 
novel 00000000000000000000$ 0000 
1111111111111111111$ 111£ 
222222222222222222 22222 
3333333333333333333333333 3333 
3333333333 
44444444444444444$ 44444$ 
55555555555555 555555 
6666666666666$ 666 
777777777777777777777777£ 777$$ 
$$ 
888888888888888888888$$$ 88888 
99999999999999999$$ 9999 
play 000000000111111111$ 0 
22222222222 22 
33333333$ 3 
44445 45 
66666666 6 
7777$ 
8888$ 8$ 
9999999$$ 99 
literary 0000000 00 
ill 
2222222222 22 
33£ 
4444 4$ 
55555 55$ 
66£$$ 6 
77777$ 77 
8888888££ 
99999 9999 
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The clustering for the nineteen sixties again indicates 
that, rather than any other category, the British competed by 
distributing more product into the ostensibly most cinematic 
area - Projects Originated For the Cinema and Not Set in the 
Recent Past. The clustering in this area was fairly stable and 
slightly greater than in the nineteen fifties. 
As in the fifties, the Non-Literary Novel and Play were the 
regions of next importance. One might well be advised to 
compete there as some hits at the North American box office, 
mainly, although not entirely, American were located there. 
Although British location in the Literary region was again 
relatively restrained, it turned out to be a very profitable 
category offering up a number of successes including three 
British. Thus the British Literary film in this period had 
repeatedly found the Holy Grail of the British film business: 
major box office success in the US. 
It was noted earlier that one of the main aspects of film 
product location in the nineteen eighties was the Sequel - the 
constant re-making of hits. Although the Sequel was not the 
goldmine it became in the eighties, clustering of Sequels is 
seen to build from the fifties and into the sixties when the 
profitability of the strategy is demonstrated from a British 
point of view. There are three British hits among Sequels. 
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Table 34 (d). 
The 1970s: 1970 to 1979. 
IS THE FILM SET IN THE RECENT PAST? 
NO I YES 
PROJECT 
ORIGINATED 
FOR THE 
CINEMA 
PROJECT sequel 
BASED 
ON A 
PRE- 
EXISTING 
WORK 
radio 
TV series 
TV sitcom 
I 
0000000000000000000000000 
00000000000 
1111111111111111111$ 
2222222222222222222222222 
2222222222222 
3333333333333333333333333 
3 
444444444444444444444$ 
5555555555555555555555555 
55555$ 
6666666666666666666666666 
6666$$$$ 
7777777777$$$$ 
8888888888888$$$ 
9999999999999999£$$ 
00000 
ill 
222222 
3333$$ 
44444444$ 
555555555 
666 
777 
88888$$ 
999999999 
00 
11 
22222 
33333 
4444 
555555 
66777 
88888$ 
9£$ 
2 
1 
22222 
4 
7 
8 
111 
22 
333333 
4 
6 
7 
9 
$ 
667 
8 
1 
(continued) 
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Table 34 (d) continued. 
comic strip 2333£ 
non-fiction book 01 001233 
778 
Snort story 000000 111 1 
22 2 
34 
7 $ 
899 
novel 00000000000000000000000$$ 0000000$ 
111111111 1 
222222222222$ 22$ 
333333333333333$ 333 
444444444444444444 4444 
555555555$$$ 55 
666666 666 
7777777$$ 777777 
8888888888 888888 
99999999$ 999999 
play 00000000000 
111 $ 
222222 2 
33333333333 
444 
5555 
666 66 
77777 
8$$ 888$ 
99 9 
literary 00000000 000 
1 11 
2222222 222 
3333 33 
555 5 
66666666 
7777 7 
99 $ 
[£ in comic strip - 79 
$ Short Story - 76) 
Sources: adapted from Halliwell (1991) 
Variety (1991) 
Finler (1988) 
Gifford (1986) 
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Finally, the nineteen seventies can be considered: as 
before, the predominant tendency of British film makers is to 
locate in the sector where Projects are Originated For the 
Cinema and Not Set in the Recent Past. 
There is a reduction after 1976. However, the total numbers 
of British films being produced are falling. It is important to 
note that this decline, the subsequent crises of the nineteen 
eighties and the virtual extinction of the industry in the 
early nineties took place against a post-war background where 
product strategy had not indulged unduly in either Literary 
adaptation or Nostalgia. 
Again in the seventies, there is relatively little location 
on the right hand side of the nostalgia divide. In the 
seventies, it is also apparent that there was little tendancy 
to expand clustering around Sequels. This is perhaps surprising 
given the hits there in the sixties. 
A major trend in the early seventies, emanating from the 
reduced circumstances of the major British producers (as 
discussed in Chapter 3), is shown by the growth of TV Series 
and TV Sitcoms as locations for product. This, rather than the 
Literary-Nostalgic, is a truly uncinematic genre. 
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5.5 The Economics of Product Competition. 
As noted in section 5.1, product differentiation can be 
either vertical (ie. by quality, whereby households can agree 
on rankings of products), or horizontal. 
Horizontal differentiation can be viewed in two ways - 
different combinations of attributes appeal to different 
consumers (A prefers Westerns; B musicals), and consumers 
generally favour the availability of a selection of product 
variants (a wide range of genres and film stars). 
Horizontal differentiation gives rise to the notion of the 
availability for incumbent firms of market niches for a range 
of products without price competition. Moreover, barriers to 
entry can be seen to arise in cases where incumbents offer such 
a proliferation of product variants. 
This analysis arises within the context of spatial 
competition. As was observed on page 294, this is a strand of 
economic analysis concerned with horizontal product competition 
which initially grew out of the work of Hotelling (1929). 
Further major contributions can be attributed to Chamberlin 
(1933), Lerner and Singer (1937) and Lancaster (1966). 
Hotelling's original model established that the equilibrium 
market-share maximising location for two firms in a linear 
market would be to cluster back to back in the centre of the 
market. In developing this model, subsequent analysis has 
increased the number of firms, looked at competition on a 
plane, rather than a line, and relaxed Hotelling's assumptions 
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concerning inelastic consumer demand. 
Bain (1956) identified product differentiation as one of 
three sources of barriers to entry. Entry would be made 
difficult as a result of the high marketing costs imposed on 
the entrant when competing with the consumer brand loyalty, 
design know-how and access to distribution enjoyed by the 
incumbent. 
Dixit (1979) found that barriers to entry need not be 
attributed to product differentiation per se if there is only 
one product variant: the source of the barrier is the economies 
of scale which accrue to the incumbent. But what about cases in 
which there is a range of horizontally differentiated products? 
Economies of scale remain important. 
In general in the context of barriers to entry, it is 
customary to make an assumption concerning post-entry reaction 
of existing producers. Both Bain (op cit) and Sylos-Labini 
(1962) assume that incumbents sustain the pre-entry level of 
output. 
In this tradition, if the incumbent has a proliferation of 
differentiated products, the potential entrant would make an 
assumption that the incumbent will not alter its product range 
after entry has taken place. Lyons (1988) shows that, in such 
an environment, entry will appear unprofitable and will be 
deterred. 
The assumption of no post-entry product differentiation 
reaction is likely to be made on the part of the entrant if 
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there are economies of scale and sunk costs. The latter will 
have been incurred in the form of product development and in 
advertising of a location-specific nature. These sunk costs are 
assumed to have the effect of anchoring the existing firm in 
the existing product locations. 
The incumbent has populated the product differentiation 
landscape with its product variants. The spaces between 
products give the incumbent a consumer population which 
'travels' to product locations. With the presence of economies 
of scale, however, the spaces do not leave enough room for 
competitive entry. 
An early illustration of this scenario is that of 
Schmalensee (1978) whose study of 'Entry Deterrence in the 
Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Market' showed that the existence 
of economies of scale necessitated, in effect, an impossibly 
high minimum efficient size for an entrant - on entry, three 
new product variants would be required. 
For Hay and Morris (1991), the entry deterrence concerns of 
Schmalensee were succeeded in the story of spatial product 
competition by a new chapter written by Shaw (1982) and Swann 
(1985). As was briefly noted in section 5.1, these models deal 
with the question of the clustering of products in 
characteristics space. 
Shaw's study of product competition in the UK fertiliser 
industry shows the location of products in this space to be 
related to the density of demand. The competitive process from 
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1958 to 1978 is analysed in terms of the introduction, 
relocation and proliferation of products. 
Shaw's conclusions show, with Eaton and Lipsey (1975), that 
'clusters of minimally differentiated products will tend to 
develop in the process of competition'. Moreover, rather than 
competitive leapfrogging to relocate products in open sections 
of the product space, firms persist with existing locations. 
Shaw attributes this, in part, to sunk costs. 
Where leapfrogging does take place, this is explained by 
the launching of new variants based on new technology, and not 
as a competitive technique based on reshuffling into new 
combinations the existing attributes of products. 
Swann considers the clustering of product designs in 
competition in the microprocessor industry between 1971 and 
1981 and stresses that mutual agglomeration economies, ie. 
'economies accruing to firms that locate close to each other, ' 
provide an important incentive for clustering. 
External agglomeration economies arise in various ways: 
there are infrastructural and informational externalities at 
existing locations. Imitators of products are not only 
attracted to clusters by the reduced design and development 
costs there, but by the lower level of market uncertainty 
implied, and the total market is increased as a result of 
reduced consumer search costs. 
Hay and Norris (op cit) observe that 'more studies along 
the lines of Shaw and Swann are essential to a proper 
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evaluation of the theoretical models of product 
differentiation'. 
Such a study is facilitated by the preceeding three 
sections of the present chapter. These sections have considered 
the clustering in product characteristics space of British 
films. What conclusions can be drawn in the light of the 
economic theory of product competition? 
The main theoretical concerns are barriers to entry and 
economies of scale, sunk costs, leapfrogging, clustering of 
minimally differentiated products, and external agglomeration 
economies. The operation of these factors can be observed in 
the data. 
(i) Barriers to entry arising from incumbents' product 
proliferation and economies of scale: it could be argued from 
the film characteristics observed that barriers to entry do not 
arise from product proliferation - they lie elsewhere (in 
access to finance and to the distribution/ exhibition sector). 
A new firm producing only a single film project would be 
viable, other things being equal. 
On the other hand, however, it has been established that 
the long term viability of the firm in the film industry 
necessitates, among other things, a production strategy in 
relation to uncertainty whereby there is a diversified slate or 
'critical mass' of film product. 
(ii) Sunk costs: the tendency identified by Shaw (op cit) 
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for sunk costs incurred at a particular product location to 
have the effect of keeping the firm in that location is 
reflected in the trend observed in the data for the growth of 
film sequels. 
In the film industry, successful 'brands' are replicated as 
sequels largely because one has little idea of the location of 
other fertile territory in the product differentiation 
landscape. However, sunk costs serve to reinforce the 
propensity to produce sequels - one wishes fully to exploit the 
brand (James Bond, Superman, Batman and so on) into which one 
has invested unrecoverable expenditure. 
Sunk costs of the development and advertising of a single 
film product are a significant influence on subsequent product 
location: Boorman (1992) records the costs of marketing a film 
for a release across the US: $4 million for trailers, press 
junkets and screenings, plus at least $15 million for 
television advertising. 
(iii) Leapfrogging: it was observed in section 5.2 that 
certain product categories - comedy, crime, drama and fantasy - 
tended to be continuously popular locations, and that the 
practice of breaking out of these clusters and making for the 
open spaces was relatively rare. 
As Swann (ibid) has pointed out in the case of the 
microprocessor industry, the tendency for firms to cluster can 
be explained either as a risk aversion strategy or as a 
reflection of 'the forces at work in the unmodified Hotelling 
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model'. 
In the case of the film industry, the level of risk 
attaching to any single project is almost without parallel. 
Experimentations in characteristics space, leading to isolated 
location, is correspondingly uncommon. 
(iv) Clustering of minimally differentiated products tends to 
develop in the process of spatial product competition: the most 
striking feature of product differentiation in the film 
production industry is the frequency with which cycles of films 
will appear dealing with the same subject matter. 
For instance, 'Airport' (1970) introduced a 'disaster 
movie' cycle which ran through the nineteen seventies 
encompassing, among others, 'The Poseidon Adventure' (1972), 
'Earthquake' (1974), 'The Towering Inferno' (1974) and two 
. 
'Airport' sequels (1975 and 1977). 
When a cycle appears to have run its course, an extension 
can be forthcoming through films which set out to send up the 
genre in question - in the case of the disaster movie cycle for 
example, 'Airplane' (1980) which itself generated 'Airplane 2 
The Sequel, ' (1982). 
For Goldman (1984), 'The movie business is a gold rush 
business! ' A new combination of attributes which is seen to 
facilitate good fortune at the box office will rapidly attract 
large crowds of prospectors to the location. 
The success of 'Lethal Weapon' (1987), for example, 
inaugurated a cycle of 'contrasting cop teams' ('MFB' 1989). 
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The protagonists of 'Lethal Weapon' (and its two sequels) were 
two police detectives, one black and sane, the other white but 
insane. This film was followed in 1988 by 'Saigon' (two cops, 
black/vhite), 'The Presidio' (military/civilian), 'Red Heat' 
(communist/capitalist) and 'Dead Heat' (living/dead). 
In the early nineteen nineties, there was a cycle in 
Hollywood of films made by black directors. This was originated 
by 'House Party' (1990) an independent film which had cost $2/ 
million to make but took $27 million at the North American box 
office. By mid-1991, every studio wanted to make such black 
films (as opposed to the former model of Hollywood films about 
black people but made by whites). 
In 1991, nineteen black films ('New Jack City, ' 'Boyz N the 
Hood, ' etc. ) were made by the major studios. This was more than 
the total of black films for the entire decade of the nineteen 
eighties. 
Such 'clustering of minimally differentiated products' is 
explained by Goldman's view and, more formally, by the notion 
of external economies as discussed under point (v) (below). 
(v) External agglomeration economies: information 
externalities have a role in locating product characteristics 
in the sense that an existing success, in an industry where 
uncertainty is very high, indicates to producers, distributors 
and exhibitors what is at this time commercially, and perhaps 
technically feasible. 
It may be felt that consumer search costs are reduced by 
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clustering of product, and that this will cause an expansion of 
total demand. For example, if films dealing with World War II 
are presently popular with consumers, the latter will enjoy 
zero marginal costs of search, it can be assumed, on the 
release of another production set in World War II, and thus the 
market equilibrium level of consumption will be at a higher 
level than one weighed down by costs. 
Infrastructural agglomeration economies in product 
characteristic location can be of further significance in that 
current film themes, subject matter, production values, 
personnel or matters of exhibition strategy suggest to the firm 
where it needs to locate its product in order to achieve a 
minimum acceptable return on investment. 
That this may, for some critics, have led to a dismal 
derivative and imitative British cinema may be beside the 
point. Of greater relevance perhaps is the notion of 
potentially high product relocation costs should the film fail 
to sell. The film industry is almost never experimental. 
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CHAPTER SIX. 
THE DECLINE OF THE BRITISH FILM INDUSTRY - CONCLUSIONS. 
Although the American film industry has always had a 
dominant position in relation to the British industry, the 
latter has undergone a very real decline in recent years. In 
the post-var period: 
(1) the British film industry has failed to hold its 
relative share in the home market - this has fallen from more 
than 25% to leas than 10% 
(ii) the industry's two Hollywood-type major studios have 
moved from the financing of significant numbers of films to 
total withdrawal from production 
(iii) the annual output of films has fallen by more than 
50% 
In Chapter One, six central factors were identified as 
important aspects of the decline of the British film industry. 
By way of conclusion, each factor is reviewed below. 
1. The British majors. 
2. The Hollywood role in British distribution and production. 
3. British government film policy. 
4. Finance for independent production. 
5. Production cost constraints. 
6. The nature of the product. 
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1. The British 'Majors. ' 
(i) The British majors, ABPC and Rank/GBPC, emerged at an early 
stage as vertically integrated combines following the Hollywood 
model. However, their role in relation to the production sector 
of the British film industry was not sustained after the 
nineteen forties. 
(ii) The British majors and the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
model: at first, the duopolists are vertically integrated and 
they facilitate British production. But this is curtailed 
because of high barriers to entry into the American 
distribution sector. 
(iii) Conduct follows in the form of a product strategy of 
smaller and fewer films, and a squeeze on independent 
production through lack of finance. 
(iv) Furthermore, barriers are erected by the duopolists 
reducing access for British independent production into 
domestic exhibition. The British majors' control of domestic 
exhibition shores up Hollywood at the expense of British 
activity. 
(v) The British and American majors enjoy joint profit 
maximisation across the distribution-exhibition border under 
bilateral monopoly reinforced by anti-competitive practices 
like barring and alignments. 
(vi) Performance: firms are unable to compete in their home 
market; expanding British film entrepreneurs invariably crash; 
the allocation of resources to the British production industry 
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is sub optimal; decline is continuous. 
(v) In the absence of the British majors, the structure of the 
domestic production sector is characterised by numerous 
precarious firms, some producing just one film and others 
growing but failing to enjoy sustained growth. The industry is 
similar to Marshall's forest in which trees grow to a certain 
height but then die. 
(vi) For a viable British film industry today, some form of 
British major studio is required. It must penetrate the US 
distribution sector and act (as the Hollywood majors do for US 
production) as the hub in a wheel of British film making. 
(vii) This British major must have perhaps twenty five films a 
year, sufficient capital to withstand the inevitable 
intermittent expensive disaster, and appropriate organisational 
resources in terms of people and branches in the US. 
(viii) This British major would be established as a public 
corporation by the British government. In addition to a central 
role as a distributor on both sides of the Atlantic, it would 
acquire production and exhibition facilities respectively at 
(say) Shepperton Studios and the MGM cinema circuit. 
(ix) To facilitate the necessary expansion into distribution in 
the US, the new organisation would forge a partnership with a 
Hollywood major whose parent company would be induced into this 
relationship by subsidies and tax holidays concerning its 
other, non-cinema activity in the UK. 
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2. The Hollywood role in British distribution and production. 
(i) Control of distribution has been the key to film industry 
economics generally, and the main preoccupation of Hollywood in 
relation to the British film industry. 
(ii) In film production and distribution, there are very high 
fixed costs of production of the master negative, and 
subsequently low variable costs of producing prints and 
advertising screenings. 
(iii) Hence, films are a very exportable commodity. Sustaining 
the early penetration of the British distribution market was a 
priority for Hollywood. The bilateral monopoly of American and 
British majors over British distribution and exhibition has 
constituted an important constraint on British production over 
many years. 
(iv) In the permanent absence of a Competition Policy in 
respect of the cinema industry, Hollywood dominance of the 
British market has increased further. It is now almost total: 
from 1988 to 1990, American films' share of UK exhibition rose 
from 75% to 86%; the British share fell from about 16% to 12%. 
With UK admissions having recovered to 100 million, UK 
distribution subsidiaries of the Hollywood majors did very well 
in the UK: UIP, for instance, turned over £645m. ('Screen 
International, ' 8/5/92). £510m was accounted for by 
repatriation to the parent corporation in the US (cf. any form 
of UK investment). 
(v) Production: there have been a number of cycles of American 
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production activity in the UK, and many major Hollywood films 
(including six of the top ten all time North American box 
office hits) have been made in British studios. 
(vi) Advantages for the British film industry: such Hollywood 
production is an important source of employment and output; 
without it, and in the absence of significant British 
production, the industry's infrastructure will decline and 
eventually disappear. 
(vii) Disadvantages: the British film industry can operate at 
full capacity and yet produce no British films. And if British 
films ARE financed by Hollywood (as in the nineteen sixties), 
domestic finance recedes and sources are scarce when the 
Americans withdraw. 
(viii) Why do the US majors periodically come to Britain? Push 
factors: high production cost inflation in Hollywood; periodic 
cash richness of the Hollywood majors. Pull factors: the common 
language, relatively low British production costs; a low 
Sterling exchange rate; skilled labour; Eady money; favourable 
taxation arrangements for visitors; fashion. 
3. British government film policy. 
(i) A national film industry gives rise to a wide range of 
positive external benefits. However, the effect of a variety of 
government policies which have been applied to the British film 
industry is that these externalities have not been fully 
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priced. 
(ii) Numerous reports and recommendations concerning the 
British film industry have not been implemented in full: the 
Palache Report of 1944 recommended the setting up of an NFFC- 
type organisation but together with a public sector 
distributor; a Monopolies Commission report in 1966 was 
critical of the British majors' monopoly of the exhibition 
circuits and their restrictive practices in relation to 
distribution - and, nearly twenty years later, a Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission panel found itself writing almost exactly 
the same report. 
(iii) For many years, successive governments' measures to 
sustain market improvement involved the use of three 
instruments: the Screen Quota, the NFFC and the Eady Levy. All 
three support measures had flaws: the Quota was abused; the 
NFFC was underfunded; and Eady rewarded the already successful 
film maker who was often American, not British. 
(iv) It is now clear that, despite the imperfections, these 
small measures of government policy saved the British film 
industry from extinction. The industry declined, but it did not 
disappear. 
(v) In the early nineteen eighties, the Quota, the NFFC and the 
Eady Levy were abolished in order to expose the industry to 
'market forces. ' 
(vi) Market forces has destroyed the British film industry. 
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4. Finance for independent production. 
(i) Numerous British firms in film production have enjoyed 
periods of success, making memorable British films........ 
....... folloved by inevitable collapse. 
Eventually, the 
entrepreneurial model of the film firm is almost invariably 
seen to lack viability in the British context. 
(ii) Ongoing viability for such a film firm would require a 
relationship with a British major studio with control of 
distribution. Without this hub to the wheel of the film 
industry, film firms are spokes which will fall out of the 
wheel. Then the wheel itself collapses. 
(iii) Such a presence in distribution would necessarily be on 
both sides of the Atlantic: the US major studios control over 
90% of distribution inside North America. That this is a very 
large market is the basis of their competitive advantage 
(iv) The British came close to having a working hub and spokes 
model during the Independent Producers era under Rank's aegis 
in the nineteen forties. Insurrmountable barriers to entry to 
US distribution led to its downfall. 
(iv) Ostensibly, a British film firm can manage risk through a 
portfolio approach. However, Goldcrest shows how, without 
control of distribution, a careful risk management strategy of 
portfolio investment is likely to degenerate into a doomed 
struggle for mere survival. A balanced film portfolio gives way 
to open-ended expenditure commitments to a few big budget 
commercial failures. 
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(v) Only occasional British projects get Hollywood major studio 
finance. Otherwise, British production usually means ad hoc 
finance through television, British Screen and/or pre-sales to 
independent distributors in territories. 
(vi) Such deals are increasingly hard to come by. Deal 
structures discriminate against British producers. 
(vii) City of London investment is rare. The film production 
company has limited appeal for venture capitalists. The role of 
banks is normally limited to loans secured against contracted 
pre-sales. 
(viii) The nature and timing of tax allowances can unlock 
finance sources and constitute a crucial factor in terms of 
cash flow. 
S. Production cost constraints. 
(i) British film makers' budgets are frequently low. This 
inhibits their ability to compete with Hollywood. 
(ii) The production values exhibited on the screen are 
impoverished by low budgets (although there are interesting 
cases where necessity has been the mother of invention). Fewer 
stars are employed; there are short shooting timetables which 
thereby curtail time for preparation or experimentation with 
camera angles. 
(iii) Locations have to suffice in place of the more expensive 
controlled environment of a studio. Unlike the situation in 
most American cities, attitudes of British officials are often 
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inimical to effective location work. 
(iv) In British production in the late 
the line expenditure was about 12k% of 
72Z and indirect costs 155. 
(v) Cost constraints meant that above 
from about 21% over a thirty five year 
proportion of the budget available for 
film. 
nineteen eighties, above 
budgets, below the line 
the line costs had fallen 
period, pushing up the 
the actual making of the 
(vi) Direct labour costs as a whole have remained roughly 
constant over this period. The downward trend in above the line 
labour costs (including producers' and directors' fees) has 
been balanced by an increase in expenditure on production unit 
salaries (including overtime payments necessitated by the long 
working days which cost conscious film making requires). 
6. The nature of the product. 
(i) Product competition in the film industry in an environment 
of high risk frequently leads to a clustering of minimally 
differentiated products. 
(ii) Film makers assume that there are agglomeration economies 
in the clustering of product in characteristics space around 
currently popular themes, stars and so on. The film industry is 
rarely experimental. 
(iii) The British film industry has consistently attempted to 
compete with Hollywood in all the major subject areas of the 
cinema, except the Western and the Animated Cartoon. 
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(iv) Where the British have not been able consistently to 
compete is in the scale of the films. Hits tend to be clustered 
in High Budget categories; the British are often constrained to 
locating product in Medium and Low Budget niches 
(v) Nobody knows which films will succeed, but a few will be 
major hits. It is essential that there is a 'critical mass' of 
production. Without this, the British industry cannot compete, 
even in its home market, with Hollywood. 
(vi) Sunk costs are high at each brand location. When the 
'blockbusters' have been located, they can be remade as 
Sequels. 
(vii) The highest relative frequency of success in 
the nineteen eighties was among sequels. The British enjoyed 
ten such hits in the home market during the eighties. Of these, 
six were James Bond films. Two were Superman sequels (in 
reality, American films made in the UK). 
(viii) The two other sequel successes were 'Monty Python' 
films. The Star System as an effective medium of product 
differentiation is important in the contemporary film business: 
some 'Python' related British films ['Time Bandits' (1981), 
'Clockwise' (1986), 'A Fish Called Wanda' (1988) and 'Nuns On 
the Run' (199)), but not all, were money makers on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
(ix) Consistently over the post-war period, the British film 
industry has tended to base films on original screenplays which 
are not set in the recent past. It has done this to a greater 
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extent than it has adapted pre-existing sources or betrayed a 
tendancy for nostalgia by setting films in the recent past. The 
evidence does not support the view that the British have had an 
undue propensity during this period to locate their product 
variant in 'literary' or 'nostalgic' areas of the product 
differentiation landscape. 
(x) Any alleged tendency to a literary-nostalgic product in 
the nineteen eighties and early nineties cannot explain the 
decline of the industry: continuous post-war decline took place 
without this characteristic. 
(xi) A nostalgic orientation is not inappropriate for the 
cinema. Hollywood has enjoyed an intermittent nostalgia boom 
since 'American Graffiti' in 1973. Major commercial successes 
have ensued ('Back to the Future' Parts 1,2 and 3 (1985-90); 
'Peggy Sue Cot Married' (1986); 'Dead Poets' Society' (1989)] 
(xii) A literary-nostalgic orientation is not inappropriate for 
the cinema: the greatest British film, 'The Third Man' (1949), 
was in this genre; and the recent films of E. M. Forster's 'A 
Passage to India' (1984), 'A Room With a View' (1986), and 
'Howards End' (1992) have all been British commercial (and 
artistic) successes. 
It is time for what remains of the British Film Industry to 
make 'The Longest Journey'! 
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Appendix. 
Table 35. 
British Long Films by Genre, 1927 to 1948. (X) 
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 
Adventurel6.7 
Animal 0 
Children 0 
Comedy 6.7 
C'pilationO 
Crime 13.3 
Drama 13.3 
Fantasy 3.3 
History 3.3 
Horror 0 
Musical 0 
Nudist 0 
Religion 0 
Revue 0 
Romance 10.0 
Sport 3.3 
War 30.0 
Western 0 
9.3 4.6 
00 
00 
18.5 4.6 
00 
18.5 39.5 
16.7 27.9 
0 2.3 
3.7 0 
00 
0 2.3 
00 
00 
0 2.3 
18.5 14.0 
1.8 0 
13.0 2.3 
00 
002.5 2.5 
0000 
0000 
29.8 31.3 32.9 40.0 
0000 
25.5 28.4 20.2 10.0 
4.3 10.4 11.4 3.8 
0002.5 
0 1.5 0 1.2 
0001.2 
21.3 9.0 17.7 22.5 
0000 
0000 
2.1 000 
4.3 16.4 14.0 11.2 
4.3 1.5 0 2.5 
8.5 1.5 1.3 2.5 
0000 
3.4 6.7 2.5 10.3 
0000 
0000 
21.8 29.2 27.1 27.1 
0000 
13.8 13.5 16.1 16.8 
9.2 7.9 9.3 5.6 
1.2 3.4 3.4 0 
3.4 5.6 4.2 2.8 
0000 
35.6 23.6 29.7 26.2 
0000 
0000 
0 1.1 2.5 0 
9.2 4.5 2.5 3.7 
1.2 2.2 0.8 1.9 
1.2 2.2 1.7 5.6 
0000 
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 
Adventure 2.3 2.9 
Animal 00 
Children 00 
Comedy 44.3 35.7 
C'pilationO 0 
Crime 20.4 32.9 
Drama 9.1 7.1 
Fantasy 00 
History 2.3 0 
Horror 0 1.4 
Husical 18.2 4.3 
Nudist 00 
Religion 00 
Revue 0 2.9 
Romance 2.8 2.9 
Sex 00 
Sport 0 2.9 
War 1.1 7.1 
Western 00 
0 2.2 
00 
00 
36.6 39.1 
00 
29.3 15.2 
9.8 13.0 
2.4 2.2 
0 6.5 
00 
9.8 6.5 
00 
00 
00 
0 2.2 
00 
00 
12.2 13.0 
00 
00005.4 
00000 
00000 
34.1 31.1 29.4 13.2 13.5 
00000 
9.1 11.1 11.8 15.8 18.9 
2.3 8.9 14.7 18.4 10.8 
2.3 0 8.8 7.9 2.7 
9.1 002.6 2.7 
00000 
6.8 11.1 17.6 15.8 21.3 
00000 
00000 
00000 
0 6.7 11.8 15.8 13.5 
00000 
00000 
36.4 31.1 5.9 10.5 10.8 
00000 
5.9 2.9 
00 
2.0 0 
11.7 14.3 
00 
33.3 40.0 
27.4 17.1 
2.0 5.7 
3.9 5.7 
00 
3.9 2.9 
00 
00 
00 
5.9 5.7 
00 
2.0 2.9 
2.0 2.9 
00 
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Table 35 continued. 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Adventure 3.3 10.7 
Animal 00 
Children 00 
Comedy 29.4 17.3 
C'pilation0 0 
Crime 30.4 36.0 
Drama 8.7 18.7 
Fantasy 4.4 1.3 
History 2.2 1.3 
Horror 00 
Musical 1.1 2.7 
Nudist 00 
Religion 00 
Revue 00 
Romance 16.3 6.7 
Sex 00 
Sport 00 
War 4.4 5.3 
Western 00 
7.8 
0 
0 
32.8 
0 
31.2 
12.5 
4.7 
3.1 
0 
3.1 
0 
1.6 
0 
1.6 
0 
0 
1.6 
0 
6.3 
0 
0 
30.4 
0 
32.9 
15.2 
1.3 
0 
0 
2.5 
0 
1.3 
0 
5.1 
0 
0 
5.1 
0 
4.9 11.8 
00 
00 
24.4 27.1 
00 
39.0 28.2 
7.3 10.6 
4.9 4.7 
2.4 2.4 
00 
4.9 1.2 
00 
00 
00 
1.2 5.9 
00 
3.7 3.5 
7.3 4.7 
00 
4.1 
0 
0 
38.4 
0 
28.8 
9.6 
0 
1.4 
1.4 
4.1 
0 
1.4 
0 
4.1 
0 
0 
6.8 
0 
8.8 
0 
0 
28.8 
0 
32.5 
7.5 
6.2 
1.2 
1.2 
5.0 
0 
0 
0 
1.3 
0 
1.2 
6.2 
0 
10.8 10.1 9.0 
000 
000 
21.5 21.4 33.3 
000 
31.2 19.1 25.6 
12.9 9.0 9.0 
1.1 3.4 1.3 
1.1 2.2 0 
5.4 7.9 5.1 
5.4 4.5 7.7 
001.3 
000 
000 
2.2 5.6 1.3 
000 
000 
8.6 16.8 6.4 
000 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Adventure 3.7 9.0 
Animal 00 
Children 00 
Comedy 33.3 35.9 
C'pilationO 0 
Crime 24.7 24.4 
Drama 13.6 10.3 
Fantasy 2.5 2.6 
History 3.7 0 
Horror 6.2 5.1 
Musical 2.5 1.3 
Nudist 1.2 0 
Religion 00 
Revue 00 
Romance 2.5 3.8 
Sex 00 
Sport 0 1.3 
War 6.2 5.1 
Western 0 1.3 
11.0 
0 
0 
30.8 
0 
17.6 
18.7 
3.3 
2.2 
4.4 
5.5 
0 
0 
0 
1.1 
0 
0 
5.5 
0 
5.5 
0 
0 
26.4 
0 
22.0 
20.9 
6.6 
3.3 
1.1 
8.8 
0 
0 
0 
2.2 
0 
0 
3.3 
0 
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11.1 6.9 
00 
00 
15.9 19.2 
0 1.4 
27.0 24.7 
7.9 11.0 
4.8 6.9 
1.6 4.1 
11.1 8.2 
7.9 9.6 
00 
00 
00 
4.8 2.7 
00 
00 
7.9 5.5 
00 
2.9 
0 
0 
30.9 
0 
23.5 
8.8 
8.8 
2.9 
10.3 
5.9 
0 
1.5 
0 
1.5 
0 
0 
2.9 
0 
8.8 
0 
0 
17.5 
0 
20.0 
13.8 
11.2 
1.2 
11.2 
5.0 
0 
1.2 
0 
5.0 
0 
0 
5.0 
0 
2.7 2.4 0.9 
000 
001.9 
16.2 14.3 15.9 
000 
18.9 17.9 19.6 
21.6 19.0 18.7 
10.8 8.3 3.7 
6.8 4.8 7.5 
5.4 4.8 13.1 
6.8 3.6 2.8 
0 1.2 0 
0 1.2 0 
000 
2.7 8.3 8.4 
000.9 
0 1.2 0.9 
6.8 9.5 5.6 
1.4 00 
Table 35 continued. 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Adventure 3.9 2.2 
Animal 2.0 0 
Children 00 
Comedy 25.5 15.0 
C'pilationO 0 
Crime 17.6 20.4 
Drama 11.8 16.1 
Fantasy 2.0 4.3 
History 2.0 6.4 
Horror 11.8 16.1 
Musical 5.9 4.3 
Nudist 00 
Religion 00 
Revue 00 
Romance 0 1.1 
Sex 9.8 10.8 
Sport 00 
War 2.0 1.1 
Western 5.9 2.2 
2.4 
1.2 
1.2 
24.4 
0 
18.3 
8.5 
6.1 
2.4 
11.0 
8.5 
0 
1.2 
0 
2.4 
9.8 
0 
1.2 
1.2 
1.6 
0 
1.6 
14.8 
0 
19.7 
4.9 
4.9 
1.6 
27.9 
4.9 
0 
0 
0 
1.6 
11.5 
0 
0 
4.9 
6.2 3.4 
0 3.4 
00 
15.6 13.8 
1.6 0 
15.6 12.1 
17.2 13.8 
1.6 3.4 
0 6.9 
9.4 12.1 
14.1 6.9 
00 
00 
00 
1.6 0 
15.6 20.7 
00 
1.6 3.4 
00 
8.9 
2.2 
0 
13.3 
0 
15.6 
13.3 
11.1 
2.2 
0 
4.4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
17.8 
2.2 
8.9 
0 
2.1 
2.1 
0 
10.4 
2.1 
29.2 
2.1 
12.5 
2.1 
12.5 
2.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
14.6 
2.1 
6.2 
0 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Adventure 0 
Animal 0 
Children 0 
Comedy 15.4 
C'pilationO 
Crime 30.8 
Drama 19.2 
Fantasy 7.7 
History 7.7 
Horror 0 
Musical 7.7 
Nudist 0 
Religion 0 
Revue 3.8 
Romance 3.8 
Sex 3.8 
Sport 0 
War 0 
Western 0 
0 
0 
0 22.9 
0 
17.1 
22.9 
8.6 
0 
2.9 
2.9 
0 
0 
2.9 
2.9 
5.7 
2.9 
8.6 
0 
2.4 
0 
0 
23.8 
0 
9.5 
21.4 
14.3 
4.8 
2.4 
2.4 
0 
0 
0 
4.8 
2.4 
7.1 
4.8 
0 
2.2 2.8 
o0 
o0 
15.6 8.3 
00 
20.0 2.8 
24.4 30.6 
11.1 16.7 
6.7 16.7 
6.7 5.6 
0 2.8 
00 
00 
00 
6.7 8.3 
00 
2.2 0 
4.4 5.6 
00 
4.3 
0 
0 
17.4 
0 
13.0 
21.7 
6.5 
6.5 
4.3 
4.3 
0 
0 
2.2 
0 
6.5 
2.2 
10.9 
0 
3.2 5.8 
00 
3.2 5.8 
9.7 13.5 
00 
12.9 17.3 
29.0 21.2 
16.1 11.5 
9.7 7.7 
0 3.8 
6.4 3.8 
00 
00 
00 
6.4 1.9 
0 1.9 
00 
3.2 5.8 
00 
0 5.4 2.9 
2.0 00 
000 
5.9 13.5 2.9 
000 
21.6 13.5 17.6 
9.8 8.1 11 8 
15.7 10.8 20.6 
0 5.4 0 
5.9 5.4 17.6 
7.8 10.8 8.8 
000 
000 
0 5.4 0 
3.9 5.4 5.9 
7.8 8.1 5.9 
2.0 2.7 2.9 
15.7 5.4 2.9 
2.0 00 
pre-1986: adapted from Gifford (1986). 
from 1986: adapted from 'The Monthly Film Bulletin' of 
the British Film Institute. 
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